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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation duly
qualified to do business in Idaho and doing
business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime
Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; and
SHANTARA CARLOCK,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
) Case No. CV OC 0706619

1
) RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS'
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY
) JUDGMENT

VS.
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her
official capacity as Administrative District Judge
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District; LARRY D. REINER, in his official
capacity as Trial Court Administrator for the
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District; and
DIANE B U m L L , in her capacity as Assistant
Trial Court Administrator for the District Court
of the Fourth Judicial District,
Defendants.

RESPONSE
TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION
FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT- 1

ORIGINAL

I.
INTRODUCTION
The Court should deny Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion. The law does not
support what Two Jinn wants to accomplish as a result of this lawsuit. Two Jinn wants to
mandate that every Fourth Judicial District judge allow any bail agent licensed by the
Department of Insurance to act in their court, regardless of conflicts of interest, bad
history of individual performance, or the agent's criminal history. It is Two Jinn's
position that judges have to accept any individual bail agent, as long as those agents were
licensed by the Department of Insurance. Simply stated, Two Jinn asks this Court to strip
administrative judges of all authority to regulate the conduct of bail agents in their courts.
Fortunately for the courts and the public, Two Jinn's position is not supported by the law.
Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion should be denied.

11.
STATEMENT OF OPPOSING FACTS
For the purpose of Defendants' summary judgment motion only, Defendants
conceded all of the facts in the Amended Complaint, except the facts set forth and
discussed in Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Defendants ' 9/5/08 Motion for
Sumnzary Judgment, p. 5. In responding to Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment,
however, Defendants point out that there may appear to be genuine issues of material
fact. The Court cannot resolve genuine issues of material fact on a motion for summary
judgment - it must carry them over for trial. On closer inspection, Plaintiffs have not
presented any admissible evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact? and
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
(1)

Plaintiffs claim that removing James Garske from the list of approved bail

agents "results in a complete inability of Aladdin to conduct its business in the Fourth
Judicial District," citing to Exhibit B attached to James Garske's 9/5/08 Affidavit

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION
FOR

SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
-2

(Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion Jor Summary Judgment, p. 33); however
the attachment does not support Plaintiffs' contention.

The exhibit, which is

inadmissible,' supports the claim that Aladdin did the most statewide business over
Martin Luther King weekend in 2007, followed by 2005,2006, and 2004, in that order. It
does not support the claim that, over the Martin Luther King weekend in 2006, Aladdin's
business came to a screeching halt in the Fourth Judicial District as a result of James
Garske being removed from the approved list.

The evidence simply is not there.

Plaintiffs have not met their initial burden of raising a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to this claim.

(2)

Plaintiffs claim that James Garske did not have an opportunity to contest

his removal from the list prior to being removed in 2006. Memorandum in Support of

Plaint@' Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 34-35.* Defendants disagree because the
facts are otherwise.
In her 8/21/08 Supplemental Affidavit at

3, Diane Burrell attests: "On January

3, 2006, the Trial Court Administrator's office sent a letter to Mr. Garske, informing him
that his name would be removed from the list of approved agents if the Trial Court
Administrator did not receive certain documents from him by January 13, 2006." A copy
of that letter was attached to Ms. Burrell's affidavit as Exhibit 1 . In that Exhibit, Mr.
Garske is referred to the Guidelines, sections 5 and 14.1.B(3) for further information.
Section 14.1.B(3) of the Guidelines specifically instructs agents that if the "affected bail

' Exhibit B attached to James Garske's 9/5/08 affidavit is inadmissible. See Defendants' 9/10/08
hlotion to Strike, arguing that this exhibit lacks foundation and is replete with hearsay.
" Plaintiffs' claim with respect to Mr. Garske has changed significantly from what they alleged in
their First Amended Complaint. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs claimed that the Assistant
TCA removed Mr. Garske and his sub-agents "without prior notice to Aladdin.. .based on the
assistant TCA's mistaken belief that Mr. Garske had failed to submit to a criminal history
check.. ." First Amended Complaint, p. 1 1 at 'f/ 50. Now, in their motion for summary judgment,
Plaintiffs are not alleging a lack of notice; rather, Plaintiffs claim that when Mr. Garske received
the January 3, 2006 violation notice, "Mr. Garske did everything under his power to comply with
the 'violation notice' by submitting his renewal application on January 5, including a receipt that
he had submitted to the criminal history check on January 5." Memorandum in Support of
Plainrzfjs ' Motion for Summary Judgment, p.3 5.
&SPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS'
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agent believes the Trial Court Administrator has committed an error in hislher intended
action to remove the bail agent.. .he or she may, by the deadline stated in the notification
letter, request the Trial Court Administrator to review the reasons for the intended action
and/or may ...file a petition with the Clerk of the Court for a hearing before the
Administrative District Judge for review of the Trial Court Administrator's intended
action."
By the terms of the Guidelines, Mr. Garske had an opportunity to have a hearing;
however, he did not request one. Defendants contend that (1) notice was provided to Mr.
Garske prior to removing him from the list and that (2) Mr. Garske did have an
opportunity for a hearing prior to being removed from the list. Diane Burrell 8/21/08
,4fjduvit and attached exhibiu; Diane Burrell 7/9/08 AfJidavit, and Guidelines, Section
13. The evidence before the Court supports Defendants' contentions.

(3)

Based on Plaintiffs' briefing on the motion for summary judgment, there

appears to be a factual disagreement about how the Guidelines operate and are
implemented with respect to removing bail agents from the list. It may be no more than a
misunderstanding.
Plaintiffs seem to believe that Aladdin can be shut down whenever one of its
agents is removed from the list.

("Section 14.1.B. provides for the removal of a

supervising agent when a subagent fails to rectify a violation concerning the submission
of renewal materials as set forth in 14.I.B(3). The removal of the supervising agent
carries the risk of removing all subagents and, therefore, this provision carries the
potential to shut an entire agency down because one agent is unable to timely complete
renewal." Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 21)
Plaintiffs' belief is not correct.
As explained in Diane Burrell's affidavit, submitted with this response, the only
time that all subagents will be removed from the list for a violation is when the violator is
the supervising agent. Diane Bwrell 9/23/08 Affidavit at fj 5. Thus, the situation posed
RESPONSE
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by Plaintiffs, in which a subagent violates the Guidelines and the entire agency is
removed from the approved list as a result, simply would never happen under the current
Guidelines.
An example before this Court illustrates this point. Tarnrny Day (subagent) was
removed from the list for a violation, and her supervising agent James Garske was also
removed from the list; however, no additional subagents were removed.

This is

consistent with how the Guidelines are applied, as explained in Diane Burrell's 9/23/08
Affidavit.

Plaintiffs' misunderstanding of the Guidelines can be seen in how they

interpreted the situation involving Tarnmy Day.
application

of the

Guidelines

required

the

Plaintiffs wrote that ". . .a strict
removal

of

all

Mr.

Garske's

subagents ...[flortunately, on this occasion, Defendants elected to not apply the
Guidelines' literal language and, instead, removed only Mr. Garske."

Plaintiffs'

illemorandurn in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for
Reconsideration of Prior Summary Judgment Ruling, p. 10. A strict application did not
require removal of all of Mr. Garske's subagents because the supervising agent Mr.
Garske was not the violator. Only when the supervising agent violates the Guidelines
will all subagents be in danger of being removed from the list.
To the degree that Plaintiffs' misinterpretation of the Guidelines constitutes a
factual dispute, Defendants ask that the Court find the facts as explained in Diane
Burrell's 9/23/08 Affidavit and outlined above.

111.
ARGUMENT
A.

The Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to Declaratory Relief
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint seeks declaratory relief.

Defendants have

previously argued that this case does not present a live case-or-controversy because no
Plaintiff has an ongoing or threatened injury and Plaintiffs have already received all the

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS'MOTIONFOR

SUMMARY
JUDGMENT- 5

relief to which they are entitled.

7/10/08 Memorandum in Support of Motion to

Reconsider and Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 5-9. Plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment again claims that they are entitled to relief under Idaho's declaratory judgment
act; however, their argument is misplaced.
Plaintiffs argue that because Idaho's declaratory relief statute provides for any
person aggrieved by an ordinance, contract, statute or franchise, to have their legal rights
adjudicated, Plaintiffs have a right to have a court "adjudicate" the Guidelines. Id.
However, as argued previously, merely being affected by a court action is not enough to
have standing. Indeed, even past injury is not enough to have standing. City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983).

Under Idaho's declaratory judgment

legislation, there must be a real and substantial controversy that allows for specific relief
through a decree of a conclusive character. Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 5 13, 5 16,
681 P.2d 988, 991 (1984). Here, the specific relief sought by the Plaintiffs would have
no effect on remedying the violations they allege: the purported violations have already
been addressed.
The Idaho Supreme Court recently addressed an analogous mootness situation. In
Euclid Avenue Trust v. City of Boise,

P.3d

, 2008 WL 4307445 (Sept. 23,2008

Idaho), a development company challenged an ordinance and sought declaratory relief,
but later complied with the challenged ordinance. Because the development company
had complied with the ordinance, and its houses were permitted to remain standing, the
Supreme Court held that the case was moot. The Court wrote:
Here, Euclid essentially nullified its first set of applicatinns by submitting
a second set of applications, which were eventually approved. Thus, no
final action was either necessary or taken on the first set of applications.
The parties essentially resolved any disputes regarding the applicable
ordinance, based on the submission and approval of the second set of
applications. The first three assignments of error are moot.
Euclid Avenue Trust, 2008 WL 4307445 at * 5,

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS'
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Aladdin cites the case of Frizzell v. SwafSord, 104 Idaho 823, 825-26,663 P.2d
1125, 1127-78 (1983), for the proposition that declaratory relief "can be properly
requested to enjoin unlawful court practices." Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs '
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4.

SwafSord does not stand for this proposition.3

However, even assuming that declaratory relief is a proper vehicle for addressing
unlawful court practices where a court is presented with a Plaintiff suffering ongoing or
prospective harm that could be redressed by the relief sought, Plaintiffs have not
presented the Court with that situation. 7/10/08 Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Reconsider and Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 5-9. Their claims are moot and
declaratory relief is not proper.

B.

The Contracts Between Plaintiffs and the Fourth Judicial District Are
Dispositive and Bar All Relief to Plaintiffs
Defendants have consistently argued that the Fourth Judicial District has a

contract with the individual bail agents who write bonds in that district, and that Plaintiffs
are barred from bringing a declaratory judgment action to challenge the agreed-upon
terms of the contract.
This Court, in its December 17, 2007 Memorandum Decision and Order
articulated this issue as follows: "Does the Bail Agents' acknowledgement, waiver, and
certification in acceptance of the Guidelines form an enforceable contract between the 4th
District Courts and the Bail Agent?"

Order, p. 3. As Defendants have previously

argued, it does.
To date, Plaintiffs have not satisfactorily addressed this question, and, in their
motion for summary judgment, they ignore this dispositive issue completely. Plaintiffs
admonish Defendants that if "Defendants are concerned that those statutes regulating
The appeal in Swafford challenged the constitutionality of a small claims system that required
procurement of an appeal bond pursuant to statute. The statutes ($1-23 11 and $1-2312) were
found to be unconstitutional. Thus, it was not "unlawful court practices," but rather, the
constitutionality of the underlying statutes which framed the declaratory judgment action in
Swafford.

sureties and bail agents are insufficient to provide adequate protection, their remedy is
with the legislature." Memorandum in Support of PlaintiffsJ Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 10. Plaintiffs' argument dodges the very essence of Defendants' position:
Defendants do not need to "remedy" a result that they have validly contracted to obtain.
Defendants have valid, enforceable contracts with the individual bail agents who
write bonds in their district. According to those contracts, the bail agents writing bonds
in the Fourth Judicial District have agreed to abide by the terms of the Guidelines.
Two Jinn pretends that, because the Department of Insurance licenses bail agents
who satisfy certain minimum requirements, the courts must do business with all bail
agents licensed by the Department of Insurance. This is not the state of the law in Idaho.
,4t best, a DO1 license grants an agent the right to apply to write bonds in a particular
district. It does not, however, compel that district to grant the application. When the
Fourth Judicial District grants that application with respect to a particular individual bail
agent, and the bail agent also agrees to be bound by the terms of the Guidelines, a valid
and binding contract is formed. Such contracts resolve any dispute in this action and
summary judgment should be denied to the Plaintiffs on this basis.

C.

To Analyze the Merits of Plaintiffs' Due Process Claims, the Court Must
Know Who Is Alleging a Violation, What Right They Allege Has Been
Violated, and What Process Is Alleged to be Due I Lacking
Plaintiffs allege due process violations arising from two portions of the

Guidelines they find objectionable. (1) Plaintiffs' agreement for background checks as a
prerequisite to being placed on the list: they allege that the requirement to submit to a
criminal history check prior to being placed on the list abridges their "rights to
occupational liberty and to have a license issued by the DO1 and an appointment by a
certified surety considered presumptively sufficient qualification to execute bail bonds."
&lemorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgnzent, p. 17. (2)
Plaintiffs' agreement that they can be removed from the list:

K~~SPONSE
TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTIONFOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
-8

they allege that the

placement and removal provisions are arbitrary and capricious. Memorandum in Support
of Plaintiffs ' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 18.
Plaintiffs' due process analysis is faulty because it fails to address the three
questions this Court must answer: (1) who is alleging the violation, (2) what right they
allege is being violated, and (3) what process is duelallegedly lacking. Here, analysis
reveals that no Plaintiff can establish a due process violation because no plaintiff can
establish the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right.
At the outset, it is difficult to even pin down the answer to the first question, who

is alleging a violation. The answer changes with each new filing. Initially, the three
named Plaintiffs were Rebecca Salinas, James Garske and Two Jinn. Now, the three
named Plaintiffs are Shantara Carlock, James Garske and Two Jinn. However, Plaintiffs
do not limit themselves to alleging violations for the named plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege
violations on behalf of Maria Galindo, John Robles, and others, asking the court to take
judicial notice of the "various documents filed in Fourth Judicial District Cases that are
cited in this and Plaintiffs' previous memorandums."

Memorandum In Support of

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, n. 1.
The confusion regarding who is alleging particular violations is compounded by
allegations such as: "[Rfemoval from the authorized list deprives Plaintiffs' Garske and
Carlock of [the] right to pursue their occupations within the Fourth Judicial District."
Memorandum in Support of Plainfiffs' 'lotion

for Summary Judgment, p. 33. Plaintiff

Garske has alleged that he was improperly removed from the list, but Plaintiff Carlock
has never alleged that she was improperly removed from the list. Nevertheless, they are
thrown together in the briefing, as if they were both alleging a violation resulting from
improper removal. Factually, that is not the case.
Defendants contend that the parties alleging violations are the named Plaintiffs:
Shantara Carlock, James Garske, and Two Jim. Using these Plaintiffs, it is important to
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clearly understand what constitutionally protected right they claim is being violated, and
what process they allege is duellacking.
Shantara Carlock alleges a due process violation resulting from not being placed
on the list in the first place. She claims a protected property interest in pursuing her
occupation in the Fourth Judicial District. Plaintiffs ask this Court to enjoin enforcement
of the portion of the Guidelines that permits the Administrative District Judge to screen
applicants and deny them placement on the list. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiji-'
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 23. Defendants respond that Ms. Carlock does not
have a protected property interest in pursuing her occupation in a particular location, and
that, even if she did have a property interest, due process is satisfied by the opportunity
for a hearing, which Ms. Carlock received. First Amended Complaint, p. 7, at

7

32

(noting that Ms. Carlock requested a hearing on December 12, 2007 and received a
hearing on January 9,2008).
James Garske alleges a due process violation resulting from being removed from
the list. He claims a protected property interest in pursuing his occupation in the Fourth
Judicial District. Plaintiffs argue that bail agents such as Carske are entitled to notice and
an opportunity for a hearing before being deprived of any significant property interest.
firnorandurn in Support of Plainfiffs ' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 33. Defendants
respond that Mr. Garske does not have a protected property interest in pursuing his
occupation in a particular location and that, even if he did have a property interest, he is
not entitled to a hearing before being taken off the list. Even though he is not entitled to a
hearing before being taken off the list, he nevertheless had an opportunit;f for a hearing
before being taken off the list. Due process has been more than satisfied in his case. See
Supplemental Affidavit of Diane Burrell 8/21/08 and attached exhibits.
Summary judgment should be granted to Defendants on Plaintiffs' due process
claims because no Plaintiff can show a deprivation of a constitutionally protected
property right.
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS'
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D.

Plaintiffs Have No Due Process Claim Because They Have No Right to Work
in the Fourth Judicial District
To successfully allege a due process violation, Plaintiffs must claim a deprivation

of a fwndarnental right. "The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the
deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of
liberty and property." Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570
(1972).

Plaintiffs propose three bases for their claimed "rights," none of which are
supported in the law. First, they argue that the Department of Insurance statutes provide
them with a right to do business in a particular judicial district. hfemorandum in Support

of Plaint$s

' Motion for

Summary Judgment, pp. 11-1 2. As discussed below, Plaintiffs'

argument is misplaced, resting as it does on case law governing a surety's right to do
business and not an individual bail agent's right to write bonds in a particular district.
Second, Plaintiffs argue that they have a property interest created by the Guidelines
themselves. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 32.
This argument fails because the Guidelines, as a contract, do not create a property interest
/ due process interest in anything more than what is reflected in the terms of the contract.

Third, Plaintiffs contend that individual bail agents have a protected interest in pursuing
their profession independent of the Department of Insurance statutes and Guidelines.

&fernorandam in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 32. This
argument fails because, while individual bail agents may have a protected interest in their
license through the Department of Insurance, this interest is not the same as their interest
in being on an approved list to write bonds in a particular district. The latter is not a
constitutionally protected interest.

RESPONSETO PLAINTIFFS'
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1.

The Department of Insurance Statutes Do Not Provide Plaintiffs with a
Protected Propertv Right in Forcing, Courts to Do Business with Them: the
Case of American Druanists Does Not Support Plaintiffs' Position

Plaintiffs ask this Court to find that the Department of Insurance is the only entity
that may regulate bail agents and that the Department's regulation gives individual bail
agents a property right to force every judicial district to write bonds with them. For the
fourth time, Plaintiffs cite the case of American Druggists Ins. Co., Inc. v. Rogarf (1 lth
Cir. 1983). Memorandum in Support of Plaint@' hhtion for Summary Judgment, p. 12."
This time, Plaintiffs cite the case for the proposition that bail agents have some sort of
property right based on Idaho's insurance statutes. Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs '
iblotionfor Summary Judgment, p. 12 ("The regulation provided in the insurance statutes
creates a substantive interest in having compliance with that regulation be considered
sufficient in the absence of specific reasons." Id.) American Druggists does not support
this position.
In Americirn Druggists, the 1 lth Circuit reviewed a federal district court's policy
of disqualifying sureties from writing bonds in the district if the surety failed to pay a
forfeited bond. The policy was unwritten. The appellate court remanded the case for the
district court to determine whether the disqualification policy was necessary and, if so,
for the district court to develop procedures to accommodate the basic due process rights
of the sureties.

Here, Plaintiffs ask this Court to review a written contract that

disqualifies bail agents - not sureties - from writing bonds in a particular judicial district.

4

Plaintiffs first cited this case in their 7110107 Memorandum in Support of Opposition to Motion
to Dismiss / Summay Judgment, p. 17, quoting that: "regardless of the licensing status of an
individual agent, it is within a judge's discretion to approve only those bonds he or she feels will
result in the defendant's presence for criminal proceedings." Plaintiffs cited this case again in a
contemporaneous filing, claiming the case rebutted Defendants' mootness argument. 7110107
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike, p. 13. Finally, Plaintiffs relied on this case at
some length in their 7/10/07 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary injunction, p.9,
arguing that the case supported the idea that a court's disqualification policy for sureties on bail
bonds invaded an area reserved to the Secretary of Treasury.
TO PLA~NTIFFS'
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Thus, the cases are completely different factually (unwritten policy vs. written contract;
surety vs. bail agent); however, the differences do not end there.
In American Druggists, the Court found that the Secretary of the Treasury
regulated the field of corporate sureties because Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
46(d) specifically exempted corporate sureties from regulation. Idaho's corresponding
rule of criminal procedure is the not the same as the federal rule of criminal procedure
upon which the court in American Druggists relied. Idaho's rule of criminal procedure
addresses bail bonds being offered by corporate sureties and does not, unlike the federal
rule, leave that regulation to the Legislature. I.C.R. 46(d). This distinction is critical for
the result in American Druggists.
In American Druggists, the Court found that the federal regulation of corporate
sureties - which was the exclusive method for regulating corporate sureties

- created a

narrow constitutionally protected right to present bonds to the court for judicial approval.
("The scope of the surety's protected interest arising from the federal regulatory scheme
is indeed narrow.")

Id. at 1235. No comparable exclusive regulation of corporate

sureties is present in this case. However, even if Idaho's legislative regulation of sureties
were comparable to Congressional regulation of sureties, it would not matter for this
Court's purposes. This Court has not been presented with the question whether state
regulation of corporate sureties gives corporate sureties some sort of constitutionally
protected right. This case has nothing to do with corporate sureties. No corporate surety
is named as a plaintiff or has articulated a grievance with the Guidelines.

American Druggists is readily distinguished from this case. American Druggists
does not support Plaintiffs' position that Department of Insurance regulation creates a
property right for individual agents to write bonds in every single district in Idaho by
doing nothing more than complying with the minimum statutory requirements. Certainly,
Plaintiffs argue the opposite: "[SJureties and bail agents have a substantive interest in
having the license issued by the DO1 and an appointment by a certified surety considered
RESPONSE
TO PLAINTIFFS'MOTIONFOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT - 13

presumptively sufficient qualification to execute bail bonds." Memorandum in Support
of Plaintiffs ' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 9. Plaintiffs overstate their entitlement,

however, mixing the question of sureties' rights (not before this court) with bail agents'

It is important not to be led astray by arguments based on sureties. The question
is whether licensed bail agents, as individuals, have a constitutionally protected right to
write bonds to whatever district judge they choose based on the Department of Insurance
legislation. They do not.

2.

The Guidelines Do Not Create Constitutionally Protected Property or
Liberty Rights

Plaintiffs point out that this Court has previously found that the Guidelines are
sufficiently similar to a licensing procedure such that they create a protected property
interest. Memorandum in Support oj'PlaintiffsJ Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 32. In
so holding, this Court did not specify whether all licensed bail agents have a protected
property interest in being on the list, or whether this property interest accrues only to
those agents who have once been placed on the list.

In their motion for summary

judgment, Plaintiffs assume the property interest accrues to all agents, regardless of
5

For example, Plaintiffs argue:
Surety companies meeting DO1 requirements are authorized to become the sole
surety on bail bonds. I.C. $ 41-2604. All courts and judges 'shall accept and
treat such bond' as 'fully and completely complying' with the requirements of
law. 1.C. 5 41-2604.

Memorandum in Support of Plaintlfs ' Motion for Summav Judgment, p. 11.
The full text of the cited statute presents a different picture. It recognizes that judges and
courts have the authority to promulgate rules or regulations that would affect whether a bond,
undertaking, obligation, recognizance or guaranty may be executed.
This judicial control over the rights of sureties in the bail bond context is echoed in
lCMR 13(c)(3): "a fidelity surety, guaranty, title or trust company authorized to do business in
the state of Idaho and authorized to become and be accepted as sole surety on undertakings and
bonds may execute the written undertakings provided for in these rules, which may be accepted
by the person receiving the bond without prior approval by a judge unless otherwise ordered by
the administrative iudge of the iudicial district." ICMR 13(c)(3)(emphasis added).
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whether they have ever been on the list. In other words, Plaintiffs assume that by
creating Guidelines, Defendants vested every licensed bail agent with a constitutionally
protected property right to do business with the Fourth Judicial District. Even bail agents
v~hohave never set foot in the Fourth Judicial District have a constitutionally protected
property right to do business there, according to Plaintiffs' line of argument.
Defendants ask this Court to reconsider its position that the Guidelines create a
constitutionally protected property right in light of the cases being presented for the first
time in this memorandum. Defendants maintain that the Guidelines do not create a
constitutionally protected property right for any bail agent to be placed on, or remain on,
the list of approved agents.
For the purpose of a due process analysis, courts differentiate between conduct
that prevents an individual from offering the services of hisher chosen profession
everywhere and conduct that prevents an individual from offering the services of hidher
chosen profession in a particular location. To survive summary judgment on a due
process violation, a plaintiff alleging a violation of their substantive right to offer the
services of their chosen profession must show that they have been precluded from
pursuing their profession with all employers. Boyett v. Troy State Univ. a t Montgomery,
971 F.Supp. 1403, 1414 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (granting summary judgment on substantive
due process claim because "no evidence has been presented that the Plaintiff has been
precluded from pursuing his profession with all employers"); Pirolo v. City o j
Clearwater, 7 1 1 F.2d 1006, 101 1 (1 lth Cir. 1983) (Deprivation of the right to follow a
chosen profession cannot be established unless the plaintiff has been banned from
engaging in his profession with any employer); Moates v. Strength, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1305
(M.D. Ala. 1999) (Individual did not have a fundamental right to work as a private
detective in Chilton County, Alabama, or a protected liberty or property interest in the
issuance of a business license).

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS'
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The case of McInlosh v. LuBundy, 161 S.W.3d 413 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005), is
analogous to this case. In that case, a licensed clinical social worker sought judicial
review of a Department of Corrections decision denying him a place on the list of
approved sex offender therapists, despite the fact that the social worker had met all the
criteria for the DOC'S requirements. The court framed the issue as: ". . .[U]nder the facts
plead in his petition, does McIntosh have a legal right to be placed on the approved
providers list?" 161 S.W.3d at 416. The court answered that question in the negative
after reviewing similar cases from other jurisdictions. The court reasoned:
In order to prevail McIntosh must show that the agency action of
refusing to place him upon the list of approved providers treads upon a
legally protected right or privilege. The DOC'S refusal to place McIntosh
on the Approved Providers List does not deny him to his right to work as a
sex therapist in any general or particular sense, and he does not allege that
he has been denied a license to practice in the field. McIntosh points to no
rule, statute, or other authority creating a legal right or entitlement that he
be placed on the list of approved providers. McIntosh points to no
provision in state law or anywhere else that creates a property interest or
privilege in placement on the approved list. In accordance with the above
authorities, we find that McIntosh's petition failed to state a legal claim
for relief because he had no legal right or privilege to be included on the
list of approved sex therapists.
161 S .W .3d 4 13 at 4 17. In reaching this conclusion, the Missouri court cited cases from
Michigan, Georgia, and New York.
In the Michigan case, an appellate court rejected a bio tech company's argument
that, having qualified under the statute for placement on a list of approved underground
storage tank contractors, the company had a vested right to inclusion on the list that could
not be revoked without due process of law. Ba'o Tech, Inc. v. Department of ,Vafural
Resources, 235 Mich. App. 77, 596 N.W.2d 633 (1999). The Michigan appellate court
held that the statutoy language created no vested right and the company had no legally
protected right to placement on the list.
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In the Georgia case, an appellate court found that a contractor had no protected
property interest in remaining on a pre-approved contractor list used for receiving bids on
,
Ga. App. 517, 515
public works contracts. Ruby-Collins, Inc. v. Cobb C o u n ~ 237
S.E.2d 187 (1 999).
In the New York case, the court granted summary judgment against a vendor who
claimed that inclusion on an approved vendor list for the city constituted a protected
property right. Russell Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Ciiy of New York, No. 94 CIV. 8642
(JFK), 1997 WL 80601 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The court looked to the rules governing the
approved vendor list and found that no provision created a property interest, such as a
requirement to show just cause in order to keep an otherwise qualified vendor off the list.
Id at *8. See also Morley S Auto Body, Inc. v. Hunter, 70 F.3d 1209 (1 lthCir. 1995) (no
constitutionally protected property interest in remaining on county sheriffs wrecker
rotation call list.)
The Fourth Judicial District Guidelines do not contain a requirement to show just
cause to keep an otherwise qualified bail agent off the list. It is ultimately up to the
Administrative District Judge whether an applicant will be approved or not.
Affidavit of Judge Williamson, at

1 4.

9/5/08

("In all cases, whether the bail agent is initially

denied a place on the approved list, or removed from the approved list and requesting
reinstatement, it is the Administrative District Judge that has the final authority to
determine if a bail agent is on the list.")

Nothing in the Guidelines creates a

constitutionally protected property interest in writing bonds in the Fourth Judicial
District, Such a property interest does not exist.

3.

Plaintiffs Do Not Have an Independent Property Right to Compel the
Fourth Judicial District to Do Business with Them

Plaintiffs argue that, apart from any interest arising from the Department of
Insurance statutes and the Guidelines, individual bail agents have an independent
constitutionally protected property interest in pursuing their profession in the Fourth
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Judicial District based on the fact that they pursue a useful and recognized profession.6
iblemorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 12; 32.
Defendants respond that, even if bail agents are pursuing a useful and recognized
profession, which Defendants do not concede, pursuing a useful and recognized
profession does not give Plaintiffs a constitutionally independent property right to pursue
their profession in the Fourth Judicial District.
Plaintiffs cite Berry v. Summers, 76 Idaho 446,451,283 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1955),
a case dealing with dental mechanics with three to four years of apprenticeship training,
for the proposition that the right to follow a recognized and useful occupation is a right
protected by the constitution.

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for

Summary Judgment, p. 12. However, the case cited by Plaintiffs has been effectively
ovemled, as recognized the Idaho Supreme Court:
We deem it clear that the United States Supreme Court has departed from
any consideration of the substantive aspects of due process as they were formerly
applied in the early part of the century. Idaho has seen a like departure fiom the
substantive utilization of the due process provisions of our constitution. A
possible exception is contained in Berry v. Summers, 76 Idaho 446, 283 P.2d
1093 (1955) and Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 369 P.2d 10 10 (1 96 11, in which
the Court continues to hold that the due process clause of our state constitution,
Art. 1, tj 13, protects the right to pursue a useful occupation. Nevertheless, we
deem the differences between the standard applied under Idaho's due process
clause and the standard applied under the federal due process clause to be
negligible.
Jones v. Stute Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 865,555 P.2d 399,405 (1976).

his argument is undermined somewhat by the Plaintiffs' repeated claims in the
briefing that they do nothing useful for the courts or the public. First, Plaintiffs expiained
that bail agents are not useful to the court: "Bail agents provide no service to the Court,
particularly in their capacities as individuals." Plaintiffs ' Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants ' Motion to Dismiss, or, Alternatively, for Reconsideration of Prior Summary
Judgment Ruling, p. 13. Next, Plaintiffs explained that bail agents are not useful to the
person purchasing insurance: "Neither the bail agent nor the surety agree to assist the
defendant in attending court at the proper time." Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs '
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 16.
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The current state of the law with respect to an individual's "right" to pursue an
occupation is discussed in section 2, above. Plaintiffs do not have a protected right to
pursue their chosen profession in a particular location. A protected property right is
implicated only when there is a complete prohibition of the right to engage in a
profession, and not when there is a geographic or temporal limitation on the right to
engage in the profession. The U S . Supreme Court recognizes some "generalized due
process right to choose one's field of private employment"; however, the cases
recognizing that right "all deal with a complete prohibition of the right to engage in a
calling, and not [a] sort of brief interruption." Conn. v. Gubbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291-92

(1999).
Plaintiffs do not have an independent protected interest in forcing the Fourth
Judicial District to do business with them. Plaintiffs may have an independent protected
interest in their license with the Department of Insurance, although this question is not
before the Court.

Plaintiffs certainly do not have an independent constitutionally

protected right to do business in a particular location,

E.

Summary Judgment Should Be Granted to Defendants on the Trial Court
Administrator Claims Because the Trial Court Administrator Has Not
Broken Any Laws or Violated Any Rights
1.

The AssistanUTrial Court Administrator Does Not Act as a Party by
Dispensing Advice and Information

Plaintiffs contend that there is "no issue of fact regarding the TCA's role, created
by the Guidelines, as a party in exoneration proceedings." Memorandum in Szipport of

Plaint@s' Motion Jur Sumtnury Judgment, p. 25.

Defendants respectfully disagree.

Defendants disagree that the AssistanUTrial Court Administrator acts as a party and
further disagree that the Guidelines have created any such role.
The Assistant/Trial Court Administrator does not act as a party because s/he
reviews a motion to exonerate, provides information to the judges, and/or provides
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information to the prosecutor on the case.

Indeed, if the AssistantJTrial Court

Administrator were a party, there would be no need for a prosecutor.

Black's Law

Dictionary defines party very specifically:
"Party" is a technical word having a precise meaning in legal
parlance; it refers to those by or whom a legal suit is brought, whether in
law or in equity, the party plaintiff or defendant, whether composed of one
or more individuals and whether natural or legal persons; all others who
may be affected by the suit, indirectly or consequently, are persons
interested but not parties.
BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY
775 (Abridged 6thed. 1983).
According to Black's definition, the AssistantlTrial Court Administrator may be
an interested person, but is not a party.
The Guidelines do not make the AssistantjTrial Court Administrator a party. The
Guidelines permit the TCA to review a motion to exonerate. Guidelines, Section 14(D).
This review does not make the AssistantiTrial Court Administrator a party any more than
a law clerk, secretary, or deputy court clerk becomes a party when slhe reviews motions.
There is nothing magical about the Guidelines in this respect.
Defendants ask this Court to find that the AssistantlTrial Court Administrator
does not act as a party on motions to exonerate.
2.

Plaintiffs Do Not Have a Constitutionally Protected Right to Have Judges
Rule in Their Favor

Plaintiffs object to the Trial Court Administrator or the Assistant Trial Court
Administrator writing on motions to exonerate or participating in proceedings on motions
to exonerate, Plaintiffs argue that permitting the TCA to act as a party on these motions
is unlawful as a matter of law, and that the TCA interferes with Aladdin's contractual
rights. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 25-26.
In support of their argument, Plaintiffs provide numerous examples of instances in which
the TCA's assistance to judges in the form of providing information or caselaw has
"interfered w i t h Aladdin obtaining a favorable ruling. Id. pp. 26-3 1.
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Aladdin's argument that the TCA interferes with its contractual rights is based
upon the contract Aladdin has with its surety. Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 27. Under this contract, Aladdin is tasked with
protecting the surety's financial interests, which includes litigating bond forfeitures
because forfeitures cost the surety money. Id. According to Aladdin's argument, if the
TCA provides a judge with information upon which the judge relies in denying Aladdin's
motion for exoneration, the TCA has interfered with Aladdin's contractual rights.
Following the logic of this argument, any witness who testifies against Aladdin, any law
clerk who points to caselaw that disfavors Aladdin, or any secretary who uncovers a
clerical error that is fatal to Aladdin's motion, is potentially interfering with Aladdin's
contractual rights.
Aladdin does not have a contractual right to have judges rule in its favor. If the
Trial Court Administrator provides a judge with information upon which the judge relies
in ruling against Aladdin, Aladdin's complaint is with the judge, not the Trial Court
Administrator. If Aladdin believes that a judge ruled incorrectly, or improperly denied
Aladdin the opportunity for a hearing, Aladdin's remedy is to appeal the judge's decision.
Defendants agree that if the Assistant/Trial Court Administrator provided facts
outside the record to judges and the judges relied on those facts with no notice to
Aladdin, and no opportunity for Aladdin to rebut such facts, it would not be fair to
Aladdin. However, that is not the case. See 9/5/08 Affidavit of Larry Reiner, at

7 3-4.

(Trial Court Administrator and Assistant Trial Court Administrator do not engage in "ex
parte" contact regarding the Guidelines and motions to exonerate.)
Plaintiffs have failed to provide this Court with a law that the AssistantiTrial
Court Administrator has allegedly broken, or a right that the Assistant/Trial Court
Administrator has allegedly violated. Summary judgment should be granted to
Defendants on this claim.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
All Plaintiffs lack standing and the case should be dismissed on that basis.
Plaintiffs have received all the relief to which they are entitled, the case is moot, and
should be dismissed on that basis.
Additionally, Plaintiffs have signed contracts with the Fourth Judicial District
which bar their claims and this case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
If this case is not dismissed on one of the above grounds, summary judgment
should be granted to the Defendants because Plaintiffs have failed to provide evidence
that the Fourth Judicial District Guidelines prevent them from writing bonds in every
judicial district in Idaho. They do not have a constitutionally protected right to compel
the Fourth Judicial District to do business with them. Similarly, with respect to the Trial
Court Administrator's actions in assisting judges in reviewing motions to exonerate bond,
Plaintiffs have failed to show that they have a constitutionally protected right to have the
court rule in their favor, free from the "interference" of the Trial Court Administrator's
office. Summary judgment should be granted to the defendants on this claim as well.
Dated this 30th day of September 2008.

Deputy Attorney General
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ALADDIN'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL
BAIL AGENTS HAS ALREADY BEEN REJECTED BY IDAHO'S
SUPREME COURT
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants ignore principles of agency law (Plaintiffs' 9/30/08
Opposition, p. 9) because Defendants have a different view of the individual bail agent's role
than that portrayed in Plaintiffs' briefing. Defendants do not ignore principles of agency law they simply disagree with Plaintiffs about the individual bail agent's role in the court system.
Plaintiffs argue that bail agents are not useful to the courts: "Bail agents provide no
service to the Court, particularly in their capacities as individuals," Plaintiffs ' Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants ' Motion to Dismiss, or, Alternatively, for Reconsideration of Prior
Summary Judgment Ruling, p. 13, whereas Defendants believe that bail agents do provide a
useful service to the courts. See Judge Williamson 8/14/07 affidavit at T/ 14.
Plaintiffs also argue that bail agents are not useful to the person purchasing insurance:
"Neither the bail agent nor the surety agree to assist the defendant in attending court at the proper
time." Memorundum in Support of Plaintiffs ' kiotion for Summary Judgment, p. 16. The
Defendants believe that bail agents are useful to the person purchasing insurance, and that bail
agents do assist the defendant in attending court at the proper time.
Interestingly, Defendants' understanding of the role of individual bail agents differs from
the position taken by Plaintiffs in their briefing, but is consistent with the position taken by
Plaintiffs in their public advertising.'
In opposing Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs rely on the position
they have taken with respect to the role of the individual bail agent; namely, that the bail agent is
1

Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of Aladdin's internet advertising, which is available to the general
public by accessing the website www.aladdinbailbonds.com. This advertising is directly at odds with the position
taken by Aladdin in its briefing in this case. Aladdin's advertising explains that Aladdin views its mission "not only
to help individuals get their friends and loved ones out of jail in the shortest time possible, but to help them through
the process as well by helping to keep track of court appointments and other legal requirements." It also explains
that "Aladdin will also assist the defendant through every step of the process and go to great lengths to guide them
through the legal system to make their bail experience easy to understand and comply with." These statements are
not hearsay because they are an admission of a party opponent. I.R.E. 801(d)(2). Printed copies of the internet
advertisements are attached to this response as Exhibits 1 and 2.
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only

acting

as

an

agent

on

behalf

of

the

surety

and

has

no

individual

responsibility/accountability, apart from their role as the surety's agent. See James Garske
10/1/08 Affidavit at 7 5 ("Bail agents have no involvement in the case once the bond is posted.")
Relying on their carefully crafted definition of the bail agent's role, Plaintiffs argue that it is
improper to hold an individual bail agent accountable for failing to ensure that a forfeited bond is
timely paid, especially in "situations where the bail agent has changed employment or has no
authority to act on the surety's behalf." Plaintiffs ' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants

'

Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 15. See also, Id., p. 12.
The idea that an individual bail agent may escape traditional bail agent responsibilities by
floating from one bail agency to another has been rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. In
Leader v. Reiner, 143 Idaho 635, 151 P.3d 831 (2007), the Supreme Court squarely disagreed
with the notion that individual bail agents may avoid their common law duties by going to work
for a different insurance company. It was in Leader that an individual bail agent first attempted
the "you can't regulate me because I don't do anything useful in your courts" argument. The
argument did not succeed.
In Leader, an individual bail agent asked the Supreme Court to look to his employing bail
agency andor surety as the responsible parties, and not hold him individually responsible for a
failure to pay a forfeited bond. The Supreme Court declined this invitation.
The Court in Leader reviewed a case in which the Assistant Trial Court Administrator
had sent a letter to an individual bail agent telling him that if a forfeited bond was not paid, the
bail agent's name would be removed from the list of approved bail agents. The bail agent argued
that he wasn't responsible for the forfeited bond because he had left employment with Acme Bail
Bonds and it was someone else - the agency or the surety - that was responsible for paying the
forfeited bond or arresting the defendant. The bail agent went so far as to argue that because "he
was no longer an agent of the surety company that was liable on the bail bond . ..[he] therefore
could not have arrested [the criminal defendant]." Leader, 143 Idaho at 639, 151 P.3d at 835.
The Idaho Supreme Court was not persuaded by the argument that suretyship contracts are the
REPLYTO OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONFOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT- 3

sole source of an individual bail agent's legal obligations to the courts. Rather, the Idaho
Supreme Court looked to the law. According to the Idaho Supreme Court, both statutory and
common law vest individual bail agents with the authority to arrest criminal defendants who do
not appear for court. Leader, 143 Idaho at 339, 151 P.3d at 835. In other words, the individual
bail agent was not released from his responsibilities to the criminal defendant and the court,
simply because he had transferred employment to a new bail agency.
Defendants do understand agency law. They simply object to Aladdin pretending that
agency law absolves individual bail agents of personal accountability in the court system. In this
position, the Defendants are aligned with the Idaho Supreme Court.

DATED this

' &tC day of October 2008.

1

STATEOF IDAHO
GENERAL
OFFICEOF THE ATTORNEY

6 ,.

,

MELISSA
MOODY
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this li day of October 2008, I caused to be served a true
TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION
FOR SUMMARY
and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY TO OPPOSIT~ON
JUDGMENT
by the following method to:
Scott McKay
Robyn Fyffe
NEW, BENJAMIN,
MCKAY& BARTLETT
LLP
P.O. Box 2772
303 West Bannock
Boise, ID 83701

U.S. Mail
B a n d Delivery
[Zl Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
C ] Overnight Mail
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753
C ] Statehouse Mail

CHAMBERS COPY:
Honorable James J. Judd
6498 N. Antler Place
Boise, ID 83703

B . s . Mail
Hand Delivery
Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
Overnight Mail
[Z1 Facsimile:
[Zl Statehouse Mail

;

.

MELISSA
MOODY
Deputy Attorney General
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Aladdin Bail Bonds
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Aladdin Bail Bonds - Bail

Help - Bail
After a person 1s arrested the jail or court w11I set a bail amount (the dollar amount vanes based on the
dileqed offense involved dnd other conlrtbutiny factors) I[ is the court's way of making sure that a
defendant appedrs d l thew scheduled court dates once released from j d ~ l
In order for an individual to "post bail," or to secure the release of your friendiloved one from jail. they
must turn over t o the court, the full amount of the assigned bail amount. Whtle the law demands that
the ball be "non-excessive." these amounts can still be quite large and beyond the means of most
people. That's where Aladdin can help. Aladdin will arrange to cover the financial obligation t o the
courts, so the defendal~tcan be released. You will only owe Aladdln a small percentaye of the full
amount (provided the detendant makes all required court appearances), whlch is called the premium.
Aladdln will walk you through the entire process and even assist in helping the client make their
scheduled court dates We will do all of thls In the fastest poss~bletime. so the defendant can return
home to thelr fr~endsand loved ones r ~ g h away.
t
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I NEED BAIL NOW.

1.866.51 2.2245
Tell us about yourself
What is your name?

I
What citv do vou live ~ n ?

Tell us about the defendant

Your relationship to the defendant?
.. -- . -.
..

I.-'

Phat la11or city

! --

IS

the defendant In'

-

How can we contact you?
Phone

We w ~ lattempt
l
to contact you
immediately after recerving t h ~ s

information.

I

NO.

A.M.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)
TWO JINN, INC., dba ALADDIN BAIL)
BONDS and ANYTIME BAIL
1
BONDS; JAMES GARSKE; AND
)
SHANTARA CARLOCK,

case NO.

CV OC 07 06619

ORDER SEALING EXHlBlT

Plaintiffs,

)
VS.
)
)
DlSTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH )
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE )
OF IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON,)
1
in her official capacity as
Administrative District Judge;
1
LARRY D. REINER, in his official
capacity as Trial Court
1
Administrator; and DIANE
BURRELL, in her official capacity as)
Assistant Trial Court Administrator, )
Defendants.

Two Jinn having moved to seal the Exhibit 1 attached to Brian Chess
affidavit filed October 24, 2008 and the State Defendants having consented
to such and the Court finding good cause,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
1.

fl

Exhibit 1 to Brian Chess's October 24, 2008 Affidavit shall not be

ORDER SEALING EXHIBIT

Page 1 of 2

0 0 4 3b

subject to examination, inspection or copying by the public; and
2.

The Clerk of the District Court shall seal Exhibit 1 to Mr. Chess's
October 24, 2008 affidavit by placing Che same in a manila
envelope marked "SealedJJwith a general description of the
document, its filing date and the date it was sealed. The sealed
exhibit shall be attached to the filed affidavit.

DATED this

31

day of October, 2008

CERTIF CATE OF SERVICE

31

I hereby certify that on the
'tay of October, 2008 a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid or, if the Fax service block is checked, sent a copy via
facsimile to:

David Z. Nevin
Scott McKay
Robyn Fyffe
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701-2772

ORDER SEALING EXHIBIT

I

/

Fax Service

345-8274

Steven L. Olsen
t Michael S. Gilmore
j Karl T. Klein
I Melissa moody
Deputy Attorneys General
Ii P.O. Box 83720
I Boise, ldaho 83720-0010

Fax
Service.

6

854-8073
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LAWRENCE WASDEN
ATTORNEYGENERAL
STEVEN
L. OLSEN,ISB #3586
Chief of Civil Litigation
MICHAEL
S. GILMORE,
ISB # 1625
KARLT. KLEIN,ISB # 5 156
MELISSA
MOODY,ISB # 6027
Deputy Anomeys General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-00 10
Telephone: (208) 334-2400
michael. gilmore@~a~;~.idaho.gov
karl.klein@ag.idaho.gov
n~elissa.moody@,aa.idaho.~ov
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TWO J N N , INC., a California corporation duly
qualified to do business in Idaho and doing
business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime
Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; and
SHANTARA CARLOCK,
Plaintiffs,
VS.
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her
official capacity as Administrative District Judge
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District; LARRY D. E I N E R , in his official
capacity as Trial Court Administrator for the
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District; and
DIANE BURRELL, in her capacity as Assistant
Trial Court Administrator for the District Court
of the Fourth Judicial District,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV OC 070661 9

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE
TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL
AFFIDAVIT OF PETER BOTZ
FILED OCTOBER 27,2008

1
)
)

)

1
1

DEFENDANTS'
RESPONSE
TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL
AFFIDAVITOF PETERBOTZ
FILED OCTOBER
27,2008- 1

ORIGINAL

COMENOW, Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, and respond to
the supplemental affidavit of Peter Botz filed October 27, 2008 as follows.
Peter Botz is general counsel for Two Jinn, Inc., located in Carlsbad, California.
9/5/08 Affidavit of Peter Botz, at 7 2. Mr. Botz filed a supplemental affidavit on October
27,2008, after the cross-motions for summary judgment were heard.
Although Defendants would move to strike Mr. Botz's supplemental testimony
under IRE 702 if this case were being tried to a jury, the Defendants do not object to this
Court considering Mr. Botz's supplemental affidavit. Defendants ask that the Court
afford the affidavit the weight to which it is entitled: none.
Mr. Botz's supplemental affidavit does nothing more than re-hash legal arguments
contained in the briefing, claiming that "interference with the ability to obtain
exoneration of forfeitures necessarily interferes with Two Jinn's ability to perform its
obligations to its sureties." 10/27108 Supplemental Affidavit of Peter Botz, at 7 5.
Mr. Botz's information, which is long on legal argument and short on actual facts,
is at best useless to the Court; at worst, it reflects a misunderstanding of the state of the
law. Mr. Botz attests to the general expenses associated with an appeal "when it becomes
necessary to seek appellate review of a motion for exoneration denied as a result of a
recommendation by the TCA's office." Id. at 7 6,
To reiterate an important point: no motions to exonerate are denied as a result of
the TCA's actions. Motions for exoneration are denied as a result of judicial action. It is
the judge who denies the motion to exonerate, not the TCA. As an attorney, Mr. Botz is
aware that it is the judge and not the TCA who denies motions to exonerate. His affidavit
does not state otherwise.

However, Mr. Botz's affidavit, perhaps inadvertently,

mischaracterizes the process where it implies appellate review is necessitated by TCA
action. Appellate review of a judicial decision is only necessitated by judicial action.

Mr. Botz's affidavit does not contain a single specific example of harm or injury,
but only general allegations that appeals are costly. Mr. Botz's affidavit does not allege
DEFENDANTS'
RESPONSETO THE SUPPLEMENTAL
AFFIDAVIT OF PETERBOTZ
FILED OCTOBER 27,2008- 2

specific facts, as required by Rule 56(e), that would support a finding that judges have in any instance - abdicated their judicial role, but only general allegations that motions
to exonerate are denied "as a result of a recommendation by the TCA's office." Id.
Due to the above shortcomings, Mr. Botz's affidavit does not provide further
evidentiary support for Plaintiffs' Complaint. Defendants respectfully request that the
Court afford Peter Botz's supplemental affidavit its proper weight: none.
DATED this 5th day of November 2008.

By

~ 3 J a s
MELISSA
MO%Y
Deputy Attorney General

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO THE
FILED OCTOBER 27,2008- 3

SUPPLEMENTAL
AFFIDAVIT
OF PETERBOTZ

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of November 2008, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Defendants' Response to the Supplemental
Affidavit of Peter Botz filed October 27, 2008 by the following method to:
Scott McKay
Robyn Fyffe
NEVIN,BENJAMIN,
MCKAY& BARTLETT
LLP
P.O. Box 2772
303 West Bannock
Boise, ID 83701

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
Overnight Mail
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753
Statehouse Mail

CHAMBERS COPY:
Honorable James J. Judd
6498 N. Antler Place
Boise, ID 83703

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
Overnight Mail
Facsimile:
[7 Statehouse Mail
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MELISSAMOODY
Deputy Attorney General
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TWO JDW, INC., a California corporation duly
qualified to do business in Idaho and doing
business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime
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DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
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official capacity as Administrative District Judge
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At the October 17, 2008 hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment, the
Court asked the parties whether the record was complete without the agreement between
Two Jinn and its insurance companies.

To provide the Court with information it

requested, the Defendants supplemented the record with a Program Manager Agreement
("Agreement") between National American Insurance Company of California and
Danielson National Insurance Company and Two Jinn, Inc., which was attached as an
exhibit to an affidavit. Brian Chess 10/24/08 Affidavit, Exhibit 1.
Plaintiffs, in response to this supplementation of the evidentiary record, filed a
legal argument in a "Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Supplemental Ajpdavit
and ~ r i e ~ "This
' reply responds to Plaintiffs' Memorandum.

I.
DEFENDANTS DO NOT INTERFERE WITH PLAINTIFFS'
CONTRACTS

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have no right to interfere with or enforce the terms
of the Agreement between Two Jinn and its insurance companies. Memorandum in
Response to defendants' Supplemental AfJidavit and Brie$, pp. 2-4.

Plaintiffs point out

that Danielson has appointed Two Jinn, not individual bail agent employees, to handle its
claims by ensuring forfeitures are timely paid, and that Defendants have "no right to
insist that claims be handled in a different manner."

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in

Response to Defendants ' Supplemental Affidavit and BrieJ; p. 4. Contrary to Plaintiffs'

assertions, Defendants do not interfere with or attempt to enforce the terms of Two Jinn's
Agreement with its insurance companies, nor do Defendants insist that claims be handled
in any particular manner. Plaintiffs' argument misses two important points.

I

Defendants note that while they did file a supplemental affidavit and exhibit, they did not file a brief, a fact which
Plaintiffs themselves point out in their memorandum: "In submitting the Danielson Agreement, Defendants failed to
specify how it supported their request for relief.. ." Plaint@s ' Memorandum in Response to Defendants'
Suppleinental Af$davit and Brief; p.2.
AND BRIEF- 2

ooa41

First, Defendants do not insist that claims are handled in a different manner than
that set forth in the Agreement.
forfeitures are paid.

Defendants simply want to make sure that bond

Defendants have never required - let alone "insisted" - that

individual bail agents pay forfeited bonds. If forfeited bonds are paid, Defendants do not
care how that is accomplished. It is up to Two Jinn ensure that forfeited bonds are paid.

If Two Jinn does not pay forfeited bonds, the Defendants must have some recourse, some
way of collecting money owed pursuant to valid court judgments. Rather than deal with
a faceless corporate entity, Defendants turn, quite expectedly, to the entity's agent; in
Two Jinn's case, the Courts turn to individual bail agents. Judge Williamson's 8/14/08
Affidavit at 7 14.
Second, Plaintiffs' argument misses, or perhaps simply tries to exploit, the gap
between theory and reality. Some examples serve to illustrate this point. Plaintiffs'
argument is similar to insisting that Santa, and not his elves, is tasked with making toys
year round; or that the CEO of the Girl Scouts, and not actual girl scouts, is responsible
for delivering cookies door-to-door; or that the owner of a pharmacy, and not a
pharmacist, is responsible for medication being dispensed on time. In any of these
scenarios, the highest-ranking individual is ultimately responsible; however, the party
who benefits from the goods or services would quite reasonably turn to (I) the elves
(where is my Barbie?); (2) the girl scout who sold the cookies (where are my thin
mints?); or (3) the responsible pharmacist (where is my vicodin?). All of these examples
can be easily distinguished on their facts, of course, but the point is a general one
regarding how the world works, and the expected recourse when goods or services are
not provided. It would be absurd to suggest that requiring pharmacists to be "morally
responsible" for the delivery of medication interferes with the pharmacy owner's contract
with the retail establishment in which the pharmacy is located. So, too, it is absurd to
suggest that the Defendants requiring bail agents to be responsible for delivering payment

AND BRIEF- 3

on forfeited bonds somehow interferes with Two Jinn's contracts with its insurance
companies. There is simply no overlap whatsoever.
11.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE TCA'S PARTICIPATION
INCREASES LITIGATION COSTS
Plaintiffs contend that any participation by the TCA on motions to exonerate bond,
regardless of the judge's ultimate decision, injures Two Jinn's interests. This contention
is unsupported by actual evidence.
Plaintiffs write that by "advocating against Two Jinn's motions, the assistant
TCA's conduct necessarily increases litigation costs regardless of the ultimate outcome."
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Response to Defendants ' Supplemental AfJidavit and Brief,

pp.6-7. Not only is this argument completely unsupported by evidence, the evidence
before the Court actually suggests the opposite conclusion.
The evidence in the record states that "[tlhe Trial Court Administrator's Office
approves, without objection, the vast majority of motions to exonerate that it reviews.
For example, in 2007, the Trial Court Administrator's Office reviewed a total, from all
bail agencies combined, of 3,744 motions to exonerate bond.

The Trial Court

Administrator's Office approved 3,523 of those motions without objection." Brian Chess
October 10, 2008 Affidavit at '13.
Without the TCA's review of the motions to exonerate, it is possible that every
motion filed would be set for hearing before a judge. This would increase litigation costs
exponentially. 1t may be that the TCA's so-called "interference," far from injuring TwoJinn financially, has actually saved Two Jinn thousands of dollars. The evidence before
the court compels this conclusion.

It certainly does not support Two Jinn's

unsubstantiated claim that the TCA's involvement in motions to exonerate increases Two
Jinn's litigation costs.

DEFENDANTS DO NOT DERIVE THEIR AUTHORITY TO
CONTRACT WITH INDIVIDUAL BAIL AGENTS FROM BEING A
THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY TO TWO JINN'S CONTRACT
WITH ITS SURETIES
Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants have failed to specify any contractual
provisions that make bail agents parties to the bail bond contract (Plaintiffs'

Memorandum in Response to Defendants ' Supplemental Affidavit and Brie5 p. 3), or that
make bail agents or the Court third-party beneficiaries to the Agreement (Plaintif/sJ

Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Supplemental Afldavit and BrieJ p. 2).
Defendants do not derive their ability to contract with individual bail agents from

( I ) being parties to any bail bond contract or (2) being named as third-party beneficiaries
to the Agreement. Plaintiffs' argument on this point is a red-herring.

DATEDthis 17th day of November 2008.
STATEOF IDAHO
OFFICEOF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

MELISSAMOODY
Deputy Attorney General
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO I N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
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TWO JINN, INC., dba ALADDIN 1
BAIL BONDSand ANYTIME BAIL )
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BONDS; JAMES GARSKE; and
SHANTARA CARLOCK,
1
) MEMORANDUM OPINION
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1

AND
ORDER

DISTRICT COURT OF THE
1
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO; DARLA S.
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1
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official capacity as Trial Court
Administrator; and DIANE
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as Assistant Trial Court
1
Administrator,
1
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Judgment: Denied. Bail Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment: Granted in Part and Denied I n Part.
David Z Nevin, Scott McKay and Robyn Fyffe, Boise,
Lawyers for Two Jinn, Inc., James Garske, and Shantara Carlock,
Plaintiffs.
Karl T. Klein and Melissa N. Moody, Deputy Attorneys
General, Boise, Lawyers for District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District, Hon. Darla S. Williamson, Administrative District Judge,
Larry D. Reiner, Trial Court Administrator and Diane Burrell,
Assistant Trial Court Administrator.

...........................................

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, Two Jinn, Inc., dba Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail
Bonds, James Garske and Shantara Carlock all hold 'insurance producer
licenses" issued by the State of Idaho Department of Insurance pursuant to
I.C. §fj41-1001 et seq. and are qualified as "bail agents" pursuant to I.C.

41-1037 through 41-1045.

55

Hereinafter the Plaintiffs will individually be

referred to as "Two Jinn," "Garske," and "Carlock" and they will be
colledively be referred to as "Bail Plaintiffs." Two Jinn is a bail agent
engaged in the bail bond agency business in Idaho. Garske is a bail agent
employed by Two Jinn as a supervising bail agent. Carlock is a bail agent
employed by Two Jinn as a bail agent.
As relevant to this action, Bail Plaintiffs' business activities are in the
courts of the Fourth Judicial District and are conducted pursuant to the Bail
Bond Guidelines adopted by the Fourth Judicial District.

Bail Plaintiffs

believe that they have been wrongfully and adversely impacted by the
Fourth Judicial District Bail Bond Guidelines.

Bail Plaintiffs brought this

action for a judicial determination of the constitutionality, scope and
application of the Fourth Judicial District Bail Bond Guidelines.
The named Defendants are the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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District of the State of Idaho; Darla S. Williamson, in her official capacity as
Administrative District Judge; Larry D. Reiner, in his official capacity as Trial
Court Administrator; and Diane Burrell, in her official capacity as Assistant
Trial Court Administrator (hereinafter the defendants shall be collectively
referred to as the 'State Defendants?. The District Court of the Fourth
Judicial District (herein after Fourth Judicial District) is a state judicial
administrative district of the courts located in the counties of Ada, Boise and
Elmore. Judge Darla S. Williamson is the duly acting Administrative District
Judge of the Fourth Judicial District and as such is charged with the overall
administration of the courts in the Fourth Judicial District. Judge Williamson
will herein after be referred to as the "ADJ".

Larry D. Reiner and Diane

Burrell are employed respectively as the Trial Court Administrator and
Assistant Trial Court Administrator of the Fourth Judicial District and
hereinafter be referred to collectively as the 'TCA" and respectively as the
Reiner and Burrell.
The State Defendants have moved for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) or alternatively for reconsideration of the
December 18, 2007 denial of their motion to dismiss and for summary
judgment pursuant I.R.C.P. 56(b). Bail Plaintiffs have moved for summary
judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(b). The issues raised are intertwined and
all motions were argued jointly.

They will be addressed in this single

opinion.
STANDARD FOR SUBJECT MAl7ER JURISDICTION

I n considering an I.R.C.P. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss the Supreme
Court discussed the nature of subject matter jurisdiction in Bach v, Mile4
144 Idaho 142, 145, 158 P.3d 305, 308 (2007) where in it held:
Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases
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over a general type or class of dispute. Boughton v. Price, 70
Idaho 243, 249, 215 P.2d 286, 289 (1950). Article V, 5 20 of
the Idaho Constitution provides that the district court shall
have original jurisdiction to hear all cases, both at law and in
equity. Thus, the district court had the subject matter
jurisdiction to determine the claims presented by the parties.
STANDARD FOR RECONSIDERATION

In considering a motion to reconsider under I.R.C.P. ll(a)(Z)(B) the
court should take into consideration any new facts presented by a party that
are called to its attention. See Coeur dA/ene Min. Co. v. Firs Nat7 Bk, 118
Idaho 812, 823,800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD I N NON-JURY CASE

The standard for summary judgment in a non-jury case was set forth
in Watkins v, Peacock, 145 Idaho 704, 708, 184 P.3d 210, 214 (2008) as
"[Ilf the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" summary
judgment is proper. I.R.C.P. 56(c). The burden is on the
moving party to prove an absence of genuine issues of material
fact. Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d 165,
168 (1997). However, "as the trier of fact, the district court is
entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon
the undisputed evidence properly before it and grant the
summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting
inferences." Davis Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 640, 991 P.2d
362, 365 (1999).

'

STANDARD FOR INJUNCTION

An injunction will be granted only in extreme cases and the party
seeking an injunction has the burden of proof.

See Harris

Cassia

County, 106 Idaho 513, 518, 681 P.2d 988, 993 (1984). "The granting or
refusal of an injunction is a matter resting largely in the trial court's
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discretion."

Conley v. Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 272, 985 P.2d 1127,

1135 (1999).
I.Facts and Procedural History

In dealing with the matter of motions for summary judgment the
Notice of Trial Setting and Scheduling Order filed on March 28, 2008
required:
There shall be served and filed with each motion for summary
judgment a separate concise statement, together with a
reference to the record, of each of the material facts as to which
the moving party contends there are no genuine issues of
dispute. Any party opposing the motion shall with their
response in opposition serve and file a separate concise
statement, together with a reference to the record, setting forth
all material facts as to which it is contended there exist genuine
issues necessary to be litigated. I n determining any motion for
summary judgment, the Court may assume that the facts as
claimed by the moving party are admitted to exist without
controversy, except and to the extent that such facts are
asserted to be actually in good faith controverted by a statement
filed in opposition to the motion.
Although no party filed any such "separate concise statement," the parties
have submitted factual statements in their respective memoranda that in
substance agreed that the factual evidence submitted in this matter is
undisputed, although in some instances they draw conflicting inferences
from the same facts. Pursuant to Watkins

'Peacock, supra, in reaching

my conclusions in this matter, Ihave drawn the most probable inferences
from that undisputed evidence.
HISTORY OF BAIL BONDS
The term "bail" has various meanings, i.e.:
The term "bail" has been used to refer to the means of
procuring the release from custody of one charged with an
offense, while also ensuring his or her future attendance in
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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court and compelling him or her to remain within the
jurisdiction of the court. Bail is a device which exists to ensure
society's interest in having an accused answer to a criminal
prosecution, without unduly restricting his liberty and without
ignoring the accused's right to be presumed innocent. The
word "bail" may also be used to refer to the security or bond
for a defendant's appearance in court and also to designate the
person in whose custody the defendant is placed when
released from jail and who acts as a surety for the appearance
of the defendant or party under arrest. This person is also
sometimes described as the "surety," or the "bailor." A person
released on bail is generally referred to as the "principal."
"Bail" has been used as a verb meaning the delivery of an
accused to persons who by law become security for his
appearance in court when it is required.

***

While released on bail prior to trial, a defendant is still
considered to be within the constructive custody of the law.
The fixing of bail and release from custody are matters
traditionally within the discretion of the courts.
Within the context of the issues before the court and in order to
avoid confusion, the parties involved in a bail transaction will be
characterized as follows:
"Bail Bond" - A contract between the State, the principal/defendant

and the surety.
"Principal" - The individual charged as a criminal defendant who

seeks a bail bond.
"Surety"

-

The entity providing the bond," i.e. National American

Insurance Company of California and its wholly-owned subsidiary
Danielson National Insurance Company
"Bail

Bond Agency"

-

The

insurance

producer licensee

representing the surety, in this case, Two Jinn.
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"Bail Agents" - The individual insurance producer licensees (Garske

and Carlock) employed by the bail bond agency (Two Jinn) to represent it
and the surety in issuing bail bonds on the surety.
"Supervising Bail Agent" - The individual bail agent designated as

the managing agent (Garske) for a bail bond agency (Two Jinn).
I n order to address the issues raised, it is important to clarify the
purpose of bail, the traditional statutory methods of posting the same and
the current use of surety insurance.
It has been said that the purpose of bail is to ensure the

presence or secure the attendance, of the accused at trial, that
is, to guarantee the appearance of the accused before the
court at such times as court may direct;

***

The purpose of bond is not to collect revenue. Nor, due
to the presumption of innocence, is the object of bail to effect
punishment in advance of conviction; bail is a device which
exists to ensure society's interest in having the accused answer
to a criminal prosecution without unduly restricting his or her
liberty and without ignoring the accused's right to be presumed
innocent. Nor is bail a method to punish sureties.

***

8A Am. Jur. 2d 5 2.
The Supreme court reviewed the history of bail and the application of
the Idaho bail statutes to bail bonds in Leader

'Reiner, 143 Idaho 635,

639-640, 151 P.3d 831, 835-836 (2007) where it provided:
Many of the Appellant's arguments made below center
upon applying specific provisions and words in Idaho's bail
statutes to bail bonds. The problem with that approach is that
most of the applicable statutes were enacted before there were
bail bonds. The bail statutes provide that to be released from
custody on bail, the defendant first had to have a judge set the
dollar amount of bail. I.C.
19-2901 & 19-2902. The
defendant then had hn/o statutory options. One option was to
deposit cash with the clerk of the court in the amount that the
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judge set for bail. I.C. 5 19-2922. The other option was to
have two sufficient sureties execute and acknowledge before
the judge the undertaking of sufficient bail. I.C. fj19-2909. I n
the undertaking, the sureties promised to pay the sum
specified by the judge as bail if the defendant failed to appear
or to hold himself amenable to the orders and process of the
court.
Id. The sureties each had to be a resident,
householder, or freeholder in this state, and they each had to
be worth the amount specified in the undertaking exclusive of
property exempt from execution. I.C. 5 19-2910. The court
could also require that they be residents of the county where
the bail is offered. Id. The sureties had to sign affidavits
showing that they possessed the statutory qualifications to be
bail, and the court could examine them under oath regarding
their sufficiency to pay the amount of the undertaking. I.C. 5
19-2911. All of the statutes cited in this paragraph were
adopted in 1864 by the territorial legislature. None of them
have since been amended except Idaho Code 5 19-2909, and
the amendments to that statute were not substantive. These
statutes do not address bail bonds because bail bonds did not
exist when they were enacted. Appellant is attempting to
make them apply to the bail bond agents, supervising agents,
and surety companies that exist today. Neither the bail bond
agent nor the surety company fits the statutory qualifications of
the two sufficient sureties set forth in Idaho Code 5 19-2910.
Modifying the statutes to make them applicable to bail bond
agents and surety companies is the province of the legislature.
The use of bail surety bonds was approved by the Idaho Legislature
when it enacted I.C. 341-2604 (S.L. 1961, ch. 330, 5557) which permitted
surety insurers qualified under the Idaho Insurance statutes to become the
sole surety on bonds. Only surety insurance companies licensed by the
Idaho Department of Insurance may lawfully issue bail bonds. I.C.

59 41-

103, 41-305, 41-308, 41-507 and 41-2604. When it adopted the Idaho
Criminal Rules and the Misdemeanor Criminal Rules in 1979, effective July
1, 1980, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the posting of bail by use
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of a surety bond. I.C.R. 46(d) and M.C.R. 13(c)(3).
I n State v. Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 116, 952 P.2d
1249, 1252 (Ct. App. 1998), Idaho clearly established that:
A bail bond agreement is a suretyship contract between

the state on one side and an accused and his or her surety on
the other side, whereby the surety guarantees the appearance
of an accused. . . . The extent of the surety's undertaking is
determined by the bond agreement and is subject to the rules
of contract law and suretyship.
. . . (Citations omitted).
The absence of legislation or Supreme Court rules relating to bail
surety bonds has led to the adoption of guidelines such as those in question
in this action.
BAIL AGENT'S RELATIONSHIP

vrs-A-V~STHE
SURETY

The relationship of a bail bond agency to the surety and the
relationship of a bail agent to the bail bond agency and to the surety are all
grounded in agency law and are each that of an agent to a disclosed
principal. See the bail bond exemplar, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.
A copy of Two Jinn's general agency agreement with one of the

sureties it represents (National American Insurance Company of California
and its wholly-owned subsidiary Danielson National Insurance Company)
was attached to the Affidavit of Brian Chess, Administrative Secretary to
Trial Court Administrator filed on October 24, 2008. As the parties have
not included any other agency agreements between Two Jinn and other
sureties, it is a reasonable assumption that this general agency agreement
is representative of all other such general agency agreements between
Two Jinn and its sureties. This agreement will hereinafter be referred to
as the 'general agency agreement."
The general agency agreement establishes the relationship between
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Two Jinn and this surety. I n substance, it provides that the bail bond
premiums charged by Two Jinn for bail bonds issued on the surety are
distributed as follows:
To the Surety
3 O/O
7 O/O
To a Contingent Reserve Account owned by
Two Jinn but held in trust for Two Jinn by
the Surety
To Two Jinn
90 O/O
Total Premiums -- 100 %
Thus Two Jinn receives ninety-seven per cent (97 %) of the premiums on
the bail bonds it sells. Under the terms of the general agency agreement
Two Jinn is required to pay any premium taxes (I.C. fj41-402) charged by
the State on its share of the premiums.
The general agency agreement further provides that Two Jinn is
responsible for paying all claims on the bail bonds. The general agency
agreement defines claims as
[all1 costs and expenses associated with claims processing and
loss payments on Bonds, including but not limited to court
costs, fees, investigative costs, court judgments on Bond
forfeitures and attorneys fees.
Additionally, Two Jinn has agreed to indemnify the surety for any claims
paid by the surety. The net effect of this agreement is that Two Jinn is a
real party in interest on the bail bonds it sells. See I.R.C.P. 17(a) and
State v. Vargas, 141 Idaho 485, 111P.3d 621 (Ct. App. 2005).

The General Agency Agreement also incorporates a Retail
Underwriting Policy of Manager and a Retail Branch Policy of Manager.
The General Agency Agreement exhibits containing these policies were not
included in the copy of the General Agency Agreement filed with the court
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and are therefore assumed to have no bearing on the issues raised by the
parties.
Individual bail agents are employed by Two Jinn on an oral, salaried at
will contract basis. As the parties have provided no specific information
regarding the terms of Garske's employment as supervisory bail agent, it is
a reasonable assumption that Garske is employed on the same basis as
other bail agents: on an oral, salaried at will contract basis. At Two Jinn's
request, the surety appoints Two Jinn's qualified employees as its appointed
agents pursuant to I.C. 3 41-1018.
Absent provisions in other agreements between 1) the surety and the
bail bond agency; 2) the surety and the bail agent; 3) the bail bond agency
and the bail agent; 4) the principal (the accused) and the bail bond agency;
5) the principal and the surety; and/or 6) the principal and the bail agent,
neither the bail bond agency (Two Jinn) nor the bail agent (Garske or
Carlock) is a party to the suretyship contract between the state on one side
and the principal and his or her surety on the other side. See General
Motors Acceptance Corp. vv.Turner Ins, Agency, Inc., 96 Idaho 691, 696697, 535 P.2d 664, 669-670 (1975).
Sureties are given wide latitude in dealing with bonded defendants
who default in making a court appearance. The common law scope of this
Taintor, 83 U.S. 366, 371-372, 21
authority has been stated in Taylor
L.M. 287 (1872) as:

'

When bail is given, the principal is regarded as delivered to the
custody of his sureties. Their dominion is a continuance of the
original imprisonment. Whenever they choose to do so, they
may seize him and deliver him up in their discharge; and if that
cannot be done at once, they may imprison him until it can be
done. They may exercise their rights in person or by agent.
They may pursue him into another State; may arrest him on
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the Sabbath; and, if necessary, may break and enter his house
for that purpose. The seizure is not made by virtue of new
process. None is needed. I t is likened to the rearrest by the
sheriff of an escaping prisoner. * * *. [I]t is said: 'The bail
have their principal on a string, and may pull the string
whenever they please, and render him in their discharge.'
Given the corporate nature of the surety insurance companies authorized to
issue bail bonds, they must of necessity act through agents, i.e. bail
agencies and bail agents. The October 27, 2008 affidavit of Peter Botz
establishes that on behalf its sureties, Two Jinn's claims handling services
encompass the common law rights of a "bail"

including "hiring

investigators to locate and apprehend bail fugitives."
ADOPTION OF THE GUIDELINES

The Fourth Judicial District Bail Bond Guidelines were initially adopted
by the ADJ on April 16, 2004.

The ADJ subsequently modified the

Guidelines in part on July 16, 2004, August 25, 2004, October 1, 2004,
December 9, 2005, October 17, 2006, and November 13, 2006. On August
22, 2008, while this action was pending, the ADJ adopted revised and
restated Bail Bond Guidelines. The judges of the Fourth Judicial District
involved in the handling of criminal and juvenile matters approved the
adoption of the Guidelines. A complete copy of the Guidelines as adopted
on August 22, 2008 has been filed as part of the Stipulation Re Revised Bail
Bond Guidelines filed on September 18, 2008. Although there are some
differences between the guidelines as they existed when this action was
commenced, the parties have agreed that all references to the Guidelines
will be to the August 22, 2008 Guidelines as filed on September 18, 2008.
ADDITIONAL FACTS AND INFERENCES

Although additional facts and inferences may be necessary to reach
my conclusions in this matter, they will be recited in the Analysis section of
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this opinion.
11. ISSUES

The foci of the Bail Plaintiffs' complaints are the provisions of the
Guidelines that in large part deal with establishment of a list of approved
bail agents, the process of being placed on or removed from the list of
authorized bail agents, the requirement that only bail bonds filed by
authorized bail agents are to be accepted as bail in the Fourth Judicial
District, and the authority for and scope of the actions taken by the TCA.
The parties have identified various issues including:
Are the issues raised in the Amended Complaint moot?
2.
Do Two Jinn, Garske and Carlock each lack standing to maintain
this action?
Does the Administrative District Judge have the authority to
3.
adopt bail bond guidelines?
4.
Do the Guidelines as adopted impermissibly conflict with the
insurance statutes regulating Bail Agents?
5. Do the Guidelines as adopted exceed the ADJ's authority?
6.
Does a Bail Agent's acknowledgement, waiver, and certification
in acceptance of the Guidelines form an enforceable contract
between the 4m District Courts and the Bail Agent?
7.
Do the Guidelines' procedures for the addition and removal of
Bail Agents provide due process?
8.
Are the actions of the TCA in commenting on or assisting the
Prosecuting Attorney on various motions relating to bail
constitute a denial of the right to due process of any of the Bail
Plaintiffs?
These issues will be addressed below, but not necessarily in the order listed.

1.

The matters presented to this court relate to the authority to adopt
Guidelines and their operation. Questions as to the necessity or wisdom of
the Guidelines adopted are not within the scope of this action.
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111. Analysis
I.

Are the issues raised in the Amended Complaint moot?
The Supreme Court discussed the doctrine of mootness and its

exceptions in Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141
Idaho 849, 851-852, 119 P.3d 624, 626-627 (2005), as:
An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and
substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded
through judicial decree of specific relief. State v. Rogers, 140
Idaho 223, 91 P.3d 1127 (2004). There are three recognized
exceptions to the mootness doctrine: ( I ) when there is the
possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on the
person raising the issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is
likely to evade judicial review and thus is capable of repetition;
and (3) when an otherwise moot issue raises concerns of
substantial public interest. Id.
While it is true that the Amended Complaint in this matter does not deal
with a current bail bond issue between the parties, it is clear from the
record that there continue to be and will continue to be repetition of many
of the past disputes delineated in the record that may evade judicial review
of the issues addressed in this proceeding. See Leader

'Reiner, supra,

Exhibit H, McKay Affidavit filed August 21, 2008 and Exhibits 1and 3, Burrell
Affidavit filed July 10, 2008. The Bail Plaintiffs are seeking injunctive relief.
Injunctions are issued to prevent the commission or continuance of
some particular act that would cause "great or irreparable injury" to the
moving party.

Injunctions are prospective in nature.

Wi/son v. Cily of

Boise,7 Idaho 69, 60 P. 84 (1900); Harris v. Preston-Whitney Irr. Co,, 92
Idaho 398,443 P.2d 482 (Idaho 1968).
The Bail Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief are not based upon any
current or present actions or threatened actions under the Bail Guidelines.
They are based solely upon the history of past actions under the Bail
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Guidelines as identified in the record.
There is evidence that the State Defendants intend to continue to
enforce and interpret the Bail Guidelines in a similar manner to the
complained of past actions. Under these circumstances the Supreme Court
held that:
It is true that injunctions should issue only where irreparable

injury is actually threatened. Where the conduct causing injury
has been discontinued, the dispute is moot and the injundion
should be denied. However, as the United States Supreme
Court observed, the trial court must be convinced that "there is
no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated."
OBoskey v. Brst Federal Savings & Loan Association, 112 Idaho 1002,

1007, 739 P.2d 301, 306 (1987) (citations omitted). I n OBoskey the trial
court found that despite First Federal Saving's protestations, it had
continued the complained of conduct and that the entry of the injunction
was appropriate. The Supreme Court affirmed.
Like the trial court in OBoskey, Ifind evidence to support the Bail
Plaintiffs position that the State Defendants are likely to engage in actions
similar to those identified in the record. I f portions of the Bail Guidelines or
their enforcement are unlawful, there would be a basis for granting
injunctive relief. As there may be a basis for granting injunctive relief, the
issues raised by Bail Plaintiffs in this action are not moot. See Harris v.
Cass.3 County, 106 Idaho 513 at 516-517,681 P.2d 988 at 991-992 (1984).

To the extent the State Defendants are raising an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l)
issue of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Ifind that the issues raised in
this action are the type of issues often presented to trial courts. I have
subject matter jurisdiction to decide these issues. See Bach V, Mile4 supra.
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2.

Do Two Jinn, Garske and Carlock each lack

standing to

maintain this action?
Standing is not concerned with the merits of the issues to be
litigated; rather it is focused upon the parties seeking relief. I n order to
possess standing a party must face a distinct, palpable injury, not one that
may be suffered by all citizens in the jurisdiction. See Selkirk-Priest Basin
Assh, I'c. v. State ex re/, Batt, 128 Idaho 831, 833-834, 919 P.2d 1032,
1034-1035 (1996) and Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778
I n this action the Bail Plaintiffs are seeking declaratory injunctive relief
from some of the provisions of the Bail Guidelines they allege to unlawful.
Declaratory judgments are used to determine the rights of parties based
upon real, actual and concrete controversy. The Idaho Supreme Court in
Harris K Cassia County, supra 106 Idaho at 516, 681 P.2d at 991 held that
It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of

specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be
upon a hypothetical state of facts.
Garske and Carlock are bail agents on the Fourth District's approved
list of bail agents and are currently subject to the terms of the Bail
Guidelines. They each have standing.
Two Jinn is a bail agency employing several bail agents who are
subject to the Bail Guidelines, including, among others, Garske and Carlock.
The net effect of Two Jinn's contractual relationship to its sureties as
outlined above is that Two Jinn is a real party in interest on the bail bonds it
sells. See I.R.C.P. 17(a) and State v, Vargas, 141 Idaho 485, 111P.3d 621
(Ct. App. 2005). Although not directly regulated by the Bail Guidelines, Two

Jinn is a party to a real and substantial controversy relating to the
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enforcement of the Bail Guidelines. Two Jinn has standing.

3.

Does the Administrative District Judge have the authority to
adopt bail bond guidelines?

Judicial rule making power is inherently vested in the "Supreme Court,
district courts, and such other courts
Constitution. Also see I.C.

. . . ."

Art. V

55

2 and 13 Idaho

33 1-212 and 1-213. Inherent and specific rule

making authority has been vested in administrative district judges by (1) I.C.

5 1-907, which provides in part:
The administrative judge or acting administrative judge in each
judicial district, subject to the rules of the Supreme Court, shall
have administrative supervision and authority over the
operation of the district courts and magistrates in the district.;
by (2) I.C.A.R. 42(e), which provides:

"The powers and duties of the administrative judge include all
those powers and duties as established by the Supreme Court,"
and by (3) the August 4, 2005 Idaho Supreme Court Order regarding the
job description, power and duties of an administrative district judge which
provides in pertinent part:
(17) delegate powers and duties to judges and court personnel
as necessary and appropriate;.
(18) establish guidelines for bail bonds with regard to posting,
forfeiture, exoneration and all other matters;
The scope of this rule making authority relates to procedural matters
as opposed to substantive ones. See State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 863,
828 P.2d 891, 892 (1992). I n trying to distinguish procedural matters from
substantive ones, the Supreme Court in State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539,
541, 700 P.2d 942, 944 (1983, quoting State

'Smith, 84 Wash.2d 498,

527 P.2d 674, 676-77 (1974), established the following guidance:
Although a clear line of demarcation cannot always be
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delineated between what is substantive and what is procedural,
the following general guidelines provide a useful framework for
analysis. Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct
and punishments for violations thereof. It thus creates,
defines, and regulates primary rights. I n contrast, practice and
procedure pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of
the courts by which substantive law, rights, and remedies are
effectuated.
The ADJ had and has the authority to adopt procedural bail bond
guidelines.
4.

Do the Guidelines as adopted impermissibly conflict with
insurance statutes regulating Bail Agents?

The dispute between the parties on this issue can be characterized
as a dispute over the separation of powers. The Idaho Supreme Court in
discussing the separation of powers doctrine stated:
The Idaho Constitution vests the power to enact substantive
laws in the Legislature. Idaho Const. art. 111, fj 1; see also
Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660, 664, 791 P.2d 410, 414 (1990)
("[Olf Idaho's three branches of government, only the
legislature has the power to make 'law.' "). This power is not
restricted by the Court's authority to enact rules of procedure
to be followed in the district courts. State v. Beam, 121 Idaho
862, 863, 828 P.2d 891, 892 (1992) ("Flhis Court's rule
making power goes to procedural, as opposed to substantive,
rules."). This Court has adopted the standard for delineating
substantive laws from procedural rules promulgated by the
Washington Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 84 Wash.2d 498,
527 P.2d 674 (1974). I n Smith, the Washington Supreme
Court observed that substantive law "creates, defines, and
regulates primary rights. I n contrast, practice and procedure
pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of the courts
by which substantive law, rights, and remedies are
effectuated." Id. at 501, 527 P.2d at 677, quoted in Beam, 121
Idaho at 863-64, 828 P.2d at 892-93.
Just as Article I1 of the Idaho Constitution prohibits the
Legislature from usurping powers properly belonging to the
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judicial department, so does that provision prohibit the
judiciary from improperly invading the province of the
Legislature. As this Court noted in Idaho State AFL-CIO v.
Leroy, 110 Idaho 691, 696, 718 P.2d 1129, 1134 (1986), "[wle
are bound to respect the reasonable exercise by the legislature
of powers expressly delegated to it by the constitution of this
state, and in the absence of other constitutional offense cannot
interfere with it." Thus, to the extent that the 1994 legislation
is a constitutional exercise of the Legislature's power to enact
substantive law, that legislation is to be given due deference
and respect. Id. at 698, 718 P.2d at 1136 ("In the absence of
a legislative invasion of constitutionally protected rights, the
judicial branch of government must respect and defer to the
legislature's exclusive policy decisions.").
In re: SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 255, 912 P.2d 614, 623
(1995).
Bail Plaintiffs urge that the Guidelines requirement that bail agents
submit to a more detailed character and fitness evaluation prior to
placement on the Fourth Districts' authorized list constitutes a regulation of
bail agents in violation of I.C. fjfj1-907, 1-213 and the Idaho Constitution.
The Bail Plaintiffs argue that the authority and power to regulate
define substantive rights, including the police power to regulate the right
to pursue an occupation for the protection of the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare is vested in the legislature. See Jones v. State
Bd o f Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 868, 555 P.2d 399, 408 (1976).

Pursuant to the authority of Idaho Code Chapter 10, Title 41 the Idaho
Department of Insurance (DOI) regulates the licensing of insurance
producers, including bail agents as specified in I.C. fjfj 41-1037 through 411045. This regulation includes among its requirements that an applicant be
subjected to a background or character evaluation. This evaluation is based
upon a criminal history records fingerprint check and the applicant's
responses to the background information questionnaire on the National
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Association of Insurance Commissioners' Uniform Application for Individual
Insurance Producer License required by the DOI.
Bail Plaintiffs contend that such state licensure vest bail agents with
rights that cannot be superseded by the Guidelines adopted by the ADJ.
See Wilshire hs. Co. v Carrington, 570 P2d 30 1(Mont. 1977).
The State Defendants take the position that it is the long recognized
general rule that the "[flixing of bail and release from custody are matters
traditionally within the discretion of the courts.

We believe that these

matters are most wisely left to the trial judge," State v. F/y, 128 Idaho 50,
53, 910 P.2d 164, 167 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Currington, 108 Idaho
539, 541, 700 P.2d 942, 944 (1985); State v. Kerrign, 98 Idaho 701, 571
P.2d 762 (1977); State v. Jiminez, 93 Idaho 140, 456 P.2d 784 (1969);
State

'Dunn, 91 Idaho 870, 434 P.2d 88 (1967) and that this discretion

also extends to the approval of the bail agents who post bail bonds as
agents of the surety. It should be noted that the Guidelines make no
attempt to approve sureties or bail bond agencies. The scope of the
Guidelines is strictly limited to the regulation of bail agents and supervising
bail agents.
The State Defendants correctly point out that the DO1 does not
investigate whether a bail agent applicant is related by blood, marriage or
adoption to any judge or person employed in a court-related position. Once
an individual is licensed, the DO1 does not require as part of its renewal
process any additional criminal history records fingerprint checks.'

See

Affidavit of Lisa Tordjman, filed August 25, 2008.
The Guidelines Section 11 and the APPUUnON TO BECOME AM
1

I.C. § 41-1021 requires producer licensees to report final administrative actions or commencement of
criminal prosecutions against the producer within thirty (30) days.
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AUTHORIZED BAIL AGENT WITHIN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
STATE OF IDAHO require that in addition to being a current DO1 insurance
producer licensee, the applicant must submit to a criminal history records
fingerprint check and not be subject to any of the grounds for
disqualification listed in Section 11, Part I11 Disqualification of the Guidelines,
to-wit:
Grounds for disqualification of an applicant from offering for
acceptance bail bonds in the Fourth Judicial District include the
following:
A.
The criminal history check reveals:
(1) any felony crime for which the applicant or the
applicant's proposed insurance company has been
convicted, pled guilty, received a with held
judgment, or otherwise sentenced.
(2) any misdemeanor crime involving theft, fraud, or
any other crime of dishonesty for which the
applicant or the applicant's proposed insurance
company has been convicted, pled guilty, received
a withheld judgment, or otherwise sentenced within
the last ten (10) years, including crimes committed
before age 18 years.
(3) three or more misdemeanor crimes for which the
applicant or the applicant's proposed insurance
company has been convicted, pled guilty, received
a withheld judgment, or otherwise sentenced within
the last five (5) years, including crimes committed
before age 18 years.
(4) any combination of three or more of the following
in which the applicant has been convicted. pled
guilty, received a withheld judgment, or otherwise
sentenced: failure to appear, contempt of court, or
probation violation within the last five (5) years
B.
The applicant failed to disclose information as requested
on the Application form.
C. The applicant or the applicant's insurance company is not
licensed by The Department of Insurance of the State of
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Idaho.
D. The applicant has four or more prior violations of these
Guidelines and/or previous Fourth Judicial District policies
or guidelines for bail agents which have not been
excused by the Administrative District Judge following a
hearing.
E.
The applicant is currently employed by the state or
county in a court-related position.
F.
The applicant was denied the ability to offer bail bonds
for acceptance or was removed from the list of
authorized bail agents in this or another jurisdiction.
G.
The application processing reveals the applicant has
previously had a license suspension or revocation
imposed by the department of insurance of any state of
the United States.
H.
The applicant or his/her insurance company has
previously failed to have paid a forfeited bond.
I.
The applicant is related by blood, marriage, or adoption
to a Fourth District judge.
3.
Financial insolvency of the applicant or his/her insurance
company.
K.
The applicant has not satisfied all obligations to any court
incurred while working with another bail agency.
The applicant was previously removed from the list of
L.
authorized agents.
The State Defendants attempt to support the requirement that the
AD3 must determine that the bail agent be of good moral character as
required by the Guidelines as being necessitated by statements in the ADJ's
August 14, 2007 affidavit, to-wit:
The critical factor in assuring that the accused returns to
court at the appointed time is the bail agent to whom the
accused is being released. It is the bail agent who makes
contact with the accused and determines the risks of writing
the bonds on his or her behalf. By writing the bond, the bail
agent undertakes to assure the accused's appearance, and the

6.
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corollaries of that obligation are the duty to monitor and
supervise the accused after release on bail and to recapture
should he or she fail to appear.

***

14. The character of the bailjbond agent is a critical factor for
the courts in releasing an accused into his or her care. I f the
bailjbond agent engages in criminal activity, such as writing a
check with insufficient funds, then that person's character,
ethics, and veracity is called into question.
The very
characteristics considered when releasing an accused into his
or her care. I f the bail/bond agent cannot be trusted to ensure
that the accused returns to court at the appointed time, then
the judicial system, along with the public's welfare is affected.

* .* .*

I n evaluating these assertions we should consider how bail is set and
posted. Usually the amount of bail is initially set by the bail schedules
established by I.M.C.R. 13 or is set by a judge on the arrest warrant or at
the time of a defendant's first appearance. See I.C.R. Rules 4 and 5. As
indicated in Leader v. Reiner, supra, I.C.R. 46(b) and I.C.

55

19-2909 and

19-2910 there are three methods of posting bail once the amount of bail is
set.
1.

Private Sureties: After the amount of bail was set by the court,

two sufficient sureties could execute and acknowledge before the
judge the undertaking of sufficient bail. I.C.

5

19-2909. I n the

undertaking, the sureties promised to pay the sum specified by
the judge as bail if the defendant failed to appear or to hold
himself amenable to the orders and process of the court. Ibid.
The sureties each had to be a resident, householder, or freeholder
in this state, and they each had to be worth the amount specified
in the undertaking exclusive of property exempt from execution.
I.C.

5

19-2910.

The court could also require that they be
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.

residents of the county where the bail is offered. Id. The sureties
had to sign affidavits showing that they possessed the statutory
qualifications to be bail, and the court could examine them under
oath regarding their sufficiency to pay the amount of the
undertaking. I.C.
2.

5 19-2911.

Cash: Anyone could deposit the amount of the bail set by the

court in cash with the Clerk of the Court. I.C.
3.

Bail Surety Bond.

5 19-2922.

I.C. 541-2604, I.C.R. 46(d) and M.C.R.

13(c)(3). A corporate surety bond in the amount of the bail set
by the court can be filed by a bail agent with the Court.
The first method requires the appearance of the sureties before the
court and their specific approval by the court.
The second method only requires that the amount of bail be posted
in cash. The person posting could be of the highest moral character such
as Cecil Andrus or Phil Batt or of the worst moral character such as Joseph
Duncan or Osama bin Laden. It could even be the criminal defendant
himself. It would make no difference to the Court as long as the bail was
deposited in cash,
The State Defendants fail to even suggest why the third method, a
surety bond posted by a corporation specifically authorized by law to be
the sole surety on a bail bond, requires that the agent of the corporate
surety be of good moral character, as determined by the ADJ, but that
there is no good character determination for the criminal defendant or
other individuals posting a cash bail under the second method.
While the rationales tendered by the AD3 might be aspirational for
any poster of bail, whether private surety, cash or surety bond, there is
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nothing in the record,* the guidelines, or the statutory and case law that
requires a bail agent 'to assure the accused's appearance, and

* * * the

duty to monitor and supervise the accused after release on bail and to
recapture should he or she fail to appear."

Absent some special

agreement, the only obligation of private sureties or corporate sureties is
to pay into court the amount of the bail. For circumstances involving cash
bail, there is no obligation, just the loss of the monies posted.
The Guidelines create an additional substantive licensure procedure
that more than duplicates the licensure procedure provided by the DOI.
While some of the Guidelines requirements to be placed on the Fourth
Judicial District's Approved List are not violative of the separation of powers,
i.e. Guidelines Section 11, Part III(1) regarding relationship to a Fourth
District judge, the bulk of the licensure procedure "creates, defines, and
regulates primary rights" of bail agents in violation of Idaho Const. art. 111,
I Whether specific provisions are matters that are properly within the

ambit of the court's rule making powers will be addressed in later sections
of this opinion.
5.

Do the Guidelines as adopted exceed the ADJ's authority?

Some provisions of the Guidelines are substantive in nature; that is,
they create, define and regulate primary rights in excess of the ADJfs
authority. Before discussing specific provisions, the question of whether
those provisions should cause the Guidelines to be stricken in their entirety
or whether the provisions are severable should be determined.

TWOJinn's web site representations attached as Exhibits 1 and 2 to the Reply to Opposition to
Defendants' Motion Summary Judgment might raise a question concerning its obligation to defendants,
however the Guidelines do not examine Two Jinn's qualifications.
3
Some states spell out conditions of release that include obligations of the surety. See New Jersey
Directive 13-04 prescribing the form and conditions of recognizance.
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While the Guidelines do not contain a severability clause, the Idaho
Supreme Court when considering a municipal ordinance gave applicable
guidance in Voyles K Cily of Nampa, 97 Idaho 597, 600, 548 P.2d 1217,
1220 (1976), to-wit:
When part of a statute or ordinance is unconstitutional and yet
is not an integral or indispensable part of the measure, the
invalid portion may be stricken without affecting the remainder
of the statute or ordinance. State v. Finch, 79 Idaho 275, 315
P.2d 529 (1957); Idaho Mut. Benefit Ass'n Inc. v. Robison, 65
Idaho 793, 154 P.2d 156 (1944). The principle of striking a
dispensable, unconstitutional part of a statute or ordinance
permits the striking of a single word. State v. Reese, 222
So.2d 732 (Fla.1969); Ex parte Frye, 143 Tex. Cr.R. 9, 156
S.W.2d 531 (1941).
The same rationale should apply to the Guidelines.
Cases from other iurisdictions
Both sides in this litigation have cited cases from a variety of
jurisdictions in support or opposition to the authority of the AD3 to adopt
Guidelines for the regulation bail agents. I n order to determine whether
the rationale of any of these cases applies to the case at bar, they each
should be considered in light of the above definitions and Idaho's law of
agency.

Concord CasuaItv & Suretv Co. v. United States, 69 F.2d 78 (2d
Cir. 1934).
The court of appeals held that the district court was without
jurisdiction to restrain Concord from issuing bail bonds for three years as a
consequence of its agents improper conduct.

However the court of

appeals further stated at 69 F.2d 81 that
The court is not without protection if the surety company is
deemed a poor moral or unsafe risk. I f the surety company
should so conduct its business as to lose the confidence of the
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court or a judge thereof, the judge to whom an undertaking is
submitted in any case for approval could refuse to approve it.
The court or the judge may direct the clerk or clerks to do
likewise in such instance, under the provisions of title 6
U.S.C.A. 6. The District Court might by rule refuse to accept
bonds of any named surety company. Like any other financial
risk in giving an undertaking or guaranty, a moral risk as well
as the material risk is involved.
It is the personal
responsibility- the presence of the prisoner- that a bail bond
requires. When a defendant is called upon to pay his
obligation to society, it is not the sum of the bail bond that
society asks for, but rather the presence of the defendant for
imprisonment. The court's judicial act of approval of a bond is
not mandatory under section 6, but the statute calls for the
exercise of a wise judicial discretion.
American Drua~istsIns. Co., Inc., v. Boaart, 707 F.2d 1229, 1238
(11" Cir. 19831.

American Druggists stands for the proposition that if a court is to
disallow a surety from filing bonds, it must follow one of three alternatives:
1) Notify the Secretary of Treasury to commence an investigation. 31

C.F.R. §223.21(1982); 2) Wait until the surety has failed to pay a final

judgment for thirty days. 31 U.S.C.S. §9305(e); or 3) After providing the
surety due process, enter its order declining to accept future bonds offered
by the surety.
Calvett v. Lapeer Circuit Judges. 442 Mich. 409, 502 N.W. 2d 293
(1993')

Calvert considered the question of a trial court's right to remove or

suspend an individual from a mandated list of persons engaged in the
business of becoming sureties on bonds for compensation in criminal cases
for charging fees and engaging in other conduct violative of the provisions
of the Penal Code concerning the writing of bail bonds. The opinion is
unclear as to Calvert's status as bail agent, bail agency, or surety. I n any
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event, the court held that despite licensing by the Insurance Code, Calvert
could be removed from the mandated list for his violations of the Penal
Code by the judges. Calvert establishes at 442 Mich. 412, 502 N.W. 2d
294 that although

the Insurance Code, in providing that the commissioner may
suspend or revoke the license of an agent, [it] does not bar
judges from refusing to accept bonds written or provided by a
person who violates the provisions of the Penal Code
concerning the writing of bonds.
Calvert does not address the question of judicial power to license or

determine the character or fitness of a bail agent.
I n the Matter oflohnson. 217 S.E. 2d 85 IN.C. 19751
Johnson involves judicial regulation of a "professional bondsman." I n

this case a professional bondsman is a surety and was limited by court rule
to writing bail bonds not to exceed four times the security deposit with the
clerk of court. I f anything, this case would support a court regulating the
person or entity liable on the bail bond, i.e, the surety, not a bail agent.
I n re Carter, 192 F.2d 15.16 (D.C. Cir. 19511

The court of appeals held that under statutes directing district court
to provide rules and regulations governing the business of becoming
surety for compensation upon bonds, that once a person has been
approved, that person has a property right, "the deprivation of that right,
once granted, is a judicial act, requiring due process of law."
Carison v. Mesioh. 932 P.2d 18 iOkl.Cr.. 19961

Oklahoma's comprehensive statutory regulation of the bail bond
business, The Bail Bondsman Act, 59 0kl.St.Ann. 91301 et seq, prevents a
court from enforcing local rules regulating bail bond business that are
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more restrictive than statutory scheme.

Oklahoma recognizes several

types of bail bondsmen, some of whom are sureties on the bail bonds they
write. As to default in payment on a bond posted by a "surety bondsman,"
i.e. a bail agent for an insurer, it is the insurer's license that is cancelled.
See 59 0kl.St.Ann. 51330.
Taylor v. Wadde-v.334 S.W.2d 733 [Tenn. 19601

One of several Tennessee cases cited by the State Defendants as
supporting the proposition that courts have the inherent power to regulate
professional bail bondsmen who provide bail bonds in their courts. The
application of the Tennessee cases to the status of those individuals that
under Idaho law are bail agents is of little help. Tennessee, contrary to
Idaho, by statute makes such bail agents sureties on the bail bonds they
issue. See Tennessee Code Annotated 5 40- 11-301(4).

In re Preclusion of Brice, 841 A.2d 927 [N.J.SUD~~.
20041
I n Brice the court, held that a bail agent was personally liable on a
bail bond. This decision was based upon three alternative grounds:
1.The approved court instructions for preparation of

the bail recognizance defined a bail bond and provided that
if the defendant failed to appear, "the signers of the bond"

will pay the amount of the bond to the court. The courts
rationale was that the agent signed the bail bond, ergo he
is a signer and liable to make payment.
2.Alternatively the court held that the bail agent's
agreement with the surety that he would pay any forfeiture
on bail bonds written by him made him personally liable on
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the bail bond.4
3. Lastly the court relied upon New Jersey's recent
enactment of comprehensive legislation regulating the bail
bond business. N.J.S.A. 17:31-10 through 15.
The second rationale is the most compelling as it avoids any separation of
powers issues raised by the first. The third rationale is confirming of the
second as the statutory provisions, N.J.S.A.

17:31-13(b),

distinguish

between bail agents who have provided the surety with a guarantee to
satisfy forfeited bail or a bail forfeiture judgment (such as Two Jinn) and
bail agents (Garske and Carlock) who have not.

Although it has not

modified its position with respect to the first rationale, the New Jersey
court has since modified its court rules to align with the statutes. See N.J.
Rules of Court, R. 1:13-3 and NJ Directives Dir. 13-04.
The general conclusion that can be drawn from these cases is that
upon a close reading they primarily deal with sureties and statutory or rule
schemes that differ from Idaho. They are informative. They all recognize
that a bail bond is a contract between the State, the defendant and a
surety. It is in the determination of who is a surety that these cases can
and should be distinguished from Idaho law.
Idaho as a matter of public policy has determined that compensated
bail bond sureties are limited to corporations authorized to conduct a
surety business. I.C.

55 41-103,

41-305, 41-308, 41-507, and 41-2604. It

is the ADJ's use of the Guidelines to place the obligations of a surety on
bail agents that runs afoul of the separation of powers doctrine.

Guidelines Sections I, 17,
The term "bail" has a settled legal meaning. Black's Law Dictionary
4

Brice's agreement was very similar to Two Jinn's agreement with its surety.
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4thEd. Defines the term "Bail," when used as a noun, as:
The surety or sureties who procure the release of a person
under arrest, by becoming responsible for his appearance at
the time and place designated. Those persons who become
sureties for the appearance of the defendant in court.
The Guidelines define the bail agent as the "bail." This definitional
change creates a substantive obligation on the bail agent and attempts to
vest the bail agent with the common law rights and obligations of a surety.
See 8A Am. Jur. 2d Bail,

3

1 and Taylor v. Taintor, supra. This is not a

procedural rule but a substantive rule. The general rule under agency law
as applied to bail bonds is stated in U S Bail fj254 that
A party will not be personally liable on a bail bond where he or
she executes bond documents for the surety in a representative
capacity.

This is in accord with Idaho agency law. See Genera/ Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Turner Ins. Agency, Inc., supra.

The substantive change of the bail agent's status from that of an
agent of a disclosed principal to that of a principal has led to most of the
problems facing the parties in this litigation.
For example, the Section 1 of the Guidelines require the salaried bail
agent to assume responsibility to
ensure that a forfeited bond is timely paid, notwithstanding the
right of the state or county to pursue collection of a forfeited
bond from the insurance company, and notwithstanding any
agreement between the bail agent and the insurance company."
This requirement is enforced by 517 of the Guidelines that requires
that when a notice of forfeiture is mailed to the bail agent, the bail agent
within one hundred eighty (180) days of a bond forfeiture to do one of the
following:
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(1) Surrender the defendant; or
(2) Pay to the Clerk of the Court the full amount of the
forfeited bond; or
(3) File with the court a sufficient motion for exoneration or to
set aside the forfeiture . . . .
At the discretion of the TCA's Office the consequence for a bail agent who

fails to comply with 517 or whose current or former bail agency or surety
fails to comply with 517 is removal from the list of authorized bail agents as
provided in 514 of the Guidelines. This requirement in effect conditions the
salaried bail agent's ability to continue to post surety bonds in the Fourth
Judicial District upon his or her ability to apprehend and deliver an
absconded defendant or to pay a forfeited surety bond to which the agent is
not a principal or some how to compel the agent's employer, the bail
agency, or the corporate surety to pay the forfeited surety bond, or to
commence a court proceeding on behalf of a bail agency or a corporate
surety which may not have consented to the bail agents representation. In
effect this requirement makes the bail agent a co-surety and, unless
licensed as a surety, in violation of the provisions of I.C. fjfj41-305, 41-507
and 41-2604.
The State Defendants attempt to modify the plain language of Section
1 by the ADJ's statement in fl 5 of her June 25, 2008 affidavit filed on July

10, 2008 that
The language referring to the bail agent as "the responsible
party to ensure that a forfeited bond is timely paid," is not
intended to make the individual bail agent financially responsible
for the payment of the bond. It means that the bail agent is the
individual whose job is to facilitate the payment of the bond
from the surety or other responsible entity.
is belied by the arguments of their counsel in the Reply to Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Supplemental Affidavit and Brief
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filed November 5, 2008 wherein it was argued that
Defendants simply want to make sure that bond forfeitures are
paid. Defendants have never required - let alone "insisted" that individual bail agents pay forfeited bonds. If forfeited
bonds are paid, Defendants do not care how that is
accomplished. It is up to Two Jinn (sic) ensure that forfeited
bonds are paid. I f Two Jinn does not pay forfeited bonds, the
Defendants must have some recourse, some way of collecting
money owed pursuant to valid court judgments. Rather than
deal with a faceless corporate entity, Defendants turn, quite
expectedly, to the entity's agent; in Two Jinn's case, the courts
turn to individual bail agents.
It seems clear that the purpose of holding the "individual bail agentff

accountable for the non-payment of forfeited bonds is to enforce the
payment of the bond by holding the livelihood of the lowest level of the food
chain (bail agent) hostage to the actions or non-actions of the persons or
entities liable on the bail bond, be. Two Jinn or the surety. That the State
Defendants could design Guidelines and rules that in the event of nonpayment of bonds would prevent Two Jinn and the surety from filing new
bonds is beyond question. See Concord Casualty & Surety Co. v. United
States, 69 F.2d 78, 81 (2d Cir. 1934); American Druggists Ins. Co., Inc., v.
BogaG 707 F.2d 1229, 1238 (llth
Cir. 1983); and Calvert v. Lapeer Circuit
Judges, 442 Mich. 409, 502 N.W. 2d 293 (1993).
It should be pointed out that in Idaho, unlike in some states,' a bail

bond forfeiture does not result in an enforceable court judgment; a separate
collection adion against the surety must be commenced in district court.
See I.C.

55

6-601 and 19-2928 and State K Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131

Some states, such as Washington, RCW § 10.19.090; Oklahoma, 59 0kl.St.Ann. 5 1333; California,
Penal Code fj 1306; New Jersey, N.J.S.A. 17:31-11, R. 1:13-3 and R. 3:26-6; and Montana, MCA $9 46-951 1 and 46-30-305, appear to permit the trial court forfeiting bail to have a summary procedure to enforce
the bond against the sureties.
5
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Idaho 113,952 P.2d 1249 (1998).
The provisions of the Guidelines that ignore the agency relationship
between the bail agent and the surety are substantive in nature and
constitute an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power. I.C. 51-213. The
Guidelines placement of responsibility for payment of a forfeited bail bond
upon the bail agent rather than Two Jinn or the surety is beyond the
authority of the ADJ.

-

Section 10 List Of Authorized Bail Aqents
All parties concede that the maintenance of a list of authorized bail

agents is an administrative efficiency. Thus each trial judge could establish
and maintain a list of authorized bail agents. However with 31 trial judges
in the Fourth Judicial District, the maintenance of individual lists would be
cumbersome and inefficient. Additionally, the establishment of the amount
of bail for certain offenses is established by Supreme Court rule and for
offenses not listed in the approved bail bond schedule, a bail schedule may
be established by individual judges. See M.C.R. 13(a) and (b). Support for
such a district wide list, at least in misdemeanor cases, is found in the
provision of M.C. R. 13(c)(3) that provides:
(3) Surety bail bond. By depositing, in lieu of cash, a bond or
bond certificate which guarantees payment of the amount of
the bail bond in the event the person charged fails to appear
when required by the court. A fidelity, surety, guaranty, title or
trust company authorized to do business in the state of Idaho
and authorized to become and be accepted as sole surety on
undertakings and bonds may execute the written undertakings
provided for in these rules, which may be accepted by the
person receiving the bond without prior approval by a judge
unless otherwise ordered by the administrative judge of
the judicial district. (emphasis added).

The establishment of a district wide list of authorized bail agents is an
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appropriate exercise of the ADJ's authority.
Section I1 Addinq Bail Aqents to the List of Authorized Bail Agents
Section 11 of the Guidelines outlines the procedure to be followed for
placement on such list. As discussed above, some of the provisions of this
section supplement the licensure requirements of the DO1 and to the extent
they do not duplicate the character and fitness evaluations conducted by the
DO1 they are not violative of the separation of powers doctrine and are
within the authority of the ADJ. Some of the provisions are mixed, that is a
portion of a provision is within the authority of the ADJ and a portion is not.
I t is not the function of the court in this proceeding to re-write the

Guidelines, so to the extent some provisions are found to be mixed, they will
be held to be outside the authority of the ADJ.
Section 11 Provisions Outside the Authority of the ADJ:
Sect. 11, 111, A, F, G, K and L.
Section 11 Provisions that are mixed and thus Outside the authority of
the ADJ:
Sect. 11, I,B. - while this provision would be proper for an
individual who was applying based upon a renewed producer
license issued by the DO1 it is not proper for an initial producer
licensee;
Sect. 11, 111, D. - is not appropriate for violations of Guidelines
outside of the authority of the ADJ;
Sect. 11, 111, H. - would be proper as it relates to surety's failure
to pay a forfeited bond and the surety was prevented from
issuing bonds; and
Sect. 11, 111, J. - would be proper as it relates to insolvency of
the surety and the surety was prevented from issuing bonds.
Section 12 Criminal History Checks
Section 12 of the Guidelines outlines the procedure to be followed for
obtaining criminal history record finger print checks. To the extent this
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section requires criminal history record finger print checks upon an
individual's initial application to be on the Authorized List of Bail Agents
within the first year of their DO1 licensure as a producer it is outside the
authority of the ADJ. As the DO1 relies upon self reporting of problems, I.C.

5 41-1021,

the criminal history record fingerprint check for an individual's

initial application to be on the list after the first year of their DO1 licensure
as a producer or for renewal placement on the list of authorized bail agents
is within the authority of the ADJ.
Section 14 Removina a Bail Aaent from the List of Authorized Bail
Aclents
Section 14 of the Guidelines outlines the basis and the procedure to
be followed for removing a bail agent from the list of authorized bail agents.
To the extent this section identifies grounds for removal that have been
determined to be outside the authority of the ADJ, they are unenforceable.
Forfeiture, Re-instatement & Exoneration
The Guidelines as adopted mandate that certain procedures be used
in the processing of forfeitures, bond re-instatements and exoneration of
bonds. To the extent these procedures are procedural they are within the
authority of the ADJ. Certain of the procedures appear to cross-over into
substantive provisions, i.e. Sections 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21, dictate results
only based upon mandated information. To the extent that these sections
dictate a result that is legally committed to the trial judge's discretion they
are outside the authority of the ADJ. State v. Fry, 128 Idaho 50, 54, 910
P.2d 164, 168 (App. 1994). To the extent that these sections require that
only the bail agent who posted the bond sign or take some specific action
they ignore the agency relationship of the bail agent to the surety and are
substantive and outside the authority of the ADJ.
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Forms
The Guidelines include a variety of forms that must be used in
dealing with bail issues in the Fourth Judicial District. To the extent that
these forms include information and requirements that have been found in
this opinion to be substantive rather than procedural they are outside the
authority of the ADJ.
6.

Does a Bail Agent's acknowledgement, waiver, and
certification in acceptance of the Guidelines form an
enforceable contract between the 4m District Courts and the
Bail Agent?
The State Defendants contend that Garske and Carlock have

contracted with the Fourth Judicial District and as part of that contract are
bound to the terms of the Guidelines. This contention is based upon the
language contained in the Agreement, Acknowledgement, Waiver and
Certification on Page 7 of the Application to Become an Authorized Bail
Agent within the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, to-wit:

I further acknowledge that I have read the Bail Bond Guidelines
for the Fourth Judicial District and Iagree to be bound by and to
comply with these Guidelines and any amendments thereto, and
that my offering of bail bonds for acceptance within the Fourth
judicial District shall be done in conformity with these
Guidelines.
The State Defendants assert that bail agents contract with the Fourth
Judicial District to provide services to the courts, by writing bail bonds.
These services are to defendants, not to the courts, any more than the
posting of a cash bail is a service to the court.
Am. Jur. 2d Contracts 5 19 and IDJI 6.01.1 provide that there are four
elements to a valid contract: competent parties; a lawful purpose; valid
consideration; and mutual agreement by all parties. As found above, the
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ADJ does not have the authority to lawfully make the bail agent responsible
for payment of forfeited bail bonds. Such a contract is beyond the ADJ's
authority and a contract for that purpose is unlawful and unenforceable.
Barry v. Pacific West Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 832, 103 P.3d 440, 445

(2004).
The State Defendants cite with approval various cases that stand for
the proposition that a bail bond is a contract between the government, the
defendant and the surety and should be strictly construed in accordance
with its terms. See State v. Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 116,
952 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Ct. App. 1998); In re Carter, 192 F.2d 15, 19 (1927);
US. v. Vaccai 51 F.3d 189, 193 (gth cir. 1995); State v. Ericksons, 746

P.2d 1099, 1100, (N.M. 1987).

I n making this argument, the State

Defendants fail to identify just who "the government" is that is a party to
the bail bond. This failure leaves open the possibility that "the governmentf'
party is the Fourth Judicial District or perhaps the court or judge that
accepts the bond. The bail bond itself provides guidance. The obligation on
the bail bond runs from the surety to the 'State of Idaho" not to the court,
the judge or the judicial district. See Exhibits A and B to Bail Plaintiffs' First
Amended Complaint. The "government" that is a party to the bail bond is
the same party that is the plaintiff in the criminal action against the
defendant, that is "The State of Idaho" pursuant to Idaho Const. Art. V, fj 1.
This is borne out by the fact that at the trial level, generally the lawyer
bringing the criminal action and any subsequent enforcement of a bail
forfeiture is the county prosecuting attorney not the attorney general. I.C. fj
19-2928. The payment of forfeitures as regulated by I.C.

5

19-4705 also

supports the proposition that the judge, court or judicial district is not the
"government" party to the bail bond. It should also be noted that if the
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judge, court or judicial district was the "government" party to the bail bond
there would be significant appearance of impropriety issues with the AD3 or
another judge in the district presiding over the forfeiture proceedings.
Canons 2 and 3, Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Guidelines as adopted do not form a contract rather they are a
form of regulation.
7.

Do the Guidelines' procedures for the addition and removal of
Bail Agents provide due process?
While Ihave found that the adoption of the Guidelines is within the

discretion and authority of the ADJ, the procedure followed is sufficiently
similar to a licensing scheme that Ideem that a property right attaches to a
bail agents authorization to file bonds under the Guidelines. Thus the bail
agent is entitled to due process in any proceeding to add or remove him or
her from the list of authorized bail agents.
The Idaho Supreme Court discussed the nature of due process in
Aberdeen-SpringfieJd Canal Co. v. Pe@er, 133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P.2d 917,

926 (1999) holding:
Procedural due process requires that "there must be some
process to ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived
of his rights in violation of the state or federal constitutions.
This requirement is met when the defendant is provided with
notice and an opportunity to be heard." * * * The opportunity
to be heard must occur "at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner" in order to satisfy the due process
requirement. * * * Due process "is not a concept to be
applied rigidly in every matter. Rather, it 'is a flexible concept
calling for such procedural protections as are warranted by the
particular situation.' * * * (Internal citations omitted)
The provisions of

55 11and 14 of the Guidelines provide due process

procedures regarding individuals being added or removed from the List of

00484
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Page 39 of 45

Authorized Bail Agents.

The standards for testing alleged due process

violations were recently discussed in American Falls Reservoir Disk No. 2 v,

Idaho Depf. o f Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862, 870-871, 154 P.3d 433,
A party may challenge a statute as unconstitutional "on its
face" or "as applied" to the party's conduct. * * * A facial
challenge to a statute or rule is "purely a question of law." * *
* Generally, a facial challenge is mutually exclusive from an as
applied challenge. * * * For a facial constitutional challenge
to succeed, the party must demonstrate that the law is
unconstitutional in all of its applications. Id. I n other words,
"the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances
exists under which the [law] would be valid." Id. I n contrast,
to prove a statute is unconstitutional "as applied", the party
must only show that, as applied to the defendant's conduct,
the statute is unconstitutional. * * *

***

An "on its face" constitutional analysis may not be combined
with an "as applied" constitutional analysis. * * * I n other
words, a court may hear both types of challenges to a rule's
constitutional validity; however, it may not do a "hybridized"
form of either test, in which the two tests are combined into a
single analysis. * * *
The record reflects some problems with an 'as applied" analysis of the
due process provisions. I n a few instances, Judge McKee found that the
Assistant T W s commenting on petitions or motions without notice to the
bail agent or his or her counsel might implicate a violation of due process.
The matters in question were decided on other due process grounds. See
Ada County cases H 0700165 and H 0601174.
To the extent that the basis either for rejecting an application to be
placed on the Authorized List of Bail Agents or for removal from such list
have been found within the authority of the ADJ, the provisions if properly
followed meet minimal standards for constitutional due process, that is
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notice and a timely opportunity to be heard.

See Aberdeen-Springfidd

Canal Company supra.
8.

Are the actions of the TCA in commenting on or assisting the
Prosecuting Attorney on various motions relating to bail
constitute a denial of the right to due process of any of the
Bail Plaintiffs?

Bail Plaintiffs' assert that their rights are violated by the ADJ's
delegation of power to the TCA to
1. Initially determine whether an applicant should be placed

upon the approved list of bail agents. Guidelines Section 11.
2. Initially review motions for exoneration before referring to

the presiding judge. Guidelines Section 14(I)(D).
3. Determine that named defendant is deceased.

Guidelines

Section 19.
Bail Plaintiffs' further assert that the TCA participates as an adverse party in
various motions involving forfeitures and exonerations.
The State Defendants assert the TCA has done nothing improper and
that the TCA does not act as a party or proponent of a particular position.
The record establishes that 1) the TCA has on occasions, perhaps
inadvertently, annotated bail bond motions without providing copies to the
moving party, 2) sat at counsel table with the county attorney on disputed
bail bond motions, and 3) has advised the county attorney on strategies and
authorities regarding bail bond motions.
The TCA is a part of the judicial branch of government. The position
of TCA was created Idaho Administrative Rule 43 which provides in part
that:
A district trial court administrator may be appointed by the
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Supreme Court in each judicial district, to carry out the
Supreme Court's constitutional responsibility to administer and
supervise the state court system and to carry out those
administrative duties of the District Court that may be
delegated to the trial court Administrator by the Administrative
Judge. The authority to hire a district trial court administrator
rests in the Supreme Court, and has been delegated to the
Administrative Director of the Courts. *** A district trial court
administrator performs work under the general direction and
supervision of the Administrative Judge, and assists the
Supreme Court, through the Administrative Director of the
Courts, in the Court's constitutional duties to administer and
supervise a unified and integrated judicial system and to carry
out those administrative duties of the District Court that may
be established by statute or inherent power of the court.
Generally efforts to improve efficiency and judicial economy by
providing standardized forms and initial screening of filings are an
appropriate use of the TCA.
The use of the TCA to administer the placement of applicants on the
List of Authorized Bail Agents pursuant to Guidelines Section 11 is
appropriate subject to the previous determination that some of the
requirements of that section are outside the authority of the AD3 and
unlawful. The review procedures available to an applicant found to be
disqualified by the TCA meet the minimum standards of due process.
Motions for exoneration and/or to set aside a forfeiture based upon
specific statutory provisions are generally determined on a pro forma basis
and without a hearing. The use of the TCA to initially screen such motions
is appropriate to confirm the applicable timeline and supporting information
and provide such information to the presiding judge. See Idaho Code of
Judicial Conduct, Canon 38(7)(c).

That it is improper for the TCA to

annotate or comment upon such a motion without providing the information
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to Bail Plaintiffs is recognized by the Affidavit of Reiner filed on September
5,2008 and the TCA policy adopted on November 4, 2008.
None of the State Defendants are parties to the bail bond. It is
inappropriate for any of them to be a party or be perceived as a party or an
advocate for or against exoneration or forfeiture. As discussed above, the
government party to the bail bond is the State of Idaho as represented by
the county prosecutor. It is improper for the TCA to give pointers or
assistance to any party to the bail bond, the State, the defendant or the
surety.
To the extent that some of forms provided as part of the Guidelines
require approval by the TCA or a stipulation by the TCA they constitute a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine, an improper delegation of
judicial discretion and the unauthorized practice of law.
CONCLUSIONS

1. This court has subject matter jurisdiction of the issues raised in this
action.
2. The claims raised by the Bail Plaintiffs are not moot.
3. Two Jinn, Garske and Carlock have standing to bring the claims raised

in this action.
4. The AD3 has the authority to adopt procedural Guidelines regulating

the bail bond business in the Fourth Judicial District.
5. To the extent the Guidelines ignore the agency relationship between a

bail agent and the surety or bail agency they are unlawful and
unenforceable.
6. The ADJ does not have the authority to adopt bail agent qualification

standards greater than those imposed by the DOI, except as they may

00488
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Page 43 of 45

relate to a bail agents family relationship to a Fourth District judge or a bail
agents simultaneous employment as an employee in a court-related
position.
7. The provisions of the Guidelines that require a bail agent "to ensure"

that a forfeited bond is paid and provide sanctions for not paying a forfeited
bond are unlawful.

8. The Guidelines provide constitutional due process to Bail Plaintiffs.
9. The Guidelines may properly require a criminal history records finger
print check for an individual's initial application to be on the list of
authorized bail agents after the first year of their DO1 licensure as a
producer or for renewal placement on the list of authorized bail agents.
10. A bail agent's acceptance of the Guidelines does not form a contract.
11. The TCA may initially screen bail bond motions to confirm the

applicable timeline and supporting information.
12. The TCA may not annotate or comment upon bail bond motions

without providing the information to all parties to the motion.
13. None of the State Defendants are parties to the bail bond or to any
proceedings on the bail bond.
14. The TCA may not give pointers or assistance to any party to the bail

bond.
15. The bail bond forms attached to the Guidelines may not require

approval or stipulation by the TU\.
ORDER

1.

The State Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

2.

Bail Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted in Part
and Denied in part.
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3.

Bail Plaintiffs shall prepare a form of judgment incorporating the
terms of this opinion. The proposed form of judgment shall be
submitted to the State Defendants for approval as to its form.
Approving the form of Judgment shall not be considered any
agreement as to the correctness of its terms. I f the form of
judgment can not be agreed to by the parties, they may either
submit the proposed form of judgment and their positions
concerning it to the court or they may request a hearing on the
form of proposed judgment.

ENTERED this

6 Jil
--

day of February, 2009

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
cyIhereby certify that on the b day of February, 2009 a true and
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David Z. Nevin
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Robyn Fyffe
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & B A R l L f T LLP
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701-2772

Fax Service
k S fWr\L

w

345-8274
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Steven L. OIsen
Michael S. Gilmore
Karl T. Klein
Melissa Moody
Deputy Attorneys General
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I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO I N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

1

TWO JINN, INC., dba ALADDIN
)
BAIL BONDS and ANYTIME BAIL )
BONDS; JAMES GARSKE; and
)
SHANTARA CARLOCK,
Plantiffis,

)

case NO.

CV OC 07 06619

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
AND

VS.

1)

PERMANENT INJUNCTION

DISTMCT COURT OF THE FOURTH)
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
1
STATE OF IDAHO; DARLA S.
1
WILLIAMSON, in her official
1
capacity as Administrative District )
Judge; LARRY D. REINER, in his
off~cialcapacity as Trial Court
Administrator; and DIANE
1
BURRELL, in her official capacity
as Assistant Trial Court
1
Administrator,
1
DefeMnts

1

1

On February 6,2009, the Court entered its Memorandum Opinion and
Order denying the motions of Defendants: the District Court of the Fourth
Judicial District of the State of Idaho (herein after "Fourth Judicial District");
Darla S. Williamson, in her official capacity as Administrative District Judge
(herein after "ADJ"); Larry D. Reiner, in his official capacity as Trial Court
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION
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. Administrator (herein after "TCA"); and Diane Burrell, in her official capacity as
Assistant Trial Court Administrator (herein after "Assistant TCA") (hereinafter
the defendants shall be collectively referred to as the 'State Defendants") and
granting in part and denying in part the motions of Plaintiffs: Two Jinn, Inc.,
dba Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail Bonds, James Garske and Shantara
Carlock (hereinafter the Plaintiffs will individually be referred to as "Two Jinn,"
"Garske," and "Carlock" and they will be collectively be referred to as "Bail
Plaintiffs")). Based upon the holdings in said Memorandum Opinion and Order,
I T I S DECLARED, ENJOINED, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that:

1.

The State Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion

for Dismissal are denied.
2.

To the extent any of Bail Plaintiffs' claims are not addressed in this

judgment they are denied.
3.

The ADJ has the authority to adopt procedural Bail Bond

Guidelines regulating the bail bond business in the Fourth Judicial District.
Pursuant to this authority and as an administrative efficiency, the AD3 may
direct the office of the TCA to maintain a list of bail agents who are authorized
to post bail bonds in the Fourth Judicial District (hereinafter the "authorized
list").
4.

The Bail Bond Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial District

(hereinafter "Bail Bond Guidelines") exceed the authority of the ADJ to adopt
procedural guidelines by: ignoring the agency relationship between a bail
agent and the surety or bail agency; imposing bail agent qualification
standards greater than those imposed by the Idaho Department of Insurance

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION
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(hereinafter 'DOI"), except as they relate to a bail agent's family relationship
to a Fourth Judicial District judge or a bail agent's simultaneous employment
in a court-related position; requiring bail agents to ensure that a forfeited
bond is paid; and providing sanctions for a bail agent's failure to pay a
forfeited bond. Therefore, the State Defendants have no right or power to
implement, apply or enforce within the Fourth Judicial District, Bail Bond
Guidelines that:
a.

Define 'bail agents" as the responsible party to ensure that a
forfeited bond is timely paid, as set forth in Section 1 of the
Guidelines;

b.

Reject a bail agent's application for placement on the authorized
list based on the results of a criminal history check as set forth in
Section 1l.III(A) of the Bail Bond Guidelines;

c.

Reject a bail agent's application for placement on the authorized
list where that agent is not employed in a state or county court
related position; does not have a family relationship with a Fourth
Judicial District judge; has disclosed required information on the
application form; is licensed by the DOI; and is authorized to post
bonds for a DO1 certified insurance company, as set forth in
Section ll.III(D), (F), (G), (H), (J), (K) & (L) of the Bail Bond
Guidelines;

d.

Require bail agents to provide information on the application to
become an authorized agent that does not form a lawful basis for
rejecting such an application, including Questions 2 to 10 of the
Application to Become an Authorized Bail Agent within the Fourth
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Judicial District, found as an appendix to the Bail Bond Guidelines;
e.

Permit the TCA to petition for the removal of bail agents from the
authorized list based on disciplinary measures other than
suspension or revocation of a producer license issued by the DO1
as set forth in Section 14.I.A(1) of the Bail Bond Guidelines;

f.

Permit the TCA to petition for the removal of bail agents from the
authorized list based on criminal history as set forth in Section
14.I.A(3) to (6) of the Bail Bond Guidelines;

g.

Permit the TCA to petition for the removal of bail agents from the
authorized list on bases that would justify suspension or
revocation of the DO1 license as set forth in Section 14.I.A(8), (9),
and (10) of the Bail Bond Guidelines;

h.

Permit the TCA to petition for the removal of bail agents from the
authorized list based on violations of the Guidelines as set forth in
Section 14.I.A(ll), (14), and (17) of the Bail Bond Guidelines,
where the bail agent allegedly violated guidelines for which the
AD1 lacked the authority to enforce;

i.

Permit the TCA to petition for the removal of bail agents from the
authorized list on the basis that the bail agent has not satisfied all
obligations incurred while working for another bail agency as set
forth in Section 14.I.A(16) of the Bail Bond Guidelines;

j.

Permit the TCA to remove a bail agent for nonpayment of a
forfeited bond and permit the TCA to issue "violations" of the
Guidelines for such nonpayment as set forth in Section 14.I.B(1) &
(2) of the Bail Bond Guidelines;
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k.

Permit the TCA to remove a bail agent from the authorized list
because a financial institution has failed to pay a check written by
that bail agent for a forfeited bond as set forth in Section
14.I.C(2) of the Bail Bond Guidelines;

I.

Require bail agents to surrender the defendant, pay a forfeited
bond or file a sufficient motion for exoneration within 180 days
following forfeiture as set forth in Section 17 of the Bail Bond
Guidelines; and

m.

Require that only the individual bail agent who offered the bail
bond for acceptance, the supervising agent or an attorney acting
on the individual agent's behalf sign bail-related documents that
are filed with the Court as set forth in Section 22 of the Bail Bond
Guidelines.

5.

The Bail Bond Guidelines may require a bail agent to submit the

results of a criminal history records finger print check with that agent's initial
application for placement on the authorized list if the bail agent has held a
producer license issued by the DO1 for more than one year. The Bail Bond
Guidelines may also require a bail agent to submit the results of such a
criminal history check with the bail agent's renewal application. Consistent
with Section 2(b) and 2(9 above, State Defendants may neither reject a bail
agent's application for placement on the authorized list nor seek his or her
removal there from based on the results of such a criminal history check.
State Defendants may forward the results of the criminal history check to the
DO1 for appropriate action against the bail agent's producer license.
6.

State Defendants may implement Bail Bond Guidelines that permit
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them to refuse a bail agent's application for placement on the authorized list
and to seek the bail agent's removal from the list if the bail agent has four or
more past violations of Guidelines, provided that those Guidelines were
procedural and within the ADJ's authority to impose. The State Defendants
may also implement Guidelines that permit them to refuse a bail agent's
application for placement on the authorized list and to seek the bail agent's
removal from the list where the surety on whose behalf the bail agent is
currently seeking to post bonds has an outstanding forfeiture, is precluded
from issuing bonds or is financially insolvent.
7.

State Defendants have no right or power to create guidelines that

dictate the outcome of a decision on a motion to exonerate or set aside
forfeiture that is legally committed to the trial court's discretion. Accordingly,
Sections 18 to 20 of the Bail Bond Guidelines may not be interpreted or
enforced in a manner that dictates the result of such a motion based upon the
mandated information.
8.

The Fourth Judicial District is not a party to the bail bond contract

between the State of Idaho, the criminal defendant and his or her surety. It is
thus inappropriate for the TCA or other representative of the Fourth Judicial
District to act as a party, be perceived as a party or advocate for or against
exoneration or forfeiture. Therefore, the State Defendants have no right or
power to:
a.

Implement, apply or enforce a policy, guideline or practice
whereby any State Defendant participates as a party or provides
assistance or pointers to the State of Idaho, the criminal
defendant or the surety concerning proceedings on motions to
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exonerate or set aside forfeiture or other bail bond related
litigation;
b.

Condition a request for exoneration following the death of a
criminal defendant upon the TCA's satisfaction that the defendant
is deceased as set forth in Section 19 of the Bail Bond Guidelines;

c.

Utilize or require bail agents to utilize form motions, stipulations
and orders that in their present format require the approval or
stipulation of the TCA, including the forms presently attached as
appendixes to the Bail Bond Guidelines set forth below:
i.
..
11.

iii.

iv,
v.
vi.
vii.
d.

Motion for Exoneration of Bail After Forfeiture;
Order of Exoneration of Bail Bond After Forfeiture;
Motion for Exoneration of Bail Bond Prior to Forfeiture;
Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Exonerate Bond;
Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Reinstate Bond;
Stipulation to Exonerate Bail Bond Due to Death of
Defendant;
Order Exonerating Bail Bond Due to Death of Defendant;
and

Apply or enforce Section 14.1.D of the Bail Bond Guidelines, which

provides that the TCA will review motions for exoneration or to set aside
forfeiture prior to submission to the presiding judge, in a manner that
permits the TCA to offer comments that go beyond confirming the
applicable time line and supporting information.
9.

The State Defendants are hereby permanently enjoined from

further implementation, application or enforcement of Bail Bond Guidelines
within the Fourth Judicial District as specified above and consistent with this
Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order filed February 6,2009. Accordingly,
the State Defendants shall no longer utilize in their present format the
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION
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Application to Become an Authorized Bail Agent within the Fourth Judicial
District or the forms listed above at 8(c) and the Defendants shall no longer
enforce the following Sections of the Bail Bond Guidelines: 1; 11.I.B; 1l.III(A),
(161, & (17); 14.I.B(1) & (2); 14.I.C(2); 17; 19; and 22.
10.

State Defendants are also hereby permanently enjoined from

implementing, applying or enforcing a policy, guideline or practice whereby
any State Defendant participates as a party during or advocates an outcome
of proceedings on motions to exonerate or set aside forfeiture or other bail
bond related litigation and from providing assistance or pointers to the State
of Idaho, the criminal defendant or the surety concerning such proceedings.

ENTERED this

3i6

day of March, 2009

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

3

Ihereby certify that on the
1 ' L y of March, 2009 a true and correct copy of the
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David Z. Nevin
Scott McKay
Robyn Fyffe
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARnErTT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
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i. Michael S. Gilmore

Karl T. Klein
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L A W E N C E WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVEN
L. OLSEN,ISB #3586
Chief of Civil Litigation
MICHAEL
S. GILMORE,
ISB # 1625
KARLT. KLEIN,ISB # 5 156
MELISSAMOODY,ISB # 6027
Deputy Attorneys General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-001 0
Telephone: (208) 334-2400
michael.gilmore@,a~.idaho.~ov
karl. klein@,aa.idaho.gov
melissa.moody@,a~.idaho.gov
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation duly
qualified to do business in Idaho and doing
business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime
Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; and
SHANTARACARLOCK,
Plaintiffs,
VS.

)

1
) Case No. CV OC 07066 19
) REQUESTFOR
) CLARIFICATION
)

1

DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her
official capacity as Administrative District Judge
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District; LL4RRYD. EfI\rTER,in his official
capacity as Trial Court Administrator for the
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District; and
DIANE BURRELL, in her capacity as Assistant
Trial Court Administrator for the District Court
of the Fourth Judicial District,
Defendants.

REQUEST
FOR CLARIFICATION
-1

Come now Defendants, by and through their attorneys, Melissa Moody and Karl
Klein, Deputy Attorneys General, and move this Court for an Order of Clarification on its
Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Paragraph 8.
The State Defendants seek clarification regarding Paragraph 8 of this Court's
Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction. Paragraph 8 provides, in relevant part:
It is thus inappropriate for the TCA or other representative of the Fourth
Judicial District to act as a party, be perceived as a party or advocate for or
against exoneration or forfeiture. Therefore, the State Defendants have no
right or power to:
a. Implement, apply or enforce a policy, guidelines or practice whereby
any State Defendant participates as a party or provides assistance or
pointers to the State of Idaho, the criminal defendant or the surety
concerning proceedings on motions to exonerate or set aside forfeiture or
other bail bond related litigation.
The Trial Court Administrator's Oftice had previously provided the attached
checklist, Exhibit A, to both parties on a motion to exonerate bond. The checklist is sent
to the prosecuting attorney and the bail agenubail agent's counsel. The checklist may be
provided to the Court also. The checklist is entirely factual, and the TCA's office does
not believe that providing this information is tantamount to being "perceived as a party or
advocate for or against exoneration or forfeiture." However, the State Defendants would
like clarification from this Court so as not to run afoul of the Court's order. Specifically,
State Defendants would like clarification whether providing information to both sides
constitutes prohibited "assistance" as set forth in this Court's Declaratory Judgment and
Permanent Injunction.
State Defendants are not requesting oral argument on this motion for clarification,
unless the Court deems oral argument necessary.

REQUESTFOR CLARIFICATION
-2

DATED this 6th day of April 2008.

STATEOF IDAHO

OFFICEOF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

KARL T. KLEN
MELISSAMOODY
Deputy Attorneys General

REQUEST FOK CLARIFICATION
-3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6th day of April 2008, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:
Scott McKay
Robyn Fyffe
NEVIN,BENJAMIN,
MCKAY& BARTLETT
LLP
P.O. Box 2772
303 West Bannock
Boise, ID 83701

CHAMBERS COPY:
Honorable James J. Judd
6498 N. Antler Place
Boise, ID 83703

~ u . s .Mail
[7Hand Delivery
C]Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
[7 Overnight Mail
C[1~acsimile:(208) 746-0753
[7 Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
[7Hand Delivery
[7Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Reauested
[7 bvernight Mail
[7Facsimile:
Statehouse Mail

MELISSAMOODY
Deputy Attorney General
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO
Pla~ntiff,
VS.
7

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR
TCA REVIEW
Power No.
Bond Amt. $
Agency:
Hear~ngDate:

In the matter of the motion to set aside and/or exonerate the above-referenced bond, the Trial Court
Administrator's review of the court file indicates as follows:

C] 1.

Bond posted on
C j 2. Minute entry date for failure to appear
C] 3. Warrant issued on
C] 4. Defendant arrested by law enforcement on
in
County in the above-referenced
case and on the above-referenced warrant
C] 5. Defendant surrendered to the custody of the Ada County Sheriff by the above-referenced bail
agency on
in the above-referenced case and on the above-referenced warrant
C] 6. Defendant posted a new bond on
from
County
7. Defendant made a bond-out clerk appearance on
8. Defendant appeared before the Court on
[Z1 9. Motion to set aside and/or exonerate bond filed on
C] l o . Bail agent has not surrendered defendant to the custody of the Ada County Sheriff within 180
days from the date of the forfeiture
C] 11. Defendant was transported to the Ada County Jail or Courthouse from
C] 12. A discrepancy exists between the court file and the information contained on the proof of
incarceration
C] 13. The warrant remains outstanding
14. The 180thday from the date of the forfeiture islwas
C] 15. The record does not indicate defendant has provided sufficient excuse for the failure to
appear
C] 16. Other:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April
, 2009, the foregoing TCA Review and copies of relevant
documents from the court file were served on the following:

C]
C]

Ada County Prosecutor by fax
Ada County Prosecutor by email

C]

Boise City Prosecutor by fax
Boise City Prosecutor by email

C]

Garden C~tyProsecutor by fax
Garden City Prosecutor by email

[I

Bail agency by fax
Bail agency by U.S. mail, prepaid

0
[7

Administrative Secretary
Trial Court Administrator's Office
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David Z. Nevin (ISB# 2280)
Scott McKay (ISB# 4309)
Robyn Fyffe (ISB# 7063)
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343- 1000

--

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TWO JINN, INC, a California corporation
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and
Anytime Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE;
and SHANTARA CARLOCK,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)
)
)

1
1

VS.
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PLAINTIFFS' WSPON SE TO
DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR
CLARIFICATION

DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH
)
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF )
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her )
official capacity as Administrative District )
Judge for the District Court of the Fourth
)
Judicial District; LARRY D. REINER, in )
his official capacity as Trial Court
)
Administrator for the District Court of the )
Fourth Judicial District; and DIANE
1
BURRELL, in her official capacity as
1
Assistant Trial Court Administrator for the )
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,)
Defendants.

1

)
)
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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 6, 2009, Defendants requested clarification as to whether the "TCA Review,"
which is a checklist prepared by the Trial Court Administrator's office (hereinafter "TCA)
following review of a bail agency's motion for exoneration or to set aside forfeiture, "runs afoul"
of the Court's March 3 1, 2009 Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction (hereinafter
"Judgnient"). According to Defendants, the checklist is "entirely factual" but they seek guidance
as to whether use of the TCA Review constitutes assistance that is prohibited by Paragraph 8(a)
of the Judgment, given their practice of providing the completed checklist to the bail agency
filing the motion and the State.
The TCA Review is not "entirely factual," limits judicial discretion and ignores the
agency relationship between the bail agent and his or her bail agency. Therefore, the TCA
Review is inconsistent with this Court's judgment and its continued use is enjoined.

11. ARGUMENT
A.

The Information Set Forth in the TCA Review Is Not "Entirely Factual"
Comments offered by the TCA on motions to exonerate must not go beyolid confin~liilg

the applicable time line and supporting information. Judgment, 7 8(d). Item 15 on the TCA
Review provides "the record does not indicate defendant has provided sufficient excuse for the
failure to appear." Whether the defendant has offered sufficient excuse for purposes of I.C. 5 19-

2927 constitutes a legal opinion and is not '"entirely factual." Similarly, by permitting the TCA
to identify whether a discrepancy exists between the court file and the informatioil contained on
the proof of incarceration, Item 12 allows the TCA to comment on the weight of the supporting
information, rather than simply confirming its presence. Item 16, simply titled "other," permits

2
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the TCA to comment on the motion without limitation, including going beyond confirming the
time line and supporting information. Therefore, Items 12, 15 and 16 are outside the permissible
scope of the TCA's screening of exoneration motions as set forth in Paragraph 8(d) of the
Judgment.

B.

The TCA Review Limits the Exercise of Judicial Discretion

Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Judgment, the "Defendants have no right or power to
create guidelines that dictate the outcome of a decision on a motion to exonerate or set aside
forfeiture that is legally committed to the trial court's discretion." Contrary to this provision, the
TCA Review fails to include information relevant to the trial court's exercise of discretion in
determining whether to set aside a forfeiture and exonerate bond, thereby suggesting that the
presence or absence of the enumerated information is determinative of whether the bail agency's
motion should be granted.
For instance, Item 5 provides: "Defendant surrendered to tlie custody of the Ada County
Sheriff by the above-referenced bail agency on -- in the above-referenced case and on the
above-referenced warrant." By including the language "in the above-referenced case and on the
above-referenced warrant," this Item implies that even if the bail agency surrenders the defendant
to the Ada County Jail, the motion to exonerate should be denied unless the surrender was on the
applicable warrant. Thus, if a defendant failed to appear in three cases and the bail agency
surrendered the defendant to the Ada County Jail on warrants issued in two of the cases but
before the third warrant was received by the jail, Item 5 would not apply. This interpretation is
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contrary to 1.C. 5 19-2927,' which does not require that the surrender be on a particular warrant
and, instead provides that "if within one hundred eighty (1 80) days of the date of forfeiture, a
person, other than the defendant, who has provided bail for the defendant, surrenders the
defendant to the jail facility of the county which issued the warrant, the undertaking of bail or
deposits are thereby exonerated." Moreover, pursuant to I.C. 5 19-2925, a bail agency can
surrender the defendant at any time before final discharge - with or without a warrant.
The TCA Review also does not set forth other circumstances relevant to exoneration,
including where the defendant has been deported or where the bail agency has surrendered the
defendant to law enforcement in another county. For instance, in the circumstance where a
defendant has outstanding warrants in more than one county, a bail agency might surrender the
defendant to a county other than Ada and cause the Ada County warrant to be served. The bail
agency ~vouldthen argue that the bond should be exonerated, minus transportation costs,2
because justice does not require enforcement of the forfeiture under 1CR 46(e)(4). Similarly, the
defendant's deportation or incarceration ill another county or state would also be relevant to

Section 19-2927, along with the rest of Chapter 29 of Title 19, was repealed by tlouse
Bill 184. House Bill 184 enacted the "Idaho Bail Act," which was signed by the Governor on
April 1,2009 and will become effective of July 1,2009. Rather than make the defendant's
surrender the operative event, the newly enacted I.C. 5 19-2922(4) provides that "the court shall
order the bail exonerated" if "the defendant has appeared before the court within one hundred
eighty (180) days of the court's order of forfeiture."
Where the defendant is brought before the court within 180 days of forfeiture, the new
Bail Act accounts for this scenario by providing that "in those cases where the defendant was not
returned by the person posting bail to the sheriff of the county where the action is pending, the
court may condition the exoneration of bail and the setting aside of the forfeiture on payment by
the person posting bail of any costs incurred by state or local authorities arising fiom the
transport of the defendant to the jail facility of the county where the charges are pending." I.C. tj
19-2922(4).
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whether justice required the forfeiture's enforcement.
By listing some circumstances that might justify exoneration or setting aside the forfeiture
and omitting others, the TCA Review suggests a resolution of the motion based solely on the
enumerated factors. Accordingly, the TCA Review establishes guidelines that dictate the
outcome of a decision on a motion to exonerate or set aside forfeiture that is legally committed to
the trial court's discretion, contrary to Paragraph 8 of the Judgment. Because it sets forth
impemlissible guideli
to comment on exoneration motions as set forth in Paragraph 8(d) of the Judgment.
C.

The TCA Review Ignores the Agency Relationship Between the Bail Agent and Bail
Agency

Item 10, which indicates "the bail crgerzt has not surrendered defendant to the custody of
the Ada Cot~iltySheriff within 180 days from the date of forfeiture" (emphasis supplied),
requires action by the individual bail agent, rather than the bail agency. This Section ignores the
agency relationship between the bail agent and his or her bail agency and, thus, is contrary to
Paragraph 4 of the Judgment.
111. CONCLUSION

The TCA Review is not entirely factual and permits the TCA to offer comments that go
beyond confirming the applicable time line and supporting information. Additionally, by setting
forth information that purports to be detem~inativeof whether a motion to exonerate or set aside
forfeiture should be granted, the TCA Review establishes guidelines that limit the trial court's
exercise of discretion in ruling on such motions. The TCA Review also ignores the agency
relationships by requiring action by the individual bail agent. Therefore, the TCA Review is
contrary to the Judgment and its utilization is enjoined.
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DATED this

%
&
day of April, 2009.
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CkK I'IFTCATE OF SERVICE

I CERTIFY that on April
document to be

to:

~"-b

2 09, 1 caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing

Honorable James F. Judd, 6498 N. Antler Place, Boise, ID 83703; and
Mr. Karl T. Klein and Ms. Melissa Moody, Deputy Attorneys General, Len B. Jordan
Bldg, Lower Level, 954 W. Jefferson, 2ndFloor, PO
Boise, ID 83720-0010

-
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LAWRENCE WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVEN
L. OLSEN,ISB #3586
Chief of Civil Litigation
MICHAEL
S. GILMORE,
ISB # 1625
KARLT. KLEIN,ISB # 5 156
MELISSAMOODY,ISB # 6027
Deputy Attorneys General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-00 10
Telephone: (208) 334-2400
michael.crilmore@ag.idaho.gov
karl.klein@,ag.idaho.gov
melissa.moody~ag.idaho.gov
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRiCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRiCT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation duly
qualified to do business in Idaho and doing
business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime
Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; and
SHANTARA CARLOCK,
Plaintiffs,
VS.
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her
official capacity as Administrative District Judge
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District; LARRY D. REINER, in his official
capacity as Trial Court Administrator for the
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District; and
DIANE BURRELL, in her capacity as Assistant
Trial Court Administrator for the District Court
of the Fourth Judicial District,
Defendants.

MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIALNOTICE
-1

)
)

1
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

1
1
)
)
)

1
)
)
)

1
)
)

1

Case No. CV OC 07066 19

MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL,
NOTICE PURSUANT TO
I.R.E. 201

Come now, Melissa Moody and Karl Klein, Deputy Attorneys General, and move
this Court, pursuant to I.R.E. 201(d) to take judicial notice of the court documents that
are attached to Diane Burrell's affidavit as Exhibits 1-6. Judicial notice may be taken at
any stage of the proceeding. I.R.E. 201(f). As stated in Diane Burrell's affidavit, these
court documents are on file in cases with the Fourth Judicial district.
It is requested that the Court take judicial notice of these documents because: (1)
the Fourth Judicial District Defendants intend to appeal the Court's decision in the aboveentitled case to the Idaho Supreme Court; (2) the Court's decision in the above-entitled
case affects all bail agencies and not only Aladdin (the Plaintiff in this case); therefore, to
review the entire scope of the District Court's decision, the Supreme Court needs
information with respect to other bail agencies' bail bond contracts; and (3) these
documents are all on file with the Fourth Judicial District and capable of being verified
by quick reference to the courts' files.
DATED this

/7

day of April 2009.

STATEOF IDAHO
OFFICEOF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

KARLT. KLMN
MELISSA
MOODY
Deputy Attorneys General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of April 2009, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:
Scott McKay
Robyn Fyffe
NEVIN,BENJAMIN,
MCKAY& BARTLETT
LLP
P.O. Box 2772
303 West Bannock
Boise, ID 83701

U.S. Mail
Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
[7Overnight Mail
[7Facsimile: (208) 746-0753
[ZI Statehouse Mail

CHAMBERS COPY:
Honorable James J. Judd
6498 N. Antler Place
Boise, ID 83703

[7 Hand Delivery
[7 Certified Mail, Return Receipt

[7Hand Delivery

U.S. Mail

Requested
Overnight Mail
Facsimile:
[7 Statehouse Mail

Deputy Attorney General

I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO I N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

1

TWO JINN, INC. dba ALADDIN
)
BAIL BONDS and ANYTIME BAIL )
BONDS; JAMES GARSKE; and
) case NO.
SHANTARA CARLOCK,
1
P/aintifs,
VS.

1
1
1
1

DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH)
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
1
STATE OF IDAHO; DARLA S.
1
WILMAMSON, in her official
1
capacity as Administrative District )
Judge; LARRY D. REINER, in his
official capacity as Trial Court
1
Administrator; and DIANE
1
BURRELL, in her official capacity
as Assistant Trial Court
1
Administrator,
1
Defendants

CV OC 07 06619

ORDER ON MOTION
TO TAKE JUDICIAL
NOTICE PURUSANT
TO I.R.E. 201

1
1

On March 31,2009, the Court entered its Judgment against Defendants:
the District Court of the Fourth Judicial Distrlct of the State of Idaho (herein
ORDER ON MOTlON TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE PURUSANT TO I.R.E. 201

Page 1 of 3

00,514

after "Fourth Judicial District"); Darla S. Williamson, in her official capacity as
Administrative District Judge (herein after "AD]"); Larry D. Reiner, in his oficial
capacity as Trial Court Administrator (herein after "TCA"); and Diane Burrell, in
her oficial capacity as Assistant Trial Court Administrator (herein after
"Assistant TCA") (hereinafter the defendants shall be collectively referred to as
the 'State Defendants'? and in favor of Plaintiffs: Two Jinn, Inc., dba Aladdin
Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail Bonds, James Garske and Shantara Carlock
(hereinafter the Plaintiffs will individually be referred to as'\Two Jinn,""Garske,"
and "Carlock" and they will be collectively be referred to as "Bail Plaintiffs").
The State Defendants have requested that the court take judicial notice of
certain bail bond contracts attached to the Affidavit of Diane Burrell dated April
17,2009. The State Defendants claim that such post-judgment judicial notice
should be taken so that on appeal the Idaho Supreme Court can properly review
the scope of this court's March 31,2009 Declaratory Judgment and Permanent
Injunction.
None of the bail bond contracts were presented to the court or considered
by the court prior to the entry of judgment. The form of some of the bail bond
contracts appear to vary to some degree from the form of the bail bond
contracts presented to the court prior to entry of judgment.

The State

Defendants' request for judicial notice does not accompany a motion to
reconsider pursuant to I.R.C.P. Il(a)(Z) which would require the court to
consider additional facts submitted in support of such a motion. See Cieur

dWlene Mining Co. K First Nat7 Bank, 118 Idaho 812,800 P.2d 1026 (1990).
Although the documents attached to the Burrell Affidavit are of the type
susceptible to judicial notice, Ibelieve it would be inappropriate for the trial
ORDER ON MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE PURUSANT TO I.R.E. 201
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court to take judicial of them solely because one of the parties, who did not
present them prior to judgment, wants the Supreme Court may want to
consider them. The motion to take judicial notice is denied.

2 0% day of April, 2009

IT I S SO ORDERED this

CERTIFI

TE OF SERVICE
&
day of April, 2009 a true and correct copy of the

Ihereby certify that on the
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid or, if the Fax service block is checked, sent a copy via
facsimile to:
David Z. Nevin
Scott McKay
Robyn Fyffe
N M N , BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLEn. LLP
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701-2772

FaxServla! f

Fax Service

Steven L. Olsen
Michael S. Gilmore
I Karl T. Klein
345-8274 / Melissa Mwdy
j Deputy Attorneys General
I P.O. Box 83720
f Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

854-8073

w,{

Clerk of the District Court

ORDER ON MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE PURUSANT TO I.R.E. 201

Page 3 of 3

00516

NO.

.

I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO I N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

1

TWO JINN, INC., dba ALADDIN
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BAIL BONDS and ANYTIME BAIL )
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) case NO.
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1
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VS.
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1
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DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH)
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1
STATE OF IDAHO; DARLA S.
1
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1
capacity as Administrative District)
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official capacity as Trial Court
Administrator; and DIANE
1
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1
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1
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1
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On March 31,2009, the Court entered its Judgment against Defendants:
the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho (herein
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after "Fourth Judicial District"); Darla S. Williamson, in her official capacity as
Administrative District Judge (herein after 'ADJf'); Larry 0. Reiner, in his official
capacity as Trial Court Administrator (herein after "TCA'9; and Diane Burrell, in
her official capacity as Assistant Trial Court Administrator (herein after
"Assistant TCA") (hereinafter the defendants shall be collectively referred to as
the "State Defendants") and in favor of Plaintiffs: Two Jinn, Inc., dba Aladdin
Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail Bonds, James Garske and Shantara Carlock
(hereinafter the Plaintiffs will individually be referred to as"Two Jinn,"'Garske,"
and "Carlock" and they will be collectively be referred to as 'Bail Plaintiffs").
The State Defendants have request clarification of said judgment as it
relates to the State Defendant's continued use of the "TCA Review Form"
attached as Exhibit A to their Request for Clarification. Bail Plaintiffs have
responded with detailed objections to the State Defendants' request.
The TCA Review Form was not a form that was included in the forms
covered by and adopted by the Fourth Judicial District Bail Bond Guidelines that
were at the center of this litigation. I do not recall and have been able to find
that a copy of the TCA Review Form either referred to or offered as an exhibit
during the course of the hearings leading up to the Judgment.
The request for this court to conduct a post-judgment evaluation of the
TCA Review Form is akin to requesting the court to offer an advisory opinion.
While such an evaluation might answer the questions posed by the State
Defendants, it would be improper. See MDSInvestments, L.L.C. v. State, 138
Idaho 456, 65 P.3d 197 (2003) and Country Ins. Co. v. Agricultural
Development, Jnc., 107 Idaho 961, 695 P.2d 346, (1984).

The provisions of the March 31, 2009 Declaratory Judgment and
ORDER ON REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION
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Permanent Injunction provide sufficient guidance for the State Defendants in
determining whether or to what extent to use the TCA Review Form.

v

es F. Judd,

Sw Judge

Ihereby certify that on the
a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid or, if the Fax service block is checked, sent a copy via
facsimile to:
FaxSenrice

David Z. Nevin
Scott McKay
Robyn Fyffe
NMN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLElT LLP
P.O.Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701-2772
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Fax Senrice
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345-8274 1 Melissa Moody
I Deputy Attorneys General
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Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
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LAWRENCE WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVENL. OLSEN,ISB #3586
Chief of Civil Litigation
MICHAEL
S. GILMORE,
ISB # 1625
KARLT. KLEM,ISB # 5156
MELISSAMOODY,ISB # 6027
Deputy Attorneys General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2400
rnichael.qilmore~,a,an.idaho.~ov
karl.klein@,arr.idaho.gov
melissa.moody@ag.idaho.rrov
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TWO J N N , NC., a California corporation duly
qualified to do business in Idaho and doing
business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime
Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; and
SHANTARACARLOCK,
Plaintiffs,
VS.
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her
official capacity as Administrative District Judge
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District; LARRY D. REINER, in his official
capacity as Trial Court Administrator for the
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District; and
DIANE BURRELL, in her capacity as Assistant
Trial Court Administrator for the District Court
of the Fourth Judicial District,
Defendants.
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Come now State Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, Michael Gilmore,
Karl Klein and Melissa Moody, Deputy Attorneys General, and hereby provide notice to the
District Court that State Defendants have promulgated new Bail Bond Guidelines for the Fourth
Judicial District (Attachment 1) to conform with the District Court's March 3 1,2009 Declaratory
Judgment and Permanent Injunction. These Guidelines were promulgated and became effective
April 29, 2009.
After the District Court issued its judgment in this case, State Defendants created a form
for use by the Trial Court Administrator and his assistant (Attachment 2) to conform with the
District Court's March 31, 2009 Declaratory Judgment & Permanent Injunction.

State

Defendants believe this form, which was created solely for the purpose of conforming with the
District Court's judgment in this case, and was the subject of Defendants' April 6 , 2009 Request
for Clarification, does in fact conform with the District Court's judgment.
DATED this 30th day of April 2008.
STATEOF IDAHO
OFF~CE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

MICHAEL
S. GILES~~RE
KARLT. KLEIN
MELISSA
MOODY
Deputy Attorney General

NOTICE
OF COMPLIANCE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of April 2008, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:
Scott McKay
Robyn Fyffe
LLP
NEVIN,BENJAMIN,
MCKAY& BARTLETT
P.O. Box 2772
303 West Bannock
Boise, ID 83701

CHAMBERS COPY:
Honorable James J. Judd
6498 N. Antler Place
Boise, ID 83703

rn U.S. Mail

IZ] Hand Delivery
IZ] Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
Overnight Mail
IZ] Facsimile: (208) 746-0753
IZ] Statehouse Mail

rn U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery

IZ] Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
[Z1 Overnight Mail
Facsimile:
IZ] Statehouse Mail

MELISSA
MOODY
Deputy Attorney General
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MARCH3 1,2009 PERMANENT
INJUNCTION - 3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO
RE: Bail Bond Guidelines for the
Fourth JudiciaI District

)

ADMlNISTRATIVE ORDER

WHEREAS, pursuant to I.C. 9 1-907 and I.C.A.R. 42(e), the Administrative Judge in each
judicial district has been granted administrative supervision and authority over the courts in their
respective districts; and
WHEREAS, the admission of bail is part of the operation of the trial courts and the
acceptance of bail bonds is a judicial function of the courts over which courts have inherent
power to administer their affairs; and
WHEREAS, the posting of bail bonds relates to public safety and welfare and it is
therefore in the best interest of the courts and the general public to ensure the appearance of the
accused at the trial and other hearings as required by the courts and to provide for the consistent
and prompt payment of forfeited bail bonds; and
WHEREAS, it is in the best interest of the general public and the court to ensure that
persons or entities who are permitted to present for acceptance of bail bonds in the Fourth Judicial
District possess qualifications of good character and conduct their business in an ethical, prompt
and law-abiding manner; and
WHEREAS, the judges of the Fourth Judicial District collectively handle approximately
3,700 motions annually involving bail bond matters, and the judges need the help of the court's
staff in reviewing these motions in order to address them thoroughly and timely;
WHEREAS, the Fourth Judicial District desires to make fair, reasonable, and consistent
rules applying to all persons offering bonds for acceptance in its district, and
WHEREAS, the Fourth Judicial District provided a draft of the Bail Bond Guidelines to
the judges, all bail agencies within the Fourth Judicial District and to their attorney if represented,
the Department of Insurance, and the Ada County Prosecutor for their review and comment.
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this court adopts the attached Bail Bond
Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial District, and these guidelines shall be followed by all persons
or entities desiring to offer bail bonds in the Fourth Judicial District, and by the Trial Court
Administrator, clerks, and sheriffs of the Fourth Judicial District, and,

Administrative Order re: Bail Bond Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial District

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order supersedes and replaces any previous order
or orders relating to the issues addressed herein, and these guidelines shall be effective
immediately, and the Trial Court Administrator shall immediately mail a copy of this order with
attached guidelines to all such currently authorized persons.
DATED: April 29,2009.

Administrative Judge
Fourth Judicial District
The judges of the Fourth Judicial District approve the adoption of these Bail Bond
Guidelines.
District Judges:
Hon. Deborah Bail

Hon. Thomas F. Neville

Hon. Cheri Copsey

Hon. Patrick Owen

Hon. Richard Greenwood

Hon. Michael Wetherell

Hon. Timothy Hansen

Won. Ronald Wilper

Hon. Michael McLaugNin
Criminal and Juvenile Magistrate Judges, Ada County:
Hon. Lamont Berecz

Hon. Cathleen MacGregor Irby

Hon. James Gawth~n

HOD.David Manweiier

Hon. Theresa Gardunia

Won. Michael Oths

Hon. William Harrigfeld

Hon. Daniel Steckel

Hon. John Hawley

Hon. Kevin Swain

Adntinistratillr: Order re: Bail Bond Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial District

Hon. Thomas Watkins
Boise County Magistrate:
Hon. Roger Cockerille
Elmore County Magistrates:
Hon. David Epis

Hon. George Hicks

Valley County Magistrate:
Hon. Henry Boomer

Admi~~istr~tive
Order rc*Bail Bond Guidelines for the Foltrth Judicial Dislrict
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BAIL BOND GUIDELINES FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

SECTION 1.
APPLICATION OF GUIDELINES
These Guidelines shall apply in all locations within the boundaries of the Fourth Judicial
District.

00528
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SECTION 2.
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
The Trial Court Administrator's Office will not disclose information from the bail agent's
application except as required by Title 9 Chapter 3 of the Idaho Code.
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SECTION 3.
REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCEPTANCE OF BAIL BONDS
No bail bonds shall be accepted by any sheriff or Clerk of the District Court within the
Fourth Judicial District from any person who is not on the list of authorized bail agents
maintained by the Trial Court Administrator as stated in Section 10 of these Guidelines.
The Trial Court Administrator shall be responsible for providing all sheriffs within the
Fourth Judicial District an updated list of those bail agents whose bail bonds may be
accepted as security for a defendant's future appearance in court, including any recent
additions or deletions therefrom.
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SECTION 4.
PRIOR TO EXPIRATION OF THE BAIL AGENT'S LICENSE
Before the expiration date of the license issued by the ldaho Department of Insurance
pursuant to ldaho Code $41-1039, the bail agent shall, in order to remain on the List of
Authorized Bail Agents following the expiration date:
(1)

Have a criminal history records fingerprint check completed by the ldaho State
Police Bureau of Criminal Identification (see section entitled "Criminal History
Checks"). The results of this criminal history records check must be received by
the Trial Court Administrator's Office from the ldaho State Police prior to the
expiration of the bail agent's Resident Producer license;

(2)

Complete and submit to the Trial Court Administrator's Office, Ada County
Courthouse, Boise, Idaho, an updated Application to Become an Authorized Bail
Agent Within the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho. A copy of the renewed
license issued by the ldaho Department of Insurance must accompany the
Application;

(3)

Provide to the Trial Court Administrator's Office a current copy of the contract
between the bail agent and the represented insurance company or, if one does not
exist, a current copy of the contract(s) between the bail agent's agency and the
represented insurance company or companies, if such contract has changed since
it was last provided to the Trial Court Administrator's Office. The copy of the
contract shall accompany the renewal application.

All paragraphs of the Section entitled "Adding Agents to the List of Authorized Bail Bond
Agents" will apply to license renewals.
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SECTION 5.
BOND AND POWER OF ATTORNEY FORMS
All bail bonds and power of attorney forms used in the Fourth Judicial District shall:
Be on forms provided by the insurance company;
Not be altered in any way;
(3) Bear the original signature of the person posting the bond; no power of attorney
may be used more than once or photocopied to be submitted as the original;
(4) Bear the typed or pre-printed current name, address, and telephone number of the
person posting the bond. This information must match the information that is on
record with the Trial Court Administrator's Office.
(5) Bear the typed or pre-printed current name, address, and telephone number of the
insurance company underwriting the bond;
(6) Be accurately and completely filled out;
(7) Not be submitted after the expiration date, if any, on the face of the Power of
Attorney.
(1)
(2)

The sheriffs or any person within the Fourth Judicial District having legal custody of any
person shall have no authority to accept any bail bond that does not comply with this
Section, and no bail agent shall attempt to submit a bail bond which does not comply
with this Section.
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SECTION 6.
STACKING BONDS - PROHIBITED
Only one Power of Attorney shall be submitted with each bond, and the face value or
face amount of the Power shall be equal to or greater than the amount of the bail or
bond set by the Court in the case for which the bond and Power are being submitted. A
bail agent shall not attempt to "stack" bonds or Powers by submitting more than one
Power of Attorney for any single bond.
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SECTION 7.
SOLICITING IN THE COURTHOUSE - PROHIBITED
All bail agents shall refrain from soliciting clients in any court facility in the Fourth Judicial
District. Also prohibited is the distribution of all non-governmental posters, banners,
signs, flyers, pamphlets, or the like in the foyers, lobbies, and corridor spaces of any
Fourth District court facility.
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SECTION 8.
TAKING CUSTODY OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE COURTHOUSE
Any bail agent or any person acting on behalf of a bail agent must obtain the approval
and assistance of the court security officer before attempting to take custody of any
individual andlor attempting to remove any individual from within a FouFth Judicial
District court facility.
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SECTION 9.
LIST OF AUTHORIZED BAIL AGENTS
It shall be the responsibility of the Trial Court Administrator's Office of the Fourth Judicial
District to maintain a list of bail agents who are authorized to present for acceptance a
bail bond in the Fourth Judicial District. Persons authorized to accept bail bonds shall
not accept a bail bond from a bail agent who is not on this list. The list will be provided to
the Sheriff's Department and to the Clerk of the Court for each of the four counties
comprising the Fourth Judicial District. The purpose of the list is only to provide notice to
the counties as to those bail agents who are authorized to present bonds for acceptance
within the district and not for advertising or any other purpose not specifically authorized
by the Administrative District Judge of the Fourth Judicial District. A copy of the list of
authorized agents is available at the Trial Court Administrator's Office to any bail agent.
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SECTION 10.
ADDING BAlL AGENTS TO THE LIST
OF AUTHORIZED BAIL AGENTS
The policies contained in this document will be those that are followed when an
individual makes application to be added to the List of Authorized Bail Agents in the
Fourth Judicial District.

I.

REQUIREMENTS

All individuals desiring to offer for acceptance bail bonds within the Fourth Judicial
District must:
A.

Possess and maintain a current Resident Producer - General Lines or Resident
Producer - Surety Lines license issued by the ldaho Department of Insurance.

B.

After the first year of licensing, have a criminal history records fingerprint check
completed by the ldaho State Police Bureau of Criminal Identification (see section
entitled "Criminal History Checksn).

C.

Complete and submit to the Trial Court Administrator's Office, Ada County
Courthouse, Boise, Idaho, an Application to Become an Authorized Bail Agent
Within the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho. A copy of the license from the
ldaho Department of lnsurance must accompany the Application.

D. Provide to the Trial Court Administrator's Office a current copy of the contract(s)
between the bail agent and the represented insurance company or companies, or if
one does not exist, a current copy of the contract between the bail agent's agency
and the insurance company.

E.

Be appointed by the ldaho Department of Insurance to post bonds on behalf of the
insurance company listed on the Application. Proof of appointment must
accompany the application.

11.

APPLICATION

A.

All requested information and questions on the Application must be answered fully
and truthfully. The applicant shall sign the Acknowledgement, Waiver, and
Certification at the end of the Application. The supervising agent shall also sign
the Acknowledgement of Supervising Agent.

B.

The applicant may submit the Application by delivering or mailing it to the Trial
Court Administrator's Office, 200 W. Front Street, Boise, ID 83702, or the applicant
may submit the Application by faxing it to the Trial Court Administrator's Office at
fax number (208)287-7509.

C.

Processing can not be completed until all information, including a typed or legibly
printed application and the results of the criminal history records check, has been
received by the Trial Court Administrator's Office.
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Ill.

DISQUALIFICATION

Grounds for disqualification of an applicant from offering for acceptance bail bonds in the
Fourth Judicial District include the following:
A.

The applicant failed to disclose information as requested on the Application form.

B.

The applicant or the applicant's insurance company is not licensed by The
Department of Insurance of the State of Idaho.

C.

The applicant is currently employed by the state or county in a court-related
position.

D.

The applicant is related by blood, marriage, or adoption to a Fourth District judge.

If an applicant is disqualified, the Trial Court Administrator's Office will so notify the
applicant in writing. If the applicant disagrees with the disqualification, he or she may,
within thirty (30) days of the date of the disqualification determination notice, file a
petition with the Clerk of the Court requesting a hearing before the Fourth District
Administrative District Judge to show why the applicant should be allowed to offer for
acceptance bail bonds in this district.
If an applicant is deemed to be qualified, the Trial Court Administrator's Office will notify
the applicant in writing that his or her name has been added to the list of authorized bail
agents.
IV.

COPIES OF COMPLETED APPLICATIONS

Upon written request signed by the applicant, copies of a completed Application will be
provided only to the applicant at a cost of $1.00 per page or will be faxed to the fax
telephone number as provided by the applicant.
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SECTION I 1
CRIMINAL HISTORY CHECKS
Below are the procedures for obtaining criminal history checks in the Fourth District for
new bail agents offering for acceptance bail bonds or bail agents who are submitting an
Application with a renewed license:
(1)

When a bail agent is renewing his or her license with the Department of Insurance,
the applicant must have a criminal history records fingerprint check completed by
the ldaho State Police Bureau of Criminal Identification.

(2)

Applicants who reside in Ada County must have their fingerprints taken at the
ldaho State Police headquarters, 700 S. Stratford Drive in Meridian.

(3)

Depending upon the policies of the local Sheriff's Office, applicants who reside
outside of Ada County may have the option of having their fingerprints taken at the
ldaho State Police headquarters in Meridian or by having the fingerprints taken at
their local Sheriff's Office.

(4)

The results of the fingerprint check will be mailed from the Bureau of Criminal
Identification directly to the Trial Court Administrator's Office. Criminal history
checks received from any other address will not be accepted. Bail agents should
allow a minimum of 10 working days for completion of the criminal history checks.

( 5 ) When a bail agent's license is being renewed, it is the responsibility of the baii
agent to ensure that the Trial Court Administrator's Office receives the criminal
history check before the license expires.
Once criminal history check results have been received from the Bureau of Criminal
Identification, Applications to post bail bonds in the Fourth District will be processed in
the normal course of business.
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SECTION 12.
APPLICATION TO BECOME AN AUTHORIZED BAIL AGENT
WITHIN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
The Application included in the Forms Appendix section of these Guidelines is to be
completed by all individuals seeking to be added to the List of Authorized Bail Agents in
the Fourth Judicial District. It is also to be completed when a bail agent is renewing his
or her request to be on the list of authorized bail agents or when changes are made as
described in these Guidelines. Bail bonds offered by a bail agent on this list may be
accepted by sheriffs and clerks of the Fourth Judicial District without prior submission to
the court.
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SECTION 13.
REMOVING A BAIL AGENT FROM THE LIST OF
AUTHORIZED BAlL AGENTS
The policies contained in this document will be followed when an individual's name is
removed from the List of Authorized Bail Agents in the Fourth Judicial District.
I.

VIOLATIONS ALLOWING REMOVAL OF BAlL AGENT

A.
The Trial Court Administrator's Office may petition the Administrative District Judge
for the removal of a bail agent from the list of authorized bail agents for the Fourth
Judicial District for violations listed below. A notice of hearing indicating the date and
time of the hearing will be mailed to the bail agent's last-known mailing address.
(1) The bail agent did not provide complete and truthful information on the Application

(2) The bail agent is employed by the state or county in a court-related position.
(3) The bail agent is related by blood, marriage, or adoption to a Fourth District judge.
(4) If the bail agent has only one surety for the purpose of writing bonds and the
insurance company is financially insolvent.

Following the hearing, the Administrative District Judge will make a determination as to
whether or not the bail agent's name will be removed from the List of Authorized Bail
Agents and the period of time, if any, during which the bail agent's name will be
removed.
B. For violations listed in (I), (2), and (3) below the bail agent shall be immediately
removed from the List of Authorized Bail Agents without prior additional notice.

(1)

The bail agent has not provided to the Trial Court Administrator's Office a
photocopy of the ldaho Resident Producer - General Lines license or Resident
Producer - Surety Lines license as of the expiration date of the temporary license
or has not provided a renewal Application and followed all requirements for
renewal prior to the expiration date of the agent's license.

(2) The bail agent license has expired or has been suspended or revoked by the ldaho
Department of lnsurance since the date of issuance and the Trial Court
Administrator's Office has confirmed this with the ldaho Department of Insurance.
Upon reinstatement by the ldaho Department of lnsurance and upon notice
received by the Trial Court Administrator's Office, the bail agent shall be
automatically added back to the List of Authorized Bail Agents.

(3) The bail agent's insurance company or the bail agent's supervising agent requests
in writing the removal of the bail agent's name from the list for the reason the bail
agent no longer has authority to act on behalf of the insurance company or the
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supervising agent, or the Department of Insurance has indicated the bail agent is
no longer affiliated with its insurance company.
The bail agent may, at any time during the removal period, file a petition with the Clerk of
the Court requesting a timely hearing before the Administrative District Judge for review
of the removal.

C. The Trial Court Administrator's Office reviews motions for exoneration andlor to set
aside forfeiture prior to referring them to the presiding judge.
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SECTION 14.
CHANGE OF ADDRESS OR OTHER STATUS
All bail agents authorized to present for acceptance bail bonds within the Fourth Judicial
District shall immediately notify the Trial Court Administrator of any:
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)

Change of bail agent's name;
Change of bail agent's business or residential address;
Change of bail agent's business or personal phone number;
Change of name or address of the bail agent's insurance company;
Cancellation by the insurance company of the bail agent's authority to write bonds
for that company;
Any change of the bail agent's insurance company;
Change of supervising agent of the bail agent, or change of employeeslagents
whom the bail agent supervises;
Change of bail agent's status on the records of the ldaho Department of Insurance;
Cancellation of a bail agent's affiliation with a bail agency;
Affiliation with or opening a new bail agency.
Filing of any criminal charges against the bail agent or hidher supervising agent.
Filing of or initiation of any civil, criminal or administrative action by the ldaho
Department of Insurance against the bail agent or the bail agent's insurance
company.

Notification of any such change must be done by completing, dating, and signing pages
one and two of the Application to Become an Authorized Bail Agent Within the Fourth
Judicial District and delivering the same to the Trial Court Administrator's office within
five (5) business days from the date of the change. For clarification purposes, the bail
agent may provide a supplemental letter of explanation with the Application pages. If the
bail agent has met all other requirements of these Guidelines, the change will be
effective within five (5) business days after the Trial Court Administrator's Office receives
notification.
In the event the bail agent did not provide notice, the supervising agent shall notify the
Trial Court Administrator of the above changes within ten (10) business days of the
change.
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SECTION 15.
POSTING BAIL BONDS UNDER MORE THAN ONE BAIL AGENCY
For bail agents who offer for acceptance bail bonds under more than one bail agency
andlor insurance company, the following policies will apply:

(1)

To ensure that court documents and correspondence are mailed correctly, only the
name of the surety or the surety's designated agent will be placed on notices of
forfeiture and other court documents and correspondence.

(2)

Regardless of the number of bail agencies a bail agent is offering bail bonds for
acceptance, all correspondence from the Trial Court Administrator's office will be
mailed to the one address provided in writing on the bail agent's application form.

(3) Applications submitted with more than one mailing address will be returned as
"unable to process."

(4)

Each bail agent will be assigned an Ada County 3-digit number as a computer
system identifier for each bail agency for which the bail agent offers bonds.

(5)

For the purpose of providing a list of authorized bail agents to the Sheriffs Office,
the name of the bail agency that is entered into the computer system will be the
first bail agency listed on the Application.
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SECTION 16.
PROOF OF INCARCERATION
This section provides information only.

I. Surrenders of the defendant before and after forfeiture should be done in the
following manner:
A. IDAHO CODE 519-2924 SURRENDERS PRIOR TO FORFEITURE
Pursuant to Idaho Code 519-2924 at "anytime before the forfeiture of their undertaking,
the bail may surrender the defendant in their exoneration, or he may surrender himself to
the officer in whose custody he was committed at the time of giving bail, or to the county
sheriff where the action is pending". The defendant is surrendered in the following
manner:
(1) "A certificate of surrender, executed by the bail, must be delivered to the officer,
who must also attach thereto his signature, the month, day, year, and time of day as
evidence of surrender and detain the defendant in his custody thereon as upon a
commitment. The certificate of surrender shall contain the legal caption of the action in
which the undertaking was given, including the name of the defendant, case number,
name and address of the bail, and shall clearly state that the bond is being revoked by
the bailn.
The bail agent "shall, the next judicial day, file with the court in which the action
(2)
or appeal is pending the certificate of surrender, and shall deliver a copy of the same to
the county prosecuting attorneyJ'.

8. IDAHO CODE 619-2927 SURRENDERS AFTER FORFEITURE
For the purpose of assisting the court in determining whether or not to exonerate a bond
after forfeiture, the bail agent should file proof of incarceration containing the following
information with the bail agent's motion for exoneration:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)
(6)
(7)

A certificate of surrender as required above
Power number
Name of incarcerating facility
Date of incarceration of the defendant
The law enforcement number of the officer in whose custody the defendant was
surrendered
The name and phone number of the incarcerating facility
A statement indicating that the purpose of surrendering custody of the defendant
is because the posted bond was forfeited by the court.

II. INCARCERATION IN A PENITENTIARY
In the event a defendant is being held in a penitentiary, the proof of incarceration should
contain the following information:
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The legal caption of the action in which the undertaking was given, including the
name of the defendant, case number, name and address of the bail
Power number
Defendant's date of birth
Defendant's social security number
Incarceration date and hour
Parole eligibility date
Full-term release date
Name, location, and phone number of the facility
Signature and title of the person authorized by the facility to sign the document
Date the document was signed

For defendants incarcerated in an ldaho correctional facility, the incarceration
information on the "Proof of Incarceration of Defendant in a Penal Institution" form
should be verified and signed by the Idaho Department of Corrections.
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SECTION 17
LIST OF APPROVED SURETIES FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
To be valid in the Fourth Judicial District, a bail bond must be underwritten by a surety
that is on the approved list of sureties for the Fourth Judicial District. A surety must
comply with the requirements of the ldaho Department of lnsurance and remit payments
on bond forfeitures in a timely manner.
Failure to comply with the requirements of the ldaho Department of Insurance or remit
payment on a bond forfeiture will constitute grounds for removing a surety from the
approved list of sureties. If a surety has not remitted payment on a forfeited bond to the
Fourth Judicial District within 194 days after the notice of forfeiture and no stay of
forfeiturejjudgment has been entered by the trial judge, the surety will automatically be
removed from the list of approved sureties without additional notice. Upon providing
proof of payment of the forfeited bond to the Trial Court Administrator's office, the surety
will be automatically reinstated to the list.
The surety may petition the court for a hearing to be placed back on the list any time
after removal.
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FORMS APPENDIX
Application to Become an Authorized Agent Within the Fourth Judicial District,
State of Idaho
Motion for Exoneration of Bail After Forfeiture
Order of Exoneration of Bail Bond After Forfeiture
Motion for Exoneration of Bail Bond Prior to Forfeiture
Order Exonerating Bail Bond Prior to Forfeiture
Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Exonerate Bond
Order Setting Aside Forfeiture and Exonerating Bond
Certificate of Surrender of Defendant
Proof of Incarceration of Defendant in a Penal Institution
Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Reinstate Bond
Order Setting Aside Forfeiture and Reinstating Bond
Order Exonerating Bail Bond Due to Death of Defendant
Motion for Substitution of Bond
Order for Substitution of Bond
Petition to Add Agent's Name
Petition to Reinstate Agent's Name
Petition for Review Prior to Removal of Agent's Name
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J. DAVID NAVARRO,
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

BY
Deputy

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,

)
)

Case No. CR

1

VS.

)
)

1

Defendant.

)

1
)

TCA REVIEW
Power No.
Bond Amt. $
Agency:
Hearing Date:

In the matter of the motion to set aside and/or exonerate the above-referenced bond, the Trial Court
Administrator's review of the court file indicates as follows:

1. Bond posted on

C] 2. Minute entry date for failure to appear

0 3.

Warrant issued on
4. Defendant arrested by law enforcement on
in
County in the above-referenced
case and on the above-referencedwarrant
0 5. Defendant surrendered to the custody of the Ada County Sheriff by the above-referenced bail
agency on
in the above-referenced case and on the above-referenced warrant
6. Defendant posted a new bond on
from
County
7. Defendant made a bond-out clerk appearance on
8. Defendant appeared before the Court on
C] 9. Motion to set aside andlor exonerate bond filed on
10. Bail agent has not surrendered defendant to the custody of the Ada County Sheriff within 180
days from the date of the forfeiture
11. Defendant was transported to the Ada County Jail or Courthouse from
C] 12. A discrepancy exists between the court file and the information contained on the proof of
incarceration
C] 13. The warrant remains outstanding
C] 14. The 180thday from the date of the forfeiture islwas
61 15. The record does not indicate defendant has provided sufficient excuse for the failure to
appear
C] 16. Other:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on April
, 2009, the foregoing TCA Review and copies of relevant
documents from the court file were served on the following:

Ada County Prosecutor by fax
Ada County Prosecutor by email

0
0

Boise City Prosecutor by fax
Boise City Prosecutor by email

0

0

Garden City Prosecutor by fax
Garden City Prosecutor by email

0

Bail agency by fax
Bail agency by U.S. mail, prepaid

Administrative Secretary
Trial Court Administrator's Office
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LAWRENCE WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVEN
L. OLSEN,ISB #3586
Chief of Civil Litigation
MICHAEL
S. GILMORE,ISB # 1625
KARLT. KLEIN,ISB # 5 156
MELISSAMOODY,ISB # 6027
Deputy Attorneys General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2400
mike.r;zilmore@aa.idaho.gov
karl.klein@,ag.idaho.gov
melissa.mood~@,ari.idaho.~ov
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation duly
qualified to do business in Idaho and doing
business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime
Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; and
SHANTARA CARLOCK,
Plaintiffs-Respondents
vs.
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her
official capacity as Administrative District Judge
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District; LARRY D. RESNER, in his official
capacity as Trial Court Administrator for the
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District; and
DIANE BURRELL, in her capacity as Assistant
Trial Court Administrator for the District Court
of the Fourth Judicial District,
Defendants-Appellants.

NOTICE OF APPEAL- 1

)

1
)
) Case No. CV OC 07066 19

1
) NOTICE OF APPEAL
)
)
)
)

1
)

1
)

1
)
)

1
)

1
)

1
1

ORIGINAL

TO:

THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS TWO JINN, INC., JAMES GARSKE,

AND SHANTARA CARLOCK, AND THE RESPONDENTS' ATTORNEYS, SCOTT
McKAY AND ROBYN FYFFE, NEVIN BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT, LLP,. 303
WEST BANNOCK, P.O. BOX 2772, BOISE, ID 83701, AND TE-EE CLERK OF THE
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF IDAHO, IN
AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA.
1.

The above named appellants, District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of

the State of Idaho; Darla S. Williamson, in her official capacity as Administrative District
Judge; Larry D. Reiner, in his official capacity as Trial Court Administrator; and Diane
Burrell, in her official capacity as Assistant Trial Court Administrator, appeal against the
above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Declaratory Judgment and
Permanent Injunction, entered in the above entitled action on the 31Stday of March, 2009,
Honorable Judge James F. Judd, Senior District Judge, presiding.
2.

The parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction described in paragraph 1 above are
appealable orders under and pursuant to I.A.R. 1l(a)(l).
3.

The following are preliminary statements of the issues on appeal which

appellant intends to assert in the appeal:
a.

Do the Bail Bond Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial District exceed the

authority of the Administrative District Judge?
b.

Do the Bail Bond Guidelines violate the Idaho Constitution;

specifically, the separation of powers doctrine?
c.

Do the Bail Bond Guidelines create a licensing scheme that is beyond

the authority of the judiciary?
d.

May the Trial Court Administrator and his employees provide

information to judges andor parties on bail bond matters?
4.

No order has been entered sealing the record on appeal.
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5.

A reporter's transcript is not requested,

6.

The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's

record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.:
a.

Affidavit of Brian Chess, 10124108

b.

Supplemental Affidavit of Peter Botz, 10127108

c.

Defendants' response to the supplemental affidavit of Peter Botz filed

October 27,2008
d.

Supplemental Affidavit of James Garske, 11110108

e.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Response to Defendants' Supplemental

Affidavit and Brief, 11110108

f.

Reply to Plaintiffs'

Memorandum in Response to Defendants'

Supplemental Affidavit and Brief, 11/17/08
g.

Memorandum and Opinion and Order on Motions for Summary

Judgment, 2/6/09

h.

Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction, 313 1109

i.

Affidavit of Susan Campbell, 9130108

j.

Affidavit of Heather Bedal with CD of ExhibitslAttachments, 9130108

k.

Affidavit of Scott McKay, 9130108

1.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to

Dismiss Allegations Regarding Trial Court Administrator's Actions on Motions to
Exonerate and Alleged Interference with Right to Appeal, 9130109
m.

Affidavit of James Garske, 1011108

n.

Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary

Judgment, 10110108
o.
10110108

Reply to Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,

p.

Reply to Memorandum Opposing Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Allegations Regarding Trial Court Administrator, 10110108

q.

Affidavit of Brian Chess, 10/10/08

r.

Plaintifrs Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in

Support, 9/5/08
S.

Amended Affidavit of Darla Williamson with revised Bail Bond

Guidelines and Administrative Order, 9/8/08
t.

Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, 9/30/08

u.

Affidavit of Diane Burrell, 9/30/08

v.

Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to

Dismiss/Motion for Reconsideration, 8/25/09
w.

Affidavit of Lisa Tordjman, 8/25/08

x.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in

Support, 9/5/08
y.

Affidavit of Darla Williamson, Administrative District Judge, 9/5/08

z.

Affidavit of Larry Reiner, Trial Court Administrator, 9/5/08

aa.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Allegations Regarding Trial Court

Administrator's Actions on Motions to Exonerate and Alleged Interference with Right
to Appeal and Memorandum in Support, 9/5/08
bb.

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction or, Alternatively, for

Reconsideration of Prior Summary Judgment Ruling, 7110108
cc.

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider and Motion for

Summary Judgment, 7110108
dd.

Affidavit of Darla Williamson, Administrative District Judge, 7110108

ee.

Affidavit of Diane Burrell, Assistant Trial Court Administrator, 7110/08

ff.

Supplemental Affidavit of Diane Burrell, Assistant Trial Court

Administrator, 812 1/08

gg.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to

Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction or, alternatively, for Reconsideration of Prior
Summary Judgment Ruling, 812 1/09

hh.

Affidavit of Scott McKay in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to

Dismiss, 812 1/08

..

11.

Affidavit of James Garske, 812 1/08

j.

Affidavit of Heather Bedal, 812 1/08

kk.

Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12/19/07

11.

First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief, 2/1/08

mm.

Answer to First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief, 211 1/08

nn.

Affidavit of Darla Williamson in Support of State Defendants'

Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 8/14/07
00.

Affidavit of Diane Burrell in Support of State Defendants' Opposition

to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 8/14/07
pp.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss/Alternative Motion for Summary

Judgment, 5114/07

qq.

Memorandum in Support of Defendants'

Motion to Dismiss1

Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment, 5/14/07

n.

Defendants' Motion to Strike, 5/14/07

ss.

Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Strike, 5/14/07

tt.

Motion for Consolidation of Case NO. CV OT 07 10721 with Case No.

CV OC 070662 19, 6/25/07
uu.

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Consolidation, 6/25/07

vv.

Affidavit of Diane Burrell, 6/25/07

ww.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to

Dismiss/Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment, 7110107

xx.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to

Strike, 7110107

yy.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 7110107

zz.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary

Injunction, 7110107
aaa.

Affidavit of Scott McKay, 7110107

bbb.

Defendants' Request for Clarification, 4/6/09, including attached TCA

form, 4/6/09
ccc.

Order denying Request for Clarification, 4/20/09

ddd.

Defendants' Motion to Take Judicial Notice Pursuant to I.R.E. 201,

4/ 17/09
eee.

Order denying Motion to Take Judicial Notice, 4120109

fff.

Notice of Compliance with Court's March 31, 2009 Order including

both attachments:
1.

Current Bail Bond Guidelines, promulgated April 29, 2009;

2.

TCA form for reviewing files (also attached to Defendants' 4/6/09
Request for Clarification);

3.
7.

Amendment to the Bail Bond Guidelines, Section 17

I certify:
(a)

No transcript has been requested and no certificate of service on a

reporter is necessary.
(b)

No transcript has been requested and no payment of fees for

preparation of a transcript is necessary.

(c)

The appellants are exempt fkom paying fees for preparation of the

clerk's record because they are agencies or officers of the State of Idaho.

3 3 1-3212(2).

See LC.

(d)

The appellants are exempt from paying appellate filing fees because

they are agencies or officers of the State of Idaho. See I.C.
(e)

5 67-2301.

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served

pursuant to Rule 20.

DATEDthis 5th day of May 2009.

STATEOF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

KARLT. KLEIN
MELISSAMOODY
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of May 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal by the following method to:
Scott McKay
Robyn Fyffe
LLP
NEVIN,BENJAM~N,
MCKAY& BARTLETT
P.O. Box 2772
303 West Bannock
Boise, ID 83701

CHAMBERS COPE
Honorable James J. Judd
6498 N. Antler Place
Boise, ID 83703

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
Overnight Mail
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753
Statehouse Mail

C1

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
Overnight Mail
Facsimile:
Statehouse Mail

Deputy Attorney General

David 2. Nevin (ISB# 2280)
Scott McKay (ISB# 4309)
Robyn Fyffe (ISB# 7063)
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 West Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
(208) 343-1000
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUI)ICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TWO JINN, INC, a California corporation
duly qualified to do business in Idaho and
doing business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and
Anytime Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE;
and SHANTARA CARLOCK,

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV OC 070661 9

)

Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross )
Appellants,
)
)

VS.

)

DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH
)
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TJ!E STATE OF )
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her )
official capacity as Administrative District )
Judge for the District Court of the Fourth
)
Judicial District; LARRY D. REINER, in )
his official capacity as Trial Court.
)
Administrator for the District Court of the )
Fourth Judicial District; and DIANE
BURRELL, in her official capacity as
)
Assistant Trial Court Administrator for the )
Distrlct Court of the Fourth Judicial District, )
Defendants-AppellantsCross-Respondents.

1

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL

1

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED CROSS-RESPONDENTS, District Court of the Fourth
Judicial District of the State of Idaho; Darla S. Williamson, in her official capacity as
Administrative District Judge; Larry D. Reiner, in his official capacity as Trial Court
Administrator; and Diane Burrell, in her official capacity as Assistant Trial Court Administrator,
AND THE PARTES' ATTORNEYS, Steven L. Olsen, Michael S. Gilmore, Karl T. Klein and
Melissa Moody, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720, AND THE CLERK OF T E ABOVEENTITLED CO

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above-named cross-appellants, Two Jinn, Inc., James Garske and Shantara Carlock
appeal against the above-named cross-respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the
Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunct~onentered in the above-entitled action proceeding
on the 3 1" day of March, Honorable Judge James F. Judd, Sentor Distnct Judge, presrdtng.
2. That the parties have a right to cross-appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the
judgment descnbed In paragraph 1 above 1s an appealable order under and pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule I l(a)(l).
3. The preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the cross-appellants intend to

assert are:
(a) whether the district court erred in concluding that the Defendants have the
authority to require bail agents to submit to a criminal history and background;
and
(b) whether the Defendants have the authority to implement Guidelines that
permit them to refuse a bail agent's application for placement on the authorized

2

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL

list and to seek the bail agent's removal from the list where the surety on whose
behalf the bail agent is currently seelung to post bonds has an outstanding
forfeiture.
4.

(a) Is an additional reporter's transcript requested? Yes
(b) The cross-appellants request the preparation of the following portions of the
reporter's transcript:
i. Transcript of the hearing on cross motions for summary judgment, held
on October 17,2008.
ii. Transcript of status conference held on December 1,2008.

5. The cross-appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. and those designated by
the appellants in the initial notice of appeal:
(a) Affidavit of James Garske, filed July 10, 2007;
(b) Affidavit of Judy Charney, filed July 10, 2007;

(c) Affidavit of Dennis Charney, filed July 10, 2007;
(d) Affidavit of Rebecca Salinas, filed July 10, 2007;
(e) Reply to Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, filed July 27, 2007;

(0 Stipulation Re: Bail bond Guidelines, filed August 1,2007;
(g) State Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
filed August 14,2007;

(h) Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, filed August 22,2007;

3
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(i) Plaintiffs7 Motion for Leave to Augment the Record Re Pending Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, filed November 16, 2007;
(j) Affidavit of Scott McKay In Support of Motion for Leave to Augment the

Record Re Pending Motion for Preliminary Injunction, filed November 16,2007;
(k) Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Augment the
Record Re Pendlng Motion for Prelimnary Injunction, filed November 16, 2007;
(1) Order Penni ttlng Augmentation of the Record and Setting Time for any
Response by State Defendants, filed November 19,2007;
(m) State Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Augment the
Record Re: Pending Motion for Preliminary Injunction, filed November 28, 2007;
(n) Plaintiffs' Memorandum

111 Reply

to Defendants' Response to Order

Permitting Augmentation of the Record, filed December 4, 2007;
(0)

Affidavit of Heather Bedal, filed September 5 , 2008;

(p) Affidavit of Susan Campbell, filed September 5 , 2008;

(q) Affidavit of James Garske, filed September 5 , 2008;
(r) Affidavit of Scott McKay, filed September 5 , 2008;
(s) Affidavit of Peter Botz, filed September 5 , 2008;
(t) Stipulation Re Revised Bail Bond Guidelines, filed September 18,2008;
(u) Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed September 30,2008;
(v) Affidavit of Scott McKay, filed October 10, 2008;

(x) Affidavit of Heather Bedal, filed October 10,2008;
4
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(y) Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Request for Clarification, April 13, 2009;
(2)

The transcript of the hearing held August 24, 2007 on Plaintiffs' Motion for

Preliminary Injunction, previously prepared by Jeanne Hinner, Accurate Court
Reporting on September 4,2007.

6. 1certify:
(a) That a copy of this notice of cross-appeal and any request for additional transcript
have been served on each reporter of whom an additional transcript has been requested as named
below at the address set out below:
i. Janet French, 8601 Ustick Road, Boise ID 83704
(b) That the clerk of the dlstrict court has been pald the est~matedfee for preparat~onof

the reporter's transciipt and any additional documents requested in the cross-appeal.
(c) That servlce has been made upon all pasties required to be served pursuant to 1.A.K
20 and the attorney general of Idaho pursuant to
DATED this &day

67-1401(1), Idaho Code.

of May, 2009.
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, klcKAY & BARTLETT LLP

Robyn ~ ~ f f e
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I CERTIFY that on May
document to be

__

z,

2009, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing

hand delivered
faxed

to:

Mr. Karl T. Klein and Ms. Melissa Moody, Deputy Attorneys General, Len B. Jordan
Bldg, Lower Level, 954 W. Jefferson, 2ndFloor, PO Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0010
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LAWRENCE WASDEN
ATTORNEYGENERAL
STEVEN
L. OLSEN,ISB #3586
Chief of Civil Litigation
MICHAEL
S. GILMORE,
1SB # 1625
KARLT. KLEIN,ISB # 5 156
MELISSA
MOODY,ISB # 6027
Deputy Attorneys General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-00 10
Telephone: (208) 3 34-2400
michael.giImore@air,.idaho.~ov
karl.kleinu)ag.idaho.gov
melissa.moody@,ag.idaho.gov
.

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation duly
qualified to do business in Idaho and doing
business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime
Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; and
SHANTARA CARLOCK,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her
official capacity as Administrative District Judge
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District; LARRY D. REINER, in his official
capacity as Trial Court Administrator for the
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District; and
DIANE BURRELL, in her capacity as Assistant
Trial Court Administrator for the District Court
of the Fourth Judicial District,
Defendants.

1
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DC Case No. CV OC 07066 19

MOTION TO INCLUDE
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS
IN THE CLERK'S RECORD
ON APPEAL

1
)
)

1
1
1
)
)
)
)
)
)

1
1

MOTION
TO INCLUDE ADDITIONALDOCUMENTS
IN 'THE CLERK'S
RECORD
ON APPEAL- 1

0RIr:rnr~I

Comes now, Melissa Moody, Deputy Attorney General, Attorney for Defendants,
and moves this Court to include the following documents in the Clerk's record on appeal:
1.

June 2, 2009 Affidavit of Melissa Moody, including exhibit 1, a copy of the
"Administrative Order Reinstating Bail Bond Guidelines Adopted August 22,
2008."

2.

June 3, 2009 Diane Rurrell Affidavit, including exhibit 1, a copy of the current
"checklist" being used by the Trial Court Administrator in the Fourth Judicial
District.
These documents are necessary for the appellate court's review of this case.
The appellate court needs to be aware of the Trial Court Administrator's current

procedure for bail bond matters. This information is contained in the June 3, 2009 Diane
Bunell Affidavit and exhibit. In addition, the appellate court needs to know which Bail
Bond Guidelines are currently in effect in the Fourth Judicial District. This inforination
is contained in the exhibit attached to the June 2,2009 Affidavit of Melissa Moody.
DATED this loth day of June 2009.

STATEOF IDAHO
OFF~CE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

MELISSAMOODY
Deputy Attorney General

MOrlON TO 1NCLUDt ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS
IN THE CLERK'S

RECORDON APPEAL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of June 2009,I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Include Additional Documents in the Clerk's
Record on Appeal by the following rnethod to:
Scott McKay
Robyn Fyffe
NEVIN,BENJAMIN,
MCKAY& BARTLETT
LLP
P.O. Box 2772
303 West Bannock
Boise, ID 83701
CHAMBERS COPY:
Honorable James J. Judd
6498 N. Antler Place
Boise, ID 83703

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Requested
- Overnight Mail
Facsimile: (208) 746-0753
C]Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
C]Hand Delivery
C]Certified Mail, Return Receipt
Reauested
C]overnight Mail
C]Facsimile:
C]Statehouse Mail

Deputy Attorney General

MOTIONTO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL
DOCUMENTS
IN THE CLERK'S RECORDON APPEAL- 3
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TO:

CLERK OF THE COURT
IDAHO SUPREME COURT
45 1 WEST STATE STREET
BOISE, IDAHO 83702
.

TWO JINN, INC., a California
)
corporation duly qualified to )
do business in Idaho and doing)
business as Aladdin Bail Bonds)
and Anytime Bail Bonds; JAMES )
GARSKE; and SHANTARA CARLOCK, )

Supreme Court No. 36476

Case No

CV OC 0706619

I

Plaintiffs-RespondentsCross-Appellants,

)
)

1
VS.

)
)
)

DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE)
OF IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON,)
in her official capacity as
)
Administrative District Judge )
for the District Court of the )
Fourth Judicial District;
)
LARRY D. REINER, in his
)
official capacity as Trial
)
Court Administrator for the
)
District Court of the Fourth
)
Judicial District; and DIANE
)
BURRELL, in her official
1
capacity as Assistant Trial
)
Court Administrator for the
)
District Court of the Fourth
)
Judicial District,
)
Defendants-AppellantsCross-Respondents.

)
)

)

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED
Notice is hereby given that on July 8,2009, I lodged a transcript 66 pages of
length for the above-referenced appeal with theDistrict Court Cbrk of the
County of Ada in the Fourth Judicial District.

Date

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TWO JTNN, INC., a California corporation duly qualified
to do business in Idaho and doing business as Aladdin
Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE;
and SHANTARA CARLOCK,

Supreme Court Case No. 36476
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross Appellants,
VS.
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO; DARLA S.
WILLZAMSON, in her officlal capacity as Admmistrative
District Judge for the District Court of the Fourth Juhcial
District; LARRY D. REINER, in his offlcial capacity as
Trial Court Ahmistrator for the District Court of the
Fourth Judicial District; and DIANE BURRELL, in her
capacity as Assistant Trial Court Administrator for the
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
Defendants-Appellants-CrossRespondents.

I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as
CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBITS to the Record:

1. Affidavit Of Brian Chess, Administrative Secretary To Trial Court Administrator, filed
October 24,2008.
1FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to
the Record:
1. Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Dismiss / Alternative Motion For
Summary Judgment, filed May 14,2007.
2. Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Strike, filed May 14,2007.
3. Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Consolidation, filed June 25,2007.
4. Affidavit Of Diane Burrell, filed June 25,2007.
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

5. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition To DefendantsyMotion To Strike, filed
July 10,2007.

6. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants' Motion To Dismiss I Alternative
Motion For Summary Judgment, filed July 10,2007.
7. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Preliminary Injunction, filed
July 10,2007.

8. Affidavit Of James Garske, filed July 10,2007
9. Affidavit Of Judy Charney, filed July 10,2007.

10. Affidavit Of Scott McKay, filed July 10,2007.
11. Affidavit Of Dennis Charney, filed July 10,2007.
12. Affidavit Of Rebecca Salinas, filed July 10,2007.
13. Affidavit Of Diane Burrell In Support Of State Defendants' Opposition To Plaintiffs'
Motion For Summary Judgment, filed August 14,2007.
14. Affidavit Of Darla S. Williamson In Support Of State Defendants' Opposition To
Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed August 14,2007.
15. Reply Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Preliminary Injunction, filed
August 22,2007.
16. Affidavit Of Scott McKay In Support Of Plaintiffs7Motion For Leave To Augment The
Record Re: Pending Motion For Preliminary Injunction, filed November 16,2007.
17. Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Leave To Augment The Record Re:
Pending Motion For Preliminary Injunction, filed November 16,2007.
18. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Reply To Defendants' Response To Order Permitting
Augmentation Of The Record, filed December 4,2007.
19. Affidavit Of Darla Williamson, Administrative District Judge, filed July 10,2008.
20. Affidavit Of Diane Burrell, Assistant Trial Court Adminstrator, filed July 10,2008.
2 1. Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Reconsider And Motion For Summary
Judgment, filed July 10,2008.
22. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants' Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of
Jurisdiction Or, Alternatively, For Reconsideration Of Prior Summary Judgment Ruling,
filed August 21,2008.
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

23. Affidavit Of James Garske, filed August 21,2008.
24. Affidavit Of Heather Bedal, filed August 21,2008.
25. Affidavit Of Scott McKay, filed August 21,2008.
26. Supplemental Affidavit Of Diane Bunell, Assistant Trial Court Administrator, filed
August 2 1,2008.
27. Affidavit Of Lisa Tordjman, filed August 25,2008.
28. Affidavit Of Heather Bedal, filed September 5,2008.
29. Affidavit Of Susan Campbell, filed September 5,2008.
30. Affidavit Of James Garske, filed September 5,2008.
3 1. Affidavit Of Scott McKay, filed September 5,2008.

32. Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment, filed September 5,2008.
33. Affidavit Of Lany D. Reiner, Trial Court Administrator, filed September 5,2008.
34. Affidavit Of Darla S. Williamson, Administrative District Judge Of The Fourth Judicial
District, filed September 5,2008.
35. Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Allegations Regarding
Trial Court Administrator's Actions On Motions To Exonerate And Alleged Interference
with Right To Appeal, filed September 5,2008.
36. Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed
September 5,2008.
37. Affidavit Of Peter Botz, filed September 5,2008.
38. Amended Affidavit Of Darla S. Williamson, Administrative District Judge Of The Fourth
Judicial District, filed September 8, 2008.
39. Affidavit Of Diane Burrell, Assistant Trial Court Adminstrator, filed September 30,2008.
40. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Allegations
Regarding Trial Court Administrator's Actions On Motions To Exonerate And Alleged
Interference With Right To Appeal, filed September 30,2008.
41. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition TO Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment,
filed September 30,2008.
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

42. Affidavit Of Scott McKay, filed September 30,2008.
43. Affidavit of Heather Bedal, filed September 30,2008.
44. Affidavit Of Susan Campbell, filed September 30,2008.
45. Affidavit Of James Garske, filed October 1,2008.
46. Affidavit Of Scott McKay, filed October 10,2008.
47. Reply Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed
October 10,2008.
48. Affidavit Of Heather Bedal, filed October 10,2008.
49. Affidavit Of Brian Chess, Administrative Secretary To Trial Court Administrator, filed
October 10,2008.
50. Reply To Memorandum Opposing Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Allegations
Regarding Trial Court Administrator, filed October 10,2008.
5 1. Supplemental Affidavit Of Peter Botz, filed October 3 1,2008.

52. Supplemental Affidavit Of James Garske, filed November 10,2008.
53. Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Response To Defendants' Supplemental Affidavit And Brief,
filed November 10,2008.
54. Affidavit Of Melissa Moody, filed June 2,2009.
55. Affidavit Of Diane Burrell, Assistant Trial Court Administrator, filed June 3,2009.
IN WTNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 22nd day of July, 2009.

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT LIST
Judqe Judd/Cindv Leoni
Judge
Clerk
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DATE: Auqust 24,2007

1 Two Jinn Inc.

CASE NO. CVOC 0706619

1

I Scott McKay
1 Attorney at Law

Plaintiff

Attorney(s)

Defendant

Attorney(s)

VS.

BY
Plaintiff

Exhibit List

NO.
1

DESCRIPTION
Copy of Bail Bond

STATUS
Admitted

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation duly qualified
to do business in Idaho and doing business as Aladdin
Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE;
and SHANTARA CARLOCK,

Supreme Court Case No. 36476
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross Appellants,
vs.

DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO; DARLA S.
WILLIAMSON, in her official capacity as Administrative
District Judge for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District; LARRY D. REINER, in his official capacity as
Trial Court Administrator for the District Court of the
Fourth Judicial District; and DIANE BURRELL, in her
capacity as Assistant Trial Court Administrator for the
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
Defendants-Appellants-Cross Respondents.

I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:
MICHAEL S. GILMORE

ROBYN FYFFE

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

:iira

Date of Service:

q

JuL k

.
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J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
~i--..-$

",

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation duly qualified
to do business in Idaho and doing business as Aladdin
Bail Bonds and Anytime Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE;
and SHANTARA CARLOCK,

Supreme Court Case No. 36476
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

Plaintiffs-Respondents-CrossAppellants,
VS.
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAEIIO; DARLA S.
WILLIAMSON, in her official capacity as Administrative
District Judge for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District; LARRY D. REJNER, in ?asofficial capacity as
Trial Court Administrator for the District Court of the
Fourth Judicial District; and DIANE BURRELL, in her
capacity as Assistant Trial Court Administrator for the
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
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THE COURT: This is the time set for hearing a
Motion for Preliminary Injunction. There have been several
Affidavits filed. Do we antidpate any live testimony, or
are we going to rely on the Affidavits for the record in
this particular matter?
MR. McKAY: It is our intention. Your Honor.
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21
22
23

THE COURT: This is the time set for hearing
in the case of Two Jinn, Inc., versus the District Court of
the Fourth Judicial District. I'm Judge Judd. l have
been assigned to this case by the ldaho Supreme Court
Mr. McKay, we'll go ahead and have you
introduceyourself and your co-counsel. You're
representing the plaintiffs in this matter?
MR. McKAY: 1am. Good afternoon. Your Honor
THE COURT: Good afternoon.
MR. McKAY: Scott McKay appearing for the
plaintiffs. I'm here with Robyn Fyffe, who is a lawyer
with our law firm, and also with James Garske, who is a
named plaintiff in this adion.
THE COURT: Mr. Kang.
MR. WVJG: Soo Kang, with the Attorney
General's Office, representing all the defendants in this

18
I 9 case.

APPEARANCES:

(208)

I

5
16
17

BE IT R M B E R E D , that the above-entitled matter
came on regutariy for hearing on August 24,2007, before
the Honorable James F Judd, Senior District Jwlge, In a
courtroom of the Ada County Courthouse, in Boise, Idaho.

BOISE, IDAHO, FRIDAY, AUGUST 24,2007,12:55 P.M.

Page 2

to rely on the Affidavits. We do have Mr. Garske
available, but Ianticipate not calling him as a witness
here today.
THE COURT: Wow about the State? Isay, "the
State," but Irecognize that -the Fourth Judicial
District, how does it take a position on this?
MR. KANG: We also will be relying on our
Affidavits, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I've got a few issues 1 want to
talk to you about before you start on your arguments.
First of all, I'm a little concerned that at the last
hearing we talked about it, and the Fourth Judicial
District said it wasn't going to amend the Guidelineswhile
this action is pendirig. And that seemed real nice and fair
to me, until Istarted getting into this and Isaw that we
had some Juty 2007 amendments to the bail statutes that
clearly make the Guidelines in violation of the statutes.
Particularly as to the time lines it's clearly in
violation.

I

-

And I recognize that this case is brought
structured lo meet the objections that Justice Eismann
raised in the Leader case, and to make sure that we raise
the issues in the triil court so you can get the Supreme
Court to look at them, which Ithink that's really a good
idea. But I'm concerned that if we're o~eratinabased u ~ o n

'1
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I the staMes that were in effect prior to July 1, is that
2 somehow you're going to have some problems on doing that
And In addiiw to that Inote - specifically
1 3
( 4 in going through some of the materials that have been
5 provided, particularlyin the Guidelines and the Guideline
6 revisions that one of the big issues that was raised in
7 the Guidelines or by the bail bond industry -was the
8 question of who receives the Notioe of Forfeiture. And I
9 note in Judge Wdliamson's letter of December Qth,2005,
10 .she addresses, well, gee, the statute says we have to send
11 it to the person who posts the bond. She quotes the
12 statute.
Now, one of your July 2007 amendments is to
13
14 change that language in the statute so it m,in the case
15 of a surety bond, go either lo the surety or to its
76 designated agent. Now, I'm not sure what impact that all
17 has on this litigation, but I'm a little concerned that
18 we've stopped, then, the Fourth Judicial District from
19 consideringthose issues in amending their Guidelines.
We're going to go through this process and Pm
20
21 going to decide them based upon the pre-2007 Guidelines,
22 and all of a sudden you're going to have a whde new
23 ballgame when they amend those. So I guess I wwld like
24 your thoughts on those t h i i s . If that's something of
25 importanceshould we stay this proceeding briefly with a

-

I

-

I1

1
1

1
I

1
1

I

1 Guidelines, Ithink, by stipulation, we could present that
2 change to the Gourt so that that's reflected in the court
3 record. And I think that that might possibly address the
4 concerns that Your Honor has identified here this

I1
I

1

.

1
1

1
1

FAX

7 statements. Ibelieve the issues in this case really
8 rewlve around whethw or not the Guidelines could be
9 promulgatedby the Administrative Distrlct Judge, In the
10 first place. And any subsequent changes would be a
11 reflection of that authority. If this case goes up to
12 appeal, as Ithink Mr. McKay stated, we can stipulate to
13 the changes if that beco
i4
16 me -- it wasn't the time lines. I don't think those are
16 really a big issue, because Ithink they will have to
17 change the statutes that are in control over those anyway.
(
18 And also, the Supreme Court rules have been changed on that
19 same Rule 46 has been changed to reflect that tlrne line
20 change.
The thing that concerns me, when I looked at
21
22 the guts of this discipline issue available on agents
23 and it's more of a practical Issue, Iguess, than a legal
24 one, but it seems a lot of those issues turn around this
25 idea that the p e r m who posts the bail is the agent, and,

I

II
I

-

-

1

1

I
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1 time line, or what's involved here?
2
MR. M c W : Your Honor, should I address that?
3
THE COURT: That's great.
4
MR.McKAY: Ithink that the Court has
5 certainty identifiid some valid concerns, but they are
6 concerns that don't really get at the issues that we are
7 litigating here surrounding the licensing and discipline of
8 bail agents. And l know that counsel, Mr. Chamey,
9 represented at our very initial hearingthat the Court
10 would not be amending these Guidelines whih this
11 litigation was panding.
12
And as the Court correctly points out, there
13 have been some changes in the law. And particularly the
14 statute that Ithink the Court refem to is dealing with
15 the change from 90 days to surrender a defendant to 180
16 days. And Ithink it would be appropriate, $ken that
17 we're presently working under these Guidelines, to have a
18 Guideline that refiects or to amend the Guideline to
19 reflect that change in the law. And l don't think that
20 that's necessarily an action that warrants a stay of this
21 liiation.
22
If this case is appealed, to make sure that we
23 go up on a meet record IUdnk that the parties have
24 worked together well so far in agreeing on the Guidelines
25 that are at issue. If &re Q a change In those

1 therefore, that's the only person we can deal with under
2 the statute. Well, that's changed now, and that might
3 change the whole tenor and context of your bail bond
4 Guidelines.
Because the new language says spedfimllly
6
6 and I'm hoking at 192927,Rsays that the derk will
7 sand it to the last known address of the person posting or
8 undertaking the bail. Or if the bail consists of a surety
S bond, to the surety or its designated agent.
10
Now, it seems to me that when you read that,
11 that language may be critical in interpretation of whether
12 a bail bond p r o d w r agent is the designated agent of the
13 surety for purposes of reoelvlng thls notice or not. And
14 I'm wncemed, because Ithink that's been the big part of
16 the nub on this issue. Imay be wrong. Maybe I'm trying
16 to put the lawsuit and you guys, or the issues, are
I 7 different. And I'm not trying to inject that. I'm just
18 saying it seems lo me that% an issue that may change some
19 of the standings of this litigation.
20
Now, as far as the issue of authority to issue
21 bal bond Guidelines and approve agents and all those
22 things, those are issues that are probably going to may
23 or may not continue playing if there's a significant
24 amendment to the GuideUnas. That can be resolved and can
25 b8 addressed in this issue even as we go forward,

-

-
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But I'm just trying to point out to you that

1 of sureties in all this. And that's our hope, too, that
2 this can be a catalyst for a change in these ~uidelwes.
3 And I
this is whet we have been say~ngall along.
4 And if y w look at our Complaint, we haw allegahons and
5 they've described the role of the surety ~nIhls.
The surety is licensed by the Department of
6
7 insurance. And the Department of Insurance determ~nesthal
8 the surety is solvent and has the ablllty to pay and
9 guarantee payment of a ball bond
And so that's why, when we're deal~ngwith
10
11 bail bond Guidelines that get to issues of the character,
12 that the fitness issues concerning the unilateral
13 determination of the TCA of the wh
I 4 agent, it's not so much an issue whe
15 like Lincoln National (sic), which doe
16 Aiaddin, who steps forward and
17 of this surety bond and we're respons~ble
for payment f
16 there is a default."
19
And so. yes, Ith~nkthere has been a
20 recognitionof that in what Your HWXX referfed to. And t
21 think that, hopefuliy, that can be a catalyst for a change
22 m some of the Guidelines at least that we're taking issue
23 with here In thls lawsult.
24
We have, of course. filed a Motion for a
25 Preliminary Injunction. And we've set forth alternative

2 this statute may change this whole ballgame, depending on
3
4
5
6
7
8

Q
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

what cMlrse the Administrative District Judge takes and
their insight into it, and what the position of the
sureties is as to what that designated agent language
means. Because I'm not sure how those thrngs play out, but
that's a pretty clear mandate.
Ioffer that to you for what it's worth. And
Ireabze you haven't had a chance to discuss that with
your Mndpals. You're here - and 1 always like to catch
lawyers on the wrong foot, if I can. And I do want to tell
you that I almost dismissed this case thrs mondng, when 1
showed up at 900 and none of you were here. And then, to
my chagrin, Irealized it was a 1:00 hearing and so I
didn't dismiss it. We're here.
That's the first question Iwant to ralse to
you. l have a whole series of other questions. I'm not
sure they relate to the issue of the preliminary
k$unctii. h d so that's probably the issue that should
go forward. So why don't we at least give them to you.
These are Wings that have been ~ n n i n g
through my mind over the last couple months that have
bothered me somewhat in looking at this whole issue, and
that is: Upon the forfeiture of a bar1bond, who has the
obltgat~onto pay? Does the contract law of the agency

-
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1 apply to the bar1 agents and the surety that issues the

2 bail bond?
3
What obligationdoes the bail agent have to a
4 third pa@, the courts, for a contract, a bail bond,
S entered into it by disclosed principal, the surety. Do
6 We Fourth District Guidelines make the bail agent a
? co-surely? Ifso. does the bail agent need to qualify as a
8 surety and obtain a Certificate of Authority pursuant to
9 T i e 41 of the Idaho Code?
10
Those things kind of run through my mind. And
11 that's one reason why Isuggested that the changes to
12 19-2927 may or may not -depending how those are taken to
13 heart by the Fowth Judicial District, might obviate some
14 of the issues that y W e raised hew.
15
Anyway, for whatever those are worth to you.
16 And i would be happy, if you think it weuid be of any
17 benefh, to take a short reass. You can talk among
18 yourselves and with each other for a minute, or we can go
19 ahead and hear the Motionfor Preiiminary Injunction.
20
MR. M Y : Iam preparedto go forward,
21 Your Honor.
22
MR. KANG: Iam also, Your Honor.
23
THE COURT: Okay. Let's go ahead.
24
MR. W Y : We'd liketo thank you,
25 Your Honor, for your remarks lhis afternoon abwi the role

Page.10
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1 bases for that preliminary injunction We submit that a
preliminary injunction is appropriate under either
Rule 65(e)l or 65(e)2, And 65(e)l makes a preliminary
injunction appropriate and I'm paraphrasing here -when
it appears by the Complaint that the plaintiff is entitled
to the relief demanded, and the relief consistent,
restraining the commission or continuance of the acts
8 complained of.
9
And with respect to 65(e)2,relief or
10 preliminary Injundion is appropriate when it appears, by
I 1 complaint or affidavit, that the commission or continuance
12 of some a d during the litigation would produce and the
13 operative language Ithink that affects our situation here
14 is "great" or "irreparable injury.' I'llcome back, if I
15 might, to 65(e)2 in a second.
.I6
But beginning with 65(e)t, we submit that we
17 have demonstrated that we are entitled to relief. And I
18 say that notwithstanding defendants' argument that this is
19 a complex or that this case presents complex issues of
20 fact and law which lkould remove it from the context or
21 remove it from the &ssibilii that we w u l d be awarded a
22 preliminary iflj~flctiofl,certainly there are no meaningfully
23 contested issues of fact.
24
We've set forth by Affidavit Ithink all of
25 the operative fads that the State has set for the

2
3
4
5
6
7

-

-

-
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I1

-

Affdavit of or submitted the Affklavit of the
2 Administrative Dlstrlct Judge and the Assistant TCA. And
3 there just are not disputed facts, that Isee, that are
4 swirling around us that would prevent entry of a
5 preliminary injunction.
With respect to complex issues of law, I
16
7 submit that we have narrowly talofed this, and presented,

I1

1
18

1
(
1

1

1

I1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Ithink, fairly clean questions of law for this Court to
9 consider. And the Court is right, this case is preceded by
10 the Leader case. And Iwon't say that this case is so much 10
[ 11
11 a reaction to that Leadermse, but there were some of
12 those same issues that at least counsel attempted to argue 12
13
13 on appeal that are mare directly fronted in this case.
14
And those issues are the separation of powers;
15
r the licensing and disciplinary pmcsdure that the
16
es have put in place violate the separation of
17 powers; and whether the removal of e bail agent from the 17
18
18 operative list that the Fourth Judicial District
19
1s maintains, that removal occurs without notice and an
20 opportunity to be heard, whether that violates due process. 20
21
Beglnnlng. first, with the separation of
a
22 powers, these Guidelines establish a licensing process and 22
23 they regulate substantive law. One does not have to look 23
24 very far to confirm that We have cited the April 6th,
24
25 2004, Administrative Order of the Court, which is found at 26

1

1
I

1

I

I1

I1

INJUNCTION

f

it's not true. Nowhere in Rule 46 is there any mention of
the bail agent. And Criminal Rule 46 takes into
consideration matters like the defendanrs nature, his
history, the alleged crime that's involved.
Now, 46(a)5 which they point the Court to,
and which Ithink we had some diswssion about at our last1
hearing, 46(a)5 permits the Court to consider the persons
who agree to assist the defendant in attending court at the
proper time.
And i submit that that language, that does not
refer to the bail agent. That refers to individuals or
people, like a parent, a spouse, a relative, a friend.
someone who has taken -maybe taken the person to their
home or has stepped forward and said, "I'm going to take
responsibility for this person to appear in court."
Now, Ipractice criminal defense. And I
practice criminal defense not only in the Fourth Judicial
District, but I practice in a number of our districts
around in couR And IwiU say that I have never heard,
and I've never heard anybody else heard that, Your Honor.
you should set bond at this amount, because, affer all, we
have Mr. Garske here who is going to be the bail agent.
Frankly, I've never seen it argued to a Court that the
Court should take into account who the bail agent is,
And Ithink to sort of pounce on this language

-

1
1

1I

1

1
1

I1
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I

1

12

Bates (Not8in the stipulated Guidelines And there%a

paragraph in that Order that provides as follows:
3 'Whereas, it is in the best interests of the general public
4 and the Court to ensure that persons or entities who are
5 permittedto present for acceptance of bail bonds in the
6 Fourth Judicial District possess qualifications of good
7 moral character, and conduct their business in an ethical.
8 prompt and law-abiding manner.* Again, that's at Bates
9 00018.
10
And we know from a number of cases that we
11 ate in our bnef, "State vs. Currington," "Jones vs. State
12 Board of Medicine," that it's the prerogatiie of the
13 legislature to define substantive rights. And substantive
( 14 righb, accordingto these cases, indude the authority to
15 regulate the rightsto pursue an occupation for the
f 6 protection of the public healh, safety, morals, M general
17 welfare.
IYs aiso, Your Honor, a well-settled right
l8
19 that to follow a recognized and useful occupation is a
M right protected by the Constitution. And in response to
Zi this argument the defendants argue that the licensing and
22 disciplinary procedure that the Guidelies create are only
23 there to ensure the presence of a criminal defendant in
24 court.
25
And I have to say that Cs just simply

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

I1

1

f

1
1
1

1
1

1
1

1
I

-

I

4 ofd(a)l that refers to a person who's agreedf.
2 assist a person in attendingcowl is a misreadingof Ihe
3 statute or a misreading of the rule.
4
I think one also needs to keep In mind what I
5 think the Cwrt started today's hearing with, and what i
6 responded to, was Ule nature of the bail bond process.

FAX

'I Where it's the surety, who's licensed and regulated by the
8 Department of Insurance, who is guaranteeing payment of the
Q bond if the defendant fails to appear.
10
The Gddelines' Ucensing process, I
11 SUbmit, are also not an exercise of judicial discretion.
12 Judicial discretion o c w in cases involving bond bn a
13 case-by-case bask. It doesn't occur through the
14 administration of a licensing process by not only the ADJ,
16 but the Trial Court Administrator and his staff.
And we have cited this American Druggist case,
16

I
1 17
1 18
1 19
1 20

21
22
23
24
25

1

a case out of the Ekrvanth Circuit, which Imink captures
this idea quite cM#jsely. That case says that the key to
achieving the appropriate balance between regulation of
sureties and j u d i i discretion to create appropriate bail
conditions is to assure that the Court is actually
exercising discretion anticipated for individual bond
apprwal. And Isubmit that that is a reference to
consHeration of bond on a case-by-case basis.
Now, the defendants in thls case argue in

I
1
I
I
1
I
1
1
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1 Because, after all, we're talking about licensing and

I response to Rat, that it would be too much of a strain to
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

have bond heard individually-to have bond heard on a
case-by-case basis, but that's how it happened. That's how
it happens anyway, except in misdemeanor cases where
there's a schedule and bond is established by a
predetermined schedule, or In cases where an arrest warrant
is obtalned and the prosecutor makes a presentationabout
what the bond should be and the factors for the Court to
consider.
And never in those ex parte communications,
which we somebmes obtain tapes of, is there a d~scussion
of who the bail agent is going to be. It's done Fight now
on a case-by-case basis, and it does not overly tax the
judiciarj, l submit.
THE COURT: Aren't they talking about -- not
that - on an ind~vidualbasis they're saying that, without
a preapproval of the list of bail agents, every time a bail
agent wanted to post bail, he would have to appear in cwrt
to be approved by the lrial judge, That's their argument
Is that it's the fact that we have a posting of
these you can't just go post the bad. And what the
Administrative District Judge has done is say, 'Well, we're
going to preapprove all these people as people who are In
good character who can take and post a bal bond." At
least that's the rattonale behind it.

-

2 substantive matters that we have -where we've vested the
3 legisiaturewith the author~tyto govern In this area
There is also mention by the defendants of
4
5 how requiring this to occur on a case-by-case basis will
6 overly tax the jud~cial will cause the expendlure of
7 unnecessaryjudlcral resources And Isubmit that if thls
8 Court were to look at the Affidavits that we submitted and
9 look at the process that's In place, this bureaucratic
10 process that requires applications and investigation of the
I 1 backgroundand renewal, and all of the disputes that arise
12 as a result of the operative Guidelines in this district,
$3 and issues that we subml are totally divorced from the
14 appearance of an individual defendant in caurt, that untold
15 judicial resources wll be saved just by doing away with
$6 this process.
17
We also argue due process, Your Honor
18 procedural due process, that the Guidel~nesthat these
$9 defendants deprive and threaten to deprive pla~ntifls
of
20 protected interestswithout comporHng wlth the
21 requirements of proceduraldue pmcess. And there IS a
22 protected Interest. Now, that protected interest is not
23 the produoer's license, but rather these Guidelines
24 restrict and regulate licensed agents agents licensed by
25 the Department of insurance, their ability to conduct
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MR. McKAY: And Iwould say in response, I
think these people have been preappoued. They have been
preapprovedby the Department of Insurance.
THE COURT: You're saying, then, the courts
have no ability to take and require do a separate
preapproval? l thought American Druggist went the other
way, myself. Ithought it ckatly Wicated that the
courts do have that discretion.
MR. MMAY: I think American D~ggist
was
dealing with situations Involvingsureties where there had
been a number of
THE COURT: Ws the same argument.
MR. McKAY: had been a number of defaults.
THE COURT: It's the same issues, I think,
that we're taking here.
MR. W Y r Yes. I think wha: I said at the
last hearing is that, yes, this Court can maintaina
list of bail agents who have been approved and who am
licensed by the Dapartment of lnsuranca. And that should
be the operative list that a sheriff, that a derk, that
the Court can rely on. And if there's a pmblemwith those
agents and again, there's no evidence in the recordthat
there has been a problem with these people not paying bonds
that they're obligated to pay, but if there's a problem,
then you'd take that up with the Departmentof Insurance.
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business in the counties of Ada, Elmore, Valley.
and Boise County.
And it doesn't matter that it's only
restficted to those counties, to the Fourth Judicial
District. Rather, it's the fact that the government in
this case the Court has stepped in and is depriving
W s e agents of this constitutionallyprotected interest
without notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
And, of course I mean, the reason that the
legislature, the reason that the Department of Insurance
has to provide notice and oppoFtunity to be heard is
because a producer's license imbues a person with a right
to pursue an ocwpational liberty their occupational
liberty. And that's exactly what's occurring here. When a
person is denied the opportunity to lae en the list, they're
denied an opportunity to pursue their right to occupational
liberty.
Now, we ate to Section 14(b) of the
Guidelines that as one of the areas where we say that
tlrere was not notice or a hearing prior to removal. And I
t h ' i possibly there's some misunderstandingby the
defendants of our argument on this. What happens under
14(b) is the Trial Court Administrator sends notice to an
24 agent informing them of a violation, telling them that you
25 have ten days to
the violation or you'll be subjed
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1
1 to removal.
2
At that point the bail agent has a choice.
2
3
3 They can file a p e f i i n and they can challenge this
4
4 determination that a violation occurred. They can also
5
5 choose to redify the vlolatlon. They can send the
6
6 papemork in or do whatever is descraed -whatever the
7
7 deficiency that is described in the letter, they can
8
8 attempt to remedy that. And if they haven't also
9
9 challenged the violation and they've only attempted to
10
10 rectify the violation, the Trial Court Administrator, at
I1
11 that point, if they determine that they have not rectified
12
12 it, they have the authority, and they have, in the past,
13
13 removed that person from the list without further notice
14 and without an opportunity to be heard. And we submit tha 14
15
15 there's very llttle effort that would be required to
16
16 provide this additional notice and a pre-removal hearing.
f 17
Mathews vs. Eldridge, a U.S.S u p m Court
117
18
18 case, says that the relevant factor in determining the
19
19 process due is the likelihood that the pre-procedure will
20
20 prevent erroneous deprivation.
21
And if you k o k at the two situations that we
22
22 presentedto the Court by way of Affidavit involving
21
23
23 Mr. Garske, both of those situations w l d have been
24 avoided simply by some communication, by notice and an 24
25
25 opportunity to be heard.

I
1

1
1

l

1

1

I

situation that the TCA could have dealt with by Simply
respondingwith a letter that said, "You're right. If a
motion is pending in that case we woh't take action. But
you don't have a motion pending in this case." And what
she sent is she sent back a letter she sent back a
letter &at just said the first part of it and referred
only to "State vs, Carla Grieve," without reference to a
case number, without referenceto any of the other tracking
information that you always see in correspondence from the
TCA's office. And then what happens two days later is
Mr. Garske is, again, removed from the list.
And Isubmit if you look at not just that
situation in Isolation, but If you look at the totally of
the situation, I think that there is a certain amount of
gotcha quality to this. That the interest is -and the
actions by the TCA's office in this case it's not just
driven by a desire to ensure the defendants appear, but
it's diiven by this rigid application and interpretationof
the Guidelines.
And Iguess at the risk of sounding
self-sewing or more self-serving, my clients did not go
into thb litigationlightly. They don't relish this
litigation. Thls isn't a whimsical exerdse sulng the
Court that they do business in, suing the ADJ. the TCA, the
Assistant TCA, who they do business with on a daily basis.
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In 2006, it was a situation involving the
2 criminal history his prior criminal his purporled
3 failure to provide a criminal history check to the TCA's
4 office. And of course the TCA later found that that had
5 been delwered by Interdepartmental mail. But, In the
6 meantime. Mr. Garske was removed from the list on a Friday,
7 and he and 39 agents who operate under his supervision were
8 unable to do business for four days.
9
Another situation Involves that we
10 described in the Affidavits of not only Mr. Ganke but
11 Mr. Charney, W v e s a situation involving a defendant,
12 Carla Grieve, who had two cases pending. And the TCA sent
13 a notice to Aladdin in c o f u w mwith one of those cases
14 and said, "An Order has been issued foffeitii the bond.
16 Pay thls bond withfn ten days."
16
Counsel for Aladdin, in response to %at
17 letter, sent back his own letter that said, "It's our
18 understandingthat if a motion is pending, according to the
I 9 Guidelines. you will not remove the bail agant or take
20 adion until the motion is re~olvad.~
And counsel h that
21 case. frankly, confused the two cases. He thought it was
22 one case and not the other case.
23
THE COURT: Who's at fault in that one?
WIR McKAY: Well, it was not a perfed
25 situation. It was not a perfect situation. But it was a
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1 They would much rather have it be like every other judicial
2 district where they could just go about doing their
3 business.
4
But the situation and you see this in the
5 Affidavits; you see this in all of the attachments to the
6 Affidavits. The situation, Your Honor, simply has become
7 untenable. It's got to the point where we have brought
8 this litigationand we're asking this Court to enter a
9 preliminary injunction to assist them in continuing to do
10 business.
$1
NOW,the other prong of our argument, of
12 course, is whether the Complaint and Affidavit show great
13 or irreparable injury. It's in the disjunctive; %(e)2
14 speaks to "great" or 'irreparable injury." And we submit
15 that we have demonstrated both great and irreparable
16 injury.
17
The TCA's office has m p l e t e control over
18 Aladdin's business. They have the ability to shut down
19 their business over de minimis matters. They have a say in
20 who what licensed agents they utilize to do business in
21 this district. And the plaintiffs in this case am
22 constantly having to defend their ability to do business by
23 responding to violation notices.
And the ability to shut down Aladdin and put

-

-
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the situatioo involving Mr.Garske and the 39 bail agents
who were put out of business for four days. And ifI
could and Irecognize this is somewhat redundant. This
is Exhibit C to Exhibit 5 of the Dennis Chafney Affidavit
But if I could hand this to the Court.
(The document was handed to the Court.)
MR. McKAY: And I'll also provMe counsel with
coptes.
(The document was handed to counsel.)
MR. Md<AY: Under these Guidelines,
Your Honor, only one supervising agent can be listed per
bail agency. And so the effect of the TCA suspending
Mr. Garske without notice is th8t you see here in
Exhibit C is a letter dated January 13,2006, from the PCA
where 39 possibly it's 30; 1 believe it's 39; maybe It's
38 bail agents, together with Mr. Garske, were shut dowf
for four days until counsel for Aladdin could get in front
of the judge and get hhn reinstated.
Mr.Garske is a *year veteran of the bail
bond business. He's always passed his criminal history
checks. This Court has never had to file a civil action to
recover on a bond that he's been involved with. And yet
he's been threatened with removal as late as January 3rd,
2006, May 1st 2007, and June Ist, 2007. He was actually
removed in connection with thls situationon January 1W,

-

-

-
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1 Sunshine Musick case. That was a situation w h e r e her
2 foner employer had failed to pay forfeited bond. So
3 because her former employer had failed to pay forfeited
4 bond, Ms. Musick was assessed with two wolations.
There's the Rebecca Salines situation which I
5
6 think this Court is familiar with. It's alleged in her
7 Complaint she was threatened with removal because of a
8 check charge that was dismissed, that she was never made
9 aware of. It was a charge that was filed and dismissed,
10 together with a dog at large case that, yes, she was
11 aware she became aware of, but the TCA's officewas
12 aware of it as well.
The TCA's ofice also has a hand in
13
14 how Aladdin -how the plaintiffs utilized their Department
15 of Insurance-licensedemployees. There's three situations
16 that we've describe in our Affidavits, m involvingJerin
17 Liscinski, where he had to file a petition, including a
18 filing fee. to resume doing business as a bail agent,
19 because he was a prior bail agent and he had voluntanly
10 removed his name from the list, bemuse he decided to work
ll in the real estate business.
22
But than when he came back to work, because he
23 had removed albeit he had voluntarily been removedfrom
24 the list, the Gu~delmesprovided he would have to file a
25 petition and pay a filing fee with the Court It just

-

-
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1 and again on May (4th. 2007. Again. this is releded
2 in the Affidavits we have submitted; the Affidavits of
3 Mr. Chamey and Mr. Garske.
Just on June 26,2007,just prior to when we
1 4
5 filed this motion, the TCA's office informed Mr. Garske

1
16
I7
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that he had committed his sixlh violation by not
immediately informing the TCA's office that an agent had
relocated out of state. And so according to the
Guidelmes, under your fourth violationthey can petition
for your removal. So Mr. Garske is now in a state of
having the TCA's office having determined he's committed a
sixth violation, and he continues to do business subject
to their decision to not petitionfor hi removal,
Offentimes, this removal occurs or the b e a t of removal
occurs over matters that are simply outside the control of
the plaintiffs.
Ireferred the Court to the criminal history
check that was sent by ISP through the hterdepaitmentel
mail. Mr.Garske had nothing to do with when that was
delivered or received by the TCA's office. There's

-

-

reference to a situation involvinga death certificate a
Uueat of violation, because them wasn't a death
23 certificate presented. when no death wtificate was
24 available.
25
The case has been corrsdidatedwith the

1 wasnl enough to submit an application.
2
Waiter Almaraz was a victim of identify theft.
3 The Trial Court Administrator's office, we submit, was
4 confused by his criminal history. And although he was

5
6
7
8

licensed by the Department of Insurance, although he had
been adiveiy doing business in the Third Judicial
Distrid, he was repeatedlydenkd requests to be placed on
the Fourth Judicii District l i t .
0
Jeremy Beal is another situation. He was
10 denied almost iive years ago, because he had a rnisderneano~
I1 criminal history. Under the revised version of the
12 Guidelines the criminal history that he had would not even
13 be considered at this date, but it was another snuatlon
I4 where he's licensed by the Department of Insurance, he's
15 posting bond inthe Third Judicial Distii, and he has to
(6 fib a petition, pay a filing fee and, through counsel,
17 . pursue placement on the Ust.
18
These aren't isolated instances,we submit.
18 This is, to use !he words of a few treatises, CJS,these
20 are constant daily threats and expenditures of time and
21 resources. And CJS provides an irreparable injury exists
22 where a wrtain pecuniary standard to measure damage is
23 lacking, ofwhen the avauable remedy at law consists of a
24 large nwrber of sults fordamages whlch, by mason of their
25 number and cost, would produoe no substantial result.
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I That's also in the 42 Pan.Jur. This is in our briefing,
2 Your Honor.
Iguess it's a way of saying we litigate thls
4 stuff all the time and Vs not enough. It doesn't change
5 thlngs. And there is no adequate remedy available. We are
6 cornpeiled to seek the declaratMyjudgment that we seek by
7 virtue of this lawsuit, and we also seek a preliminary
8 injunction because of the irreparable injury that flows,
and the threat of irreparable injury that exists on a
day-tday basis in this district.
There was some mention in the defendants'
brefing that they w~llsuffer ineparable injury If a
prel~minaryInjunctionis entered. Isubmlt that they wlU
not. There's a process In place. The Court considersbond
in these cases on an individual basis. The surety ifa
bail agent if a licensed surety -if a licensed bail
agent engages in misconduct or demonstrates incompetence
there's a diiplinary procedure avalable through the
19 Department of Insurance.
If the defendant doesn't appear, as the
21 defendants point out in their brief, the defendants can
22 pursue a civil action which they do through the proseating
20
23 attorney's ofice. A preliminary injunctionwill not cause
24 them injury. We submit that if the Cowt does not enter a
25 preliminary injunctionwe will. And that it's appropriate

I

I
1

I'm trying to f w e and that's one of the
6
7 reasons I raise that as one of the questions Ihave, to
8 beginwith. Where is the contract with the bail agent? Is
it part of th~srecord that I've got7
MR. KANG: Yes. The contract with the bail
agent, I'm not sure if It Is part of the record. But your
question -THE COURT: Well, if it's not. then I'm not
going to consider it as part of the record. That's one of
the things Idon't have a copy of the agency agreement
between the bail agent and the surety, which is apparently
filed with the Trial Court Administrator's office. Ikeep
looking for this idea that --where does this personal
19 responsibility of the bail agent come into this?
MR. KANO: And as Iwas preparing for this
21 hearing I also had concerns about what does It mean when -22 look, the State vs. Abracadabra refers to the surety. Who
20
23 has the responsibility in that contract? And it is one of
24 the first issues that 1 take up in my presentation.
26
THE COURT: Go ahead.

-
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I
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1 this contract that you have with the bail agent? 1
2 understand you've got one with the surety. But as I
3 understand, the general law in Idaho is that an agent has
4 no responsibility and no liability on a contract that he
6 enters into on behalf of a disclosed principal.
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1 to enter a preliminary injunction under both 65te)l and
1
2 65(e)2 If I could, Your Honor, have a second to confer
2
3 with my counsel to make sure l haven't missed anything?
3
4
THE COURT: Go ahead.
4
5
MR. McKAY: Your Honor, that's all I have,
5
6
THE COURT: Okay.
6
7
MR.KANG: May I approach, Your Honor?
7
8
THE COURT: You may.
8
9
9
(Documents were handed to the Court.)
10
MR.KANG: The first document, the fiow chart,
10
11 is one created by myself in preparation for t
hishearing.
11
12 The second one is the State defendant's additional
12
13 authority which, per Your Honot's Older, he would like to
13
14 receive copies of all the cases that are cited to; I have
14
15 complied, and those are the cases that I will be citing to
15
16 you during my presentation. Also, l
you'li look at the
16
17 index, Ihave specifically pointed out which pages that 1
17
18 am referring to, but I'm not going to refer to those
18
19 specific pages in my presentation today.
19
20
THE COURT: Let me ask you a question, because 20
21 I've got your flow chart on tap and it just jumps out at
21
22 me, and that's the box at the bottom. And it says
22
23 (reading) The relationship between the Court -the State, 23
24 and the bail agent surety Is contractual (end reading).
24
25
Now, 1 guess I'm trying to find out what is
25

MR. KANG: The Motion for Preliminary
Injunction should be denied because the plaintiffs' fail to
meet the burden of showing rightful injunction under either
of the theories alleged; the reasonable likelihood of
success, or great or irreparable injuries.
Iwould like to first take up the issue of the
surety under State v. Abracadabra.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. KANG: And then Iwill address each of
their arguments, including separation of powers, due
process, and authority, separately from the contract
basis. As you can tell from the Row chart that Ihave
presentedto the Court, there are hvo distinct tracts of
power, one from the Constitution, one from the State of
Idaho for the Issues involved In thls case.
The judiciary, based on its inherent authority
and discretion to accept or deny bond, and the legislature
which grants the Department of Insurance their authority to
license bail agents, e licensed bail agent's ability to
submit bail and the Court's discretion to accept or deny
only interconnect when a Court chooses to enter into a
contract with the bail agent.
I understandthat State v. Abracadabra refers
to this agent -or this person as the "surety." And that
is the first hurdle of Abracadabra's applicationto this
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that they go af&er the bail agent for recovering that.
THE COURT: That's not in my record.
MR. KANG. Iunderstandthat. That's just my
5 representation of how l understandthings to work.
THE COURT: And there's nothing hem, IS

2 case? Did this fefer to the insurance company, as
3 plaintiffs assert, like Lincoln National (sic), or is it in
4 reference to the ball agent?
This question was answered by the Court in
5

2

11 c~ttesto a number of authorities which, pertinent to

11 in the court file, Isn't 117
MR. KANG: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Now, I would note for the record
14 also, that we don't have a copy of any ball bond that ha

13 Counts I and IIof the additional authority.
14
And first Iwould like to point to Tab No. I ,
16 And in that section Am.Jur. defines the surety as the

20 agent is also considered a surety.
Further cementing thls principle that the bail
21

THE COURT: Let me also say my guess is
21 somewhat qualified, because l you look back in the

23 the Department of Insurance. And Iwould direct the

23 has a language for the bail to give. And Iassume that the

25 agent license supplied in her Affidavit.

25 language isn't codified by statute. Go ahead.
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1
You will note at the heading it says, "bail
2 agent," underneath it "surety." You will also note in the
3 two parts that ate given to the bail agent, on the sacond
4 part to the right it says, "bail agent," and again,
5 underneath, it states "surety."
6
THE COURT: And does that reflect that this is
7 a buslness In town practicing as a bail agent?
8
MR. KANG: Yes, Ywr Honor. A bail agent has
9 many hats. And Ibelieve one of the hats is not only as a
10 bail agent but also assumes the duty of a partial surety,
1.1 or at least co-liability with the s u m company that
12 insures the
13
THE COURT: Do you have any case authority for
14 thatproposition?
15
MR. KANG: Ido not, Your Honor.
16
THE COURT: It's a wonderful theory, but then
17 you raise the issue of if they are a co-surety for
18 compensationdon't they then have to qualify as an
19 insurance company underneath the insurance code of the
20 state? And, if so. that means we should throw al the bail
21 agents in j a l for violating the insurance code.
22
MR. KANG: Idon't have any further author&
23 for this, Your Honor. My understanding of the relationship
24 between the bail agent and the insurance company is that
25 they enter into a separate contract whereby if a forfeiture

-
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MR. KANG: Getting back to State v.
Abracadabra with their contractual designation of the
relationshipbetween the Court and the bail agent, and the
Court's majority oplnion refenlng to or referencing
these two that I have designated in Tab No. 1 and 2, it is
evident that when they are discussing the contract between
the Court and the surety they are talking about the
contract between the Court and the bail agent.
The question then before the Court is whether
or not a contract violates constitutional principles under
the separation of powers doctrine or due process. First,
there is no separation of powers issue. The Guidelines
provide the minimum standards by which the Court in the
Fourth Judiial Districtwill accept from bail agents with
whom they will contract.
If we were to accrtpt plaintiffs' theory an6
place every agent that is l i e d by the Department of
Insurance on the list, then the legislature, through the
Departmentof Insurance, would in effect be forcing the
courts of the Fourth Judicial District to enter into
contracts with every bail agent that is licensed. This is
contrary to the very essence of a contract.
In Wilbur vs. Blanchard, 22 Idaho 517,
126 P,1069, which is designated in Tab 4 of the additional
authority, the Court stated ". all contracts and

-

..
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1 agreements shall be founded upon the exercise of the free

(

I
1

2 wit1 of the parties which is the real essence of all
3 contracts." The maklng of a contract requires the free
4 exercise of the will or power of the contrading parties
5 and the free meeting and blending of their minds.
The Guidelines specificaly the portions
6
7 dealing with the list which is being challenged here
8 today -do not violate the separation of powers doctrine,
9 because it does not encroach upon the central functions of (
10 the legislature and Department of Insurance, but rather
11 sets forth minimum qualifications and standards that they
12 seek in persons who they will contrad with of their free
13 accord.
14
THE COURT: And again, %'syour position that
15 the contract that's posted here is between the bail agents
16 and the Court?
MR. KANG: That is cqrrect, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
19
MR. KANG: The contractual nature also
20 disposes of the due process clalm, because a
21 constitutionally recognized propety requires not only not
22 just a mere entitlement, but requues a legitimate claim of
23 entitlement to it. If we go under State v. Abracadabra,
24 and the framework provided that it is a contrad between
25 the bail agent and the Court representing the State, then

13
4
5
6

7

18

I
1

1
1

1
1

However, as Istated at h e beginning of my
presentation, Iwould also like to address it outside the
contractualcontext and discuss the separation of powers,
authority, and due process, and tern. First, I wwld Like
to take up authority. The Idaho Supreme Court held in
Idaho Press Club, Incorporated, vs. State Legislature of
the State, 142 ldaho 640, 132 P.3d 397, which is in Tab 5
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there can be no legitimate claim of entitlement to it,
because the contract, by its very essence, is to enter into
a contract by a free will. Because it is dependent on the
free will of another party, there can be no legllmate
claim of entitlement to it, Your Honor.
Furthemre, there are no great or irreparable
injuries which arise under the contractual theory, because
by entering into a contract with the Fourth Judicial
District, the bail agent agrees to abide by its terms. Any
injuty which results is due to the breach of the terms of
the contract.
THE COURT: You're now talking about the
contrad It is not the bail bond. But you're saying by
submitting to the licensure, that's the contrad they have
before the Diitrict, is what you're trying to tell me?
MR. KANG: No, Your Honor. What I'm saying is
the contad between the bail agent and the Court and that
the terms of the Guidelines are part of that contract when
they enter into
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. KANG: On that basis, Your Honor, if we
continue to go down the road of State v. Abracadabra, w d
the legal framework that it provides, then the plaintiffs'
request for preliminary lnjunctlonfalls bemuse there is
no reasonable likelihood of success, and there is no great

/

9 of additional authority, that our state constitution is a
10 limltatlon, not a grant of power.
Because the Constitution is not a grant of
11
12 power. there is no reason to believe that a constitutional
(3 provisionenumerating powers of a branch of government was
14 intended to be an txclusiw list. The branch of government
15 would inherently have powers that were not induded in that
$6 list However, where the framers drafted a provision
17 expressly limiting certain powers, there is no reason to
18 believe that they intended that llmitatmnto be broader
19 than as enumerated in the Constitution. statute or rule.
The purpose of such a provision Is to define
20
21 the limitations. So had they wanted to impose limitations.
22 they auld have easily done so. Why is this pertinent to
23 the case before the Court today? There is the universally
24 recognized nrle which is also cited in that case, Rule of
26 Construction, that states where a constiiution or statute
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spedfies certain things, the designation of such t h i s
exdudes others.
What we need to do in applying that stance
by the Idaho Supreme Court Is to determine whether
Administrative District Judge W~fliamsonhad the authority
to promulgatethe Guidelines, and we must look at the power
granted to determine whether there was a limitationon the
power or it was enumeration on the power. If it was
enumerationon the power, then she is not limited by just
what is written down. If it's a limitation, then she is
limitedto what's spedficaliy enumerated.
Idaho Code Section 2-90? allows the
Administrative Judge to adminlster the operation of
district court. This is clearly a grant of power, Your
Honor, and not a limitation, and does not Kmii the
AdministraBw District Judge in her authority over the
operation of the courts.
In the Idaho Supreme Court's Order dated
August 4,2005, the Court recognizedthis by stating, under
Idaho Code Section 1-907, 'The powers and duties of
Administrative District Judge indude, but are not limited
lo, ail those powers and duties set forth in statute or in
other ~ l e of
s the S u p m e Court as well as the following."
And under Section 18 they say spedficalty "EstabUsh
guidelines for bail bonds with regard to posting,
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1 forfeiture, exoneralion and all other matters." The Order
2 of the Supreme Cwrt is also a grant of power and not a
3 limbtion.
THE COURT: Doesn't it, by its terms, at least
4
5 as you express it right there it's saying it's granting

-

6 this under 1-Q07?
MR. KANG: Yes, Your Honor.
7
THE COURT: So maybe lt is a limitationW ' s
8
9 contained in 1-907.
MR. KANG: And under 1-907 our argument is
10
11 that it goes to the operation of the court. And so i f the
12 power exerased in promulgating the Guidelines related to
13 the operation of the courts, because it k not lim~tedin
14 any other fashion in 1-907, that It is within the swpe of
15 the Administrative District Judge to promulgate.
The Supreme Coal. as stated, granted this
16
17 power under their Supreme Court Order dated August 4,2005
18 having knowledgeof M s rule of construction. We can
19 asMane that they could have limited it or devwd the Order
20 so that it is m limit~nglanguage or language of
21 Ibnttation rather than a grant of power, but they chose not
22 to, Your Honor.
23
The Guidelinesestablished by the
24 Administrative DistridJudge Williamson falls within the
25 scope of Ulis Order in 1-907, because it does relate to the

-

THE COURT: That wasn't my question. She may
1
2 have gotten advlce from a whole bunch of people. Are you
3 saylng that every judge in the Fourth Judicial D~strictwho
4 has the discretion by statute, the case law to approve
5 balance, that that discretion is trumped by the
6 Administrative Distnd Judge? And isn't that the case
T that we had and maybe that's the American Druggist or
8 one of the other cases, but we had that very issue out
9 there. If you're going to have ~ndividualdiscretion, yes.
10 Now you're just saying we're going to exercise it for you.
I1 You're saying that she -- can she do that also on
12 sentenungs?
MR. KANG: Your Honor, my response to that
13
I4 would be that I don't belleve that each court does have
15 the inherent authority to approve or deny a bond The
16 Admin~strativeDistrict Judge is speaklng for the courts
17 under her authority, because she is the one charged with
I8 exercising the duty of over the administrative operat~on
19 of the courts. I guess exercis~ngthat discretion of all
20 the other underlying courts. Is that troubling, in terms
21 of how you pose the question? Yes, Your Honor. Ican't
22 deny the fact that the Administrative District Judge is the
23 one who placed the Order on there. And it does not say
24 that it is within it is the discretion of all the
25 courts, and it is

-

-

-

-

Page 4'
Page 43
FAX (208) 938-184: (208) 938-0213
FAX (208) 938-1843
ACCURATE COURT REPORTING
ACCURATE COURT REPORTING

(206) 938-0213

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY I N J U N C T I O N
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
I1
12
13
14
15
16
17
I8
19
20
21
22

operation of the district courts, and it does so by
promoting efficiency within the court system. And to
further eiaborate on thet, Your Honor, the list that is
created that is being dralknged today is nterely a
mechanical device. it is an administrative toot. Counsel
for plaintiffs contend that the list affects the
substantive rights of ball agents. Idlsagree.
It isn't the list that is affecting the Fights
of the bail agents, because the Court has inherent
authority on an individual case-by-case basis to approve c
deny a bond. Whether they choose to approve or deny a
bond, that is what affects the bail agent The list is
merely a creation, a mechanicaldevice, by which the list
of all those people that they have preappmved within theif
discretion is placed. The list itself

-

THE COURT: Just so we're clear here, you're
saying that Ws preapproved within the discretion. You're
saying the Admhristrative Distrid Jodge basically has the
authority, due to discretion, for every judge in the
district?

MR. K4NQ If you will look at the Affidavit
that was submiied by Administrative District Judge
23 Williamson, I believe that she d
id testify that she took
24 into consideration and asked for advice from a variety of
26 people.
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THE COURT: You know, there is a provision for
adopting local rules that require a majority action by the
district judges and then approval by the Supreme Court.
Now, you might have a clearer thing if that was the
statement of the discretion of all the judges. But I'm
trylng to find out, are you saylng that the Admlnlstratlve
District Judge has the power to make that exercise -- or
Iimii the diswetion. Ishould say, is really what it
does I S i t s the discretion of all the other judges in
the district by saying you can't accept a bond except from
mylist?
MR. KANG: The way 1 would answer that,
Your Honor, is the now of power from the Constitution to
the ldaho Supeme Court says that the ldaho Supreme Court
has the ablllty to administer the affairs of all the lower
courts.
THE COURT: The Supreme Court could say,
"Okay, no judges will accept bonds except from A. 0. C.
and D
'?
MR. KANG: Going off the power of the
Contiiution, Iwould have to say that is our position,
Your Honor, 1s that that authority is provided to Ule
Administrative DistridJudge, which flows horn the Supreme
Court, which has the authority to administer the affairs of
the district courts. The Administrative District Judge has

-
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1 been appointed to be the person to administer the affiin
2 of the district courts And within that discretion and the
3 authority granted to her, she took upon herself to
4 determine, in the
of the Fourth Judicial
5 District as a whole, the terms of which bail agents that
6 they wish to contract with, Your Honor.
7
THE COURT: Okay.
MR.KANG: Your Honor, cons~derattonof bail
8
9 agents, golng back to the authority of the Court, is a
10 critical factor in approving or denying a bond as reflected
11 n ldaho Criminal Rule 46(a)(5). I understand opposing
12 counsers posltion that he interprets subsection 5 to be
13 referring to friends, family. But it does not say or limit
14 it to friends and family. It says, "Persons who are going
15 to be responsible for the defendant attending court"
THE COURT: Where does the responsibility for
16
17 the bail agent come for dolng that, just as long as we're
18 talking about 46(a)?
19
MR.KANG: In that responsibility, Your Honor,
20 it comes from when the bail agent submits itself to the
21 Court and represents that they are going to be tendering
22 the bond for the defendant.
THE COURT: They don't submit themselves to
23
24 the Court. All they do is sign a Power of Attorney and a
25 bond and give it to the sheriff and the guy gets out of

1 language to refer to only families and parents.
THE COURT: Isn't the question related to
2
3 whether or not a person wouM be released on therr own
4 recognizance, or the amount of bail, or admltted to bail,
6 aren't those factors that are made oftentimes wlthout even
6 knowing whether the bail agent is golng to be involved?
MR. KANG: If it is to their own recognizance,
7
8 yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, let's say that I set the
9
10 bail on a defendant of $50,000, and he goes downstairs to
11 the SheMs Office and he gives them a cashier's check
12 for $50,000, and he's posted bail. Ihaven't given any
13 thought with releasing him to a bail agent, have I?
MR. K . G :In that scenario, no, Your Honor.
14
15 But I think once a bail agent imposes themselves as
16 representingor being a representative of the defendant,
17 that is a different scenario.
18
THE COURT: And is he a representatrue of the
19 defendant or a representative of the surety?
20
MR. KANG: Again, Ibelieve that's where the
21 multiple hats are being worn, is that the bail agent is an
22 agent for the surety. And at the same time, under the
23 Court's perspective, the bail agent is coming to the Court
24 and representing to the Court that they are going to do
25 what they can to reassure that the defendant is present.
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1 jail. That's generally the way it works, isn't it?
2
MR. KANG: Iwould say by signing that
3 document il Is a representation to the Court that they are
4 releasing w they are assisting the defendant in being
5 released on bail after having met with the defendant and
6 determining that the defendant is likely to return to
7 court. And in support of that Iwouid cite to the
8 memmndumthat l filed in response -or reply to the
9 Motion to Dismiss where there are some cases which Icite
10 talking about the bail agent's responsibility.
11
THE COURT: And whlle we're dolng that I can
12 tell y w that a large number of the cases that have been
13 cited are under statutory schemes and bail schemes
14 significantly diierent from those of Idaho, where they
15 actuaky have a personal bail agent who personally is the
16 surety for the and clearly Ihe surety for the bond.
17 They posted t!eir deposits and they have all different
18 things. So a lot of those are not helphrl in analyzing
19 this, bemuse they do come W w a different scheme. Some
20 of them are helpful in giving me some direction. though.
21 Go ahead.
22
MR.KANG: Going back to the Rule of
23 CMStnrdion as applied to ldaho Criminal Rule 36(a), it is
24 also a grant of authority, a grant of the discretion, and l
25 would say that Section (a)5 should not be limited in its

-

-
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M E COURT: Where do I get that representation
from the bail agent? Does he come Into court and tell me
that or does he sign some piece of paper that tells me
that? How do l get that?
MR. KANG: Iwould have to when they're not
actually appearing before the Court. Ithink the Court
would have to rely on the signing of the documents.
THE COURT: You're just saying just from the
sheer fact that they're going to act with the power of
attorney on behalf of a surety, that's their assurance?
They're gang to take thls person under their wing and take
them home, and feed them, and think that they'll be back tc
court?
MR.KANG: Again, Ithink there's the multiple
hats that come into play. And they're not only the agent
for the surety, but they are also the person &at the Court
looks to for reassuring that the defendant comes to court.
THE COURT: And what is the basis for the
Court to look to the bail agent to make sure the defendant
comes to couit?
MR. KANG: I belleve in releasing the
defendant into their care.
THE COURT: And do you think there's actually
a physical release of the defendant into their care? Is
there anything that says that? Tttere's a lot of cases that

-
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1 talk abo& dease to the @re of the surety. The surety

1 not affed the iicensing authority of the Department of
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has it's a different kind it's not a total freedom.
You're really free underneaththe Surety's more
mnefidal incarceration" Ithink is the Language one of
the cases used. But Is it really the bail agent?
MR. KANG: Ibelieve that it isn't an actual
physlml release of custody to the bail agent. But Ithink
the bail agent has a respansibility for bond here, and to
be in contact with the defendant, to essure them that they
will return to court.
n-IE COURT: Is there any contract between the
court and the bail agent or the court and the surety, for
that matter, or even in the Guidelines, that say that the
bail agent IS going to keep In contact with the defendant
and advlse h i of his court appearances and make sure he
shows up? Or is it only the payment of money if he
doesn't?
MR. W O : It is the payment of money if he
doesn't if the forfeiture occurs then . . .
THE COURT: And the bag agent doesn't owe any
of that, does he?
MR. W G : It is the surety insurance company
that does owe that, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. KANG: I would now like to move on to the

-

-

Insurance. And the judiciary has an interest in ensuring
that the defendants are released in10 the custody of tl~ose
that maintain the confidence of the Court to retum the
defendant badr at the court when Ys time The presence
of the defendant to detemtne guilt or lnnocxmce is
essantial to the judlclal process, so the judiciary does
have a significant interest in that area
The separation of powers doctrine s not
intended to prohibit one branch from taking action probably
withln a sphere that has an incidentaleffect of
duplicating a function or procedure delegated to another
branch. Iwill direct the Court's attention to Tabs 8
through 10. which are 16 CJS Constitutional Law, Sect~on
217, Younger v Superior Court, 21 Cal.3d 102, and Way v.
Superior Court, 74 Cal.App.3d 165.
"Consideration of some similar factors as used
by the Department of Insurance in the licensing of ball
agents is merely incidental and does not deprive or
encroach upon the fundin essential to the operation of
the Department of Insurance's licensing procedure." Once
again, Your Honor, the Guldellnes did not take away the
bail agent's license.
To advocate a strict separation of powers
requiring three airtight departments is an archaic view and
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sepamZwn of powers argument, Your Honor.
1
M E COURT Sure.
2
MR. KANG: The main argument by the plaintrffs
3
with regard to the separation of powers is that the
4
Guidelines take into consideration facton that are also
5
used by the Deparbnent of Insurance in their licenstng
6
procedure. The Maho Supreme Court, in Electors of
7
Big Butle Area vs. State 8oard of Education, 78 Idaho 602, 8
308 P.2d 225,which is h a t e d in Tab 6, "It Is not always
9
possible to draw a sharp line of d i i n d o n betwwn
10
legislative, judicial and executive Powers or functions,
11
nor does it appear necessary to the purpose of h
12
constitutionalseparation of powers, to do so."
13
How do we determine when a violation of a
14
separation of powers occurs if it is this murky area?
16
The Ninth Circuit provides us with an answer in Chadha v. 16
Immigration and NaturalizationService, 634, F.Zd, 408,
17
wh~chis located IITab
I 8. The Court defines the
18
~ ~ ~ ~ t i t violation
~ t i ~ nofathe
l separation of powers as an
19
assumption by one branch of power; in other words, central 20
or essential to the operation of a branch, provided also
21
that the assumptiondisrupts the court and branch in the
22
peFfmance of its duties and it's unnecessaryto implementl 23
a legitimate policy of the government.
24
25
In this case, Your Honor, the Guidelines do
2s

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
should be disregarded by this Court. Now, except in Nixon
v. Administrator of General Services, whtch is located in
Tab 11,433 U.S. 425, Due Process. Can Ijust assert that
they have a property right in their occupational ltberty
and, therefore, they are entitled to proceduraldue
process. The right to pursue the plaintiffs' occupation rs
not being dented. Your Honor, as any agent that ISnot on
the 1st can pursue and continue to pumue their occupation
In any other parts of the state.
What is being contended, Your Honor, is the
plaintiffs assert that they are nat being allowed to
practice in a certain locale, a certain place of their
choice. Merely po&wsing a license to practice an
occupation does not entitle the person to choose where he
or she wants to work.
And Iwould direct the Court's attentton to
Tab 12, 16B Am.Jur. 2d, Constitotlonal Law, Section 592.
To put it into context, Your Honor, merely because Iam
licensed by the ldatio State Bar doss not ent$le me to work
for the Office ofthe Attorney General. I had to fulfill
other additional cnteria that they were looking for.
Regardless, plaintiffs are afforded due process under the
law, and the topic W been exhaustively covered in
briefing, and I will refer the Coucs attention to
Section 14 of the Guidelines.
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i Guidelines that is a valid request to ask for.

To address one of the arguments that Mr. McKay
made a moment aga regarding Section 14@),it is true,
Your Honor, that the bail agent has a choice that they
wubj attack any violation through the TCA's office or they
could go to the Court and petiffon. But the language that
14(b) uses is "and" shsh "or," which means that they can
preserve their right to a hearing by fling a petnion at
the same time that they challenge - through the same
challenge through the TCA's office. And Iwould respond
that by chooslng to only go through the TCA office that
they walve their rfght to a predeprivatlonperiod if kt
comes to that point.
Great or irreparable injury. Taking a look at
the Aitidavits demonstrates that the process works and the
status quo should be maintained over granting the extreme
remedy of a preliminary injunction. Rebecca Salinas's
Affidavit shows that on March 22,2007, the TCA petitioned
to have her name removed from the list because of a charge
filed against her wh~chwas not disclosed actually, two
charges, Your Honor, one for fraud for lnsufiident amount
in her cheddng account, and the second one for misdemeanor
stalking incidents.
The petition for removal was heard by the
court, Admnistmtive Judge Wtlliamson, and it was denied.
She was not removed from the list. The system works. And
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THE COURT: Do you think in that part~cular
circumstance it might have been a fair administrative step
to advise the bail agent that thsre Isn't a death
certificate, or Ms. and this letter may not be
suffcient; you may want to be there when the judge
considers thts so you can explain why you don't have one?
MR. KANG: It seems to me. Your Honor. based
on the Affidavlt of Mr Charney, the bail agent d i i have
knowledge of that. Because Mr. Chamey was employed to THE COURT: After the fact, though, wasn't he?
After the denial?
MR. KANG: I apologize, Your Honor
escapes me on tha
THE
. It's not critical I'm just
saying that a
se, particularly where you have
handwritten notes on there, or if that note had been
stamped on there and it had been sent back a copy would
have been sent to the bail agentin a limety fashion so
they could have elther appeared or made some record why
they couldn't get a coroneZs report or a death
certtficate,they at least would have gotten an extension
of time, at least arguably you would have. It seems to me
thars one of the complaints they have is their relatively
wooden approach to it says it's got to be on blue paper.

-

-
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1

Iwill direct the Court's attention to the Memorandum in
Support of the Motion to Strike, which has that Order, and
also to Mr. McKay's Affidavit which contains a transcript
of that hearing.
Mr. Chamey's Affidavit discusses various
incidents. W e v e r , all of Ulem have been resolved.
First, ttiefe was some issues regardii judges relying on
the Trial Court Administrator's office's handwritten
motions, and denying motionto exonerate without a hearing.
They appealed that decision, Your Honor, and they've won.
The system works.
Plaintiffs were advised by the TCA that an
appeal bond has to be in cash. Mr.Chamey stated in his
Affidavit thal he contacted Administrative District Judge
Williamson personalty and got that issue nsohred. And
Judge WiKiamson conceded that a *rstdeh or slated
that a cashier's ch& is the same as cash in her eyes.
There is no issue there.
Mr. Chamey discusses an incident where a
Motion to Set Aside Forkdture was filed and denied,
because it was not accompanied by a death certificate or a
coroner's re*.
The coroner's report and death
wtificate is what validates the dalm of death,
Your Honor. To be exonerated on that basis we would
require some sort of proof. And so l believe under the

-
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1 If irs not on blue paper - even if it's the right thing
2 on pink paper -you know, that type of thing. And I'm not
3 sure those all rise to due process issue. But they sure
4 arise to nltplcklng Irritations.
6
MR. W G : Your Honor, I wiU state that if
6 those are matters that they want to address through the
7 amendment of the Guidelines, J W e W~liiamsonhas had an
8 open door policy in listening to those suggestions. as
8 stated in her Affidavit. And as seen from the Guideiines
10 that were presented to the Court with the Eates stamps.
11 there are numerous amendments to the Guidelines in an
12 effort by the Court to Work with bail agents in
13 streamlining and makimg it better for everybody.
14
THE COURT: Okay.
15
MR.KANO: Mr. Chemey next talks about how he
16 cantacted the T W an behalf of a baii agent who was
17 voluntarily removed from the list at the employer's
18 request. Under the Guidelines, Your Honor, when an
19 employer and this is under 1 % ~-when
)
an employer

-

20 requests that an agent be removed we give deference to that
21 employer and automatically remove that person from the
22 kt.
23
Now, as saon as that person Is remowd, we
24 do the TCA office does provlda immediately a
25 notificatlan to that agent so that they can preserve their

-
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I right to remain on that list. Now, the agent in this case,
1 as representedby Mr. McKay, Iguess, was leavingthe bail
I bond business for a different occupation of real estate.
I And Ibelieve when you do leave, yw know, there are other
5 arcumstancesthat could come back or could arise during
i your absence, and IW i v e that the Court and the TCA 1 or the Court has the authority to ask for a petitionfor
B reinstatement lo those matters.
Sunshine Musi&, where the bail agent received
4
0 two violations for not erwuring payment on two forfeitures.
I She was warned by the TCA that two more vidatlons could
2 lead to removal from the list. However, the bonds ended up
3 getting paid, and that is reflected In the Motion for
4 Consol~dation.
W E COORT: Let's talk about that. though,
5
6 just a minute. That's one of the things that really causes
7 me some puzzlement is that where a bail agent has a Power
8 of Attorney and is the agent for a surely, but 1s
19 terminated from that, whether voluntarity by the surety or
!O by her own choice, then how can she still be held liable on
!l the bond?
!2
I recognue m this case it all got resolved
!3 because somebody paid the bonds. But the process started
out saying, "So you no longer work for this bonding
3!!
company. We don't care. You get it paid or else we're

I that's just a representationI'm making to the Court.
M E COURT: They want the agent, then, to
2
3 contact the surety MR. KANG: Correct.
il
THE COURT: but they've already contacted
5
6 the surety. What are they trying to do7
MR. KANG: Well, I think that by do~ngthe
7
8 "cc" they're just givlng notice to everybody. But the
9 ultimate responsibility for getling the matter resolved
0 lies with the bail agents.
THE COURT: On what theory?
1
MR. KANG: On the theory that the custody of
2
3 the defendant was released into the bail agent's care.
Next, let's take up Mr. Gerske's Affidavb,
4
5 He states that the eppkcations of two bail agents were
6 denied because of past criminal history Their
7 applications were resubmitted, reviewed, and denled once
18 again based on their cnmtnal history, Your Honor. And I
19 would just state that is a reflection of the Fourth
!O Judicial District's pollcy of taklng matters of their
L l character and to whom they release the defendant very
22 seriously. And that is what the effect of the Guidelines
13 is.
14
Mr. Ganke next states that he was removed
25 from the list for failure to pay. He mistakenly believed
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MR. KANG: And under the Guidelines, Your
Honor, it isn't that we hold the bail agent penonally
liabie for the payment We're asking them to contact the
proper patiis. If she had an insurance surety at the time
that s b made that bond, to contad them and say, "Look,
there was a forfeiture."
THE COURT: Why doesn't the Guideline say
that, if that's what you're trying to do? Because that
isn't what it says. It says that we want you to ensure the
payment of this.
MR. KANG: And Iwould state that ensure, I
guess, could be taken two ways. But our position is that
"ensure" means that we require you to take further effort
into getting the amount paid.
M E COURT: And that's one of the reasons why
I Suggested she change in statute might eliminate some of
those issues if you were giving those to the surety as
opposed to the bail agent.
MR. KANG: And as a matter of practice
again, this is not in the record, but I also did the
argument for the 'In re %eter" caw. And during that
case, and talking with the TCA's office, they informed me
that when they do send out those letters, they do "cc" the
insurance surety. Again, that's not in the Guidelines;

-

1
2
3
4
6
6
7
8
9

20
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
22

it was for another matter. l believe this was involving
the Grieve incident And when he realizedwhat had
happened he immediately paid and was reinstatedon the
list. There may have been a mix-up. It was his ultimate
responsibility. He didn't pay, but when he did pay, he was
immediately reinstated. The system works.
Wtth regard to Almwaz, Mr. Garcia states that
he did not request her name to be removed from the Irst.
He was uncertainwhether she would be remaining in the
office, when she was transferredto the Cafifornia offices.
However, Mr. Garske dms not agree that he did not abide by
the terms of the Guidelines in which the supe~singagent
is requiredto report to the TCA's office when an agent is
no longer working.
And so rather than saying that he abided by
Ute terms, he just provides 6 rationale fer why it was not
followed. And Idon? think that has any impact with
regard to Irreparableinjuty.
The Injuries alleged have been rectmed, and
demonstrate that the system works, Ywr Honor that the
Guidelines work. Tb& plaintiffs asked the Cowt to grant a
preliminary injunctionon the basis of future actions that
may occur fe$arding defense of vioiations. This is not an
immediate need or demonstrated greater need for injwy,
irreparableinjwy; that was a preliminary injunction which

-
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3
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/
1

1

I1
12

is to be granted only in extreme cases.
The Affdavits reflect that the system works
and therefore the status quo should be maintainedand the
request for preliminary injunction denied. In conclusion,
Your Honor, the plaintiffs have failed to meet their
burden, demonstrating reasonable likelihood of success or
irreparable great orifrepafable injury to the granting
of a preliminary injunction, either under the theory of the
contract 3 stated by State vs. Abracadabra, or on an
individual basis aside from contract principle. And for
the foregoing reasons the State and defendantswhouM
respectfully request that the Court deny the preliminary
injunction and maintain the status quo at shti time. May I
stand for any questions?
THE COURT No.
MR. KANG: Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. M a y : ItoM you that Iwas not gong to
caU any witnesses, but I -the Court Identified In h i
question of counsel a number of issues that I t h i i would
be resolved if the Court had in front of it the actual bond
and surety agreement that Aladdin uses. In the middle of
counsel's presentation here an employee of Aladdin ran
downstairs and grabbed a stack of bonds that had been
exonerated from today's proceedings. So Iwould propose
to and counsel hasn't seen this, Iknow.

-
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THE COURT: It will be marked as a Court's
exhibit and stuck in the file so we have it in the record.
(The Court's exhibit was marked.)
MR. McKAY: Thank you, Your Honor. And I
think that you see in this agreement you see an
inscription of an amount quite different than that
representedby mmel for the defendant. You see in this
papenwk Lincoln General InsuranceCompany. which accessed
the surety and Ute guarantor associatedwith the defendant.
And there's no mention of any obligation on the part of the
bail agent, who has responsibility for ensuring the
appearanceof a defendant, or uMmate respons~bilityfor
payment of the bond, if there has been a failure on the
part of the defendant to appear.
Counsel has also pointed out, and polnttngthe
Coun to the l~cense a copy of the llcense Department
of Insurance license for Rebecce Sal~naswhich Is found at
Tab 3 of its submissions to the Cwrt. i Wink counsel
simply misreads the ~ P ofYthe k m e . This license does
not say that Rebecca Salines is a surety. What it says is
this is the line of insurancethat she is involved in. She
is involved in the surety l i e of insurance. And that is
consistentwith the bail bond and the Power of Attomey
that we've just entered into the record here.
Counsel made mentionof under 14(b) a bail

I
I

-

--
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THE COURT: Why don't you show it to him and
see if he's going to have any objection. You may not need
a witness.
MR. McKAY; Your Honor, I have a stack of
these bonds, and they're all -you can grab one out of the
middle. They're all the same, except for the defendant's
name.
THE COURT: Why don1you give me one and I11
make sure the Clerk makes copies lor everyone of the
specific one we have.
MR. McKAY: Yes. Your Honor. I'm handing
the Court a copy of a Power of Attorney and bail bond
an actual original not a copy, but the original Power
of Attomey and bail bond in connection with the
Roderick &own case in which bond in the amounl of $1,000
was posted by AIaddin Bail Bonds and their surely, Lincoln
Genenl (sic) Imliince Company. And I understand the
State does not
THE COURT: You're offering that as an
exemplat?
MR. M c W : l am.
THE COURT: And I'lltake it and make sure
there is a photocopy of that, and the original will be
returned to you before we leave today.
MR. CHOU: Thank you, Your Hmar.

-
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1 agent having a choice of whether to file a petition andtor
attempting to cure the deflckrncy identified by the TCA.
And It h M that Ignores the situation where the bail agent
4 recognizes that there is a deficiency. And that at least
5 under the Guidelines as presently configured, that the TCA
6 was correct in identifying that as a violation of the
7 Guidelines. So rather than pay a filing fee, rather than
8 hiring counsel to representthe bail agent who chalrenged
9 , that. me bail agent slmply tries to cure the deficiency.
10
If, in the opinion of the TCA or the assistant
II TCA, he or she does not cure that deficiency, he or she can
12 be removed from the list without notice, without an
13 opportunity to be heard.
14
THE COURT: And whether U~at'sa violation of
15 due process depends on how much process is due. And that
16 may be something that could be tixed with a discussion of
17 changes in the ball bond Guidelines, even?
18
MR. McKAY: Yes. Coonsel makes reference
19 to all of these various issues have been resolved. And I
20 know Idon't mean to pounce on Your Honor's words, but
21 in the Sunshlne Musick case you make reference"that all
22 got resolved." It's really not resolved. She has two
23 violations that are counted as violations. Under the
24 Guidelines, after she gets four violations. the TCA's
25 of&%can peaon for her removal. Mr. Garske has
2
3

I
I
I

(

-

1
1

-
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Iknow the Court indicated Ishould be short

t according to this recent letter he received, has six

1

violations.
3
So even these what are often fairly trivial
4 violations, even though they have been redressed, they're
5 still violations. And the TCA's office still has at her
6 disposal the ability to petition for the removal of these
7 bail agents
8
THE COURT: Isn't there a provision in there
9 where you can petitionthe Administrative District Judge to
0 remove these violations?
1
MR.M W Y : I thlnk that to remove a person
2 after a fourth violation requlres a petition which will
3 trigger
4
M E COURT: No. No. Where the bail agent can
5 petttion the Adminlstratlve District Judge to remove a
6 violation?
7
MR. McKAY: Yes.
8
(To Mr. Garske): Ithink the Court is right
19 about that.
!O
MR. GARSKE: Yes.
!1
MR. McKAY Iwould adml it would often be an
!2 exercise in futility if there was an actual vldation. If
23 there had been some technical violation of
24
THE COURT: That may be true.
25
MR. McKAY: of these Guidelines.

2 and Ithink Ihave been short. And I'II sit down and be
3 quiet, unless the Court has any further questions.
THE COURT: Idon't have any further
4
5 questions. Ithink, because there's an interrelationship
6 between the issues raised by the Motion to Dism~ssand
7 this, 11' 1probably issue one opinion on that and try and
8 dothat
9
Iguess Iwould conclude this you'll get
10 your copy of the bond thing. Iwould conclude, as l
11 started saying, that Ithink all parttes need to take a
12 careful look at what the changes in the 2007 legtslatron
13 were. And it seems to me that they provide a at least a
14 starting point to look at trying to beak Ilike that
15 word, tweak these Guideiines that may remove some of th
16 problems and smooth the processtng of the.
17
Ihave every confidence that Judge Will~amson
18 does desire to try and make a smooth-operating, and ever
19 running court system here, and to the extent they can savt
2 0 any time by reducing administrative logs on the Trial Coud
2 1 Administrator, she's probably going to be interested in
22 that, as long as it will still keep within what she
23 believes is the power of the administrative of the
24 courts to regulate its business.
25
And certainly almost all of the cases out

2

-

-

-

-

-
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THE COURT: That may be [rue.
MR. McKAY: Counsel refers to the and
there's some colloquy between the Court and counsel
these handwritten notes of the Trial Court Administrator
and then an appeal to Judge McKee, and that resolvedit.
Well, there was two appeals to Judge McKee for the exact
same thing. The TCA's office wrote on one of these motions
this u n s w n unsworn representation. which was not
provided to Aladdin.
Aladdin appealed to Judge McKee. They
prevailed. Judge McKee issued a written decis'm. And
following that written decision it happens again within a
short period of time. And again, Aladdii is forced to
retain counsel, file another appeal, pursue it with
Judge McKee, and yet they appeal again. But it's this
day-today it's this day-today, week-to-week operation
of Guidelines, and pmblem alter problem and e m i t u r n 01
legal resources, and the company's resources just in having
to deal with this that create the irreparablejury that
I l e described.
Iknow Ihave great respect for
Judge Williamson. Her Affidavit does, in fact, refer to an
open door policy. We've tried that. We've bied. And
here we are. Ithink this lawsuit is a fundion of not
being able to get there with that open door policy.

-
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there that have been sat on, both sides indicate that the
courts have some at a minimum, have some power to ust
some regulation of who are the sureties and bail agents
that appear in those clause in theu courts.
Now, what the parameters of that are, are, I
guess, some of the things I'm going to try and resdve, to
the extent Ican, on the motions as they posturethis
matter. It's not a submission of the entire case to me. I
understand that Sometimes we all get impatient and want
to rush ahead and get it all resolved, and that may not be
the course we take on this. We will take it in small steps
and see what we can come up with.
But Iencourage you to use some of this time
to take a serious look at maybe you want to go in and
address trying to resolve some of those ksues.
Particularly I'm concerned with the one that ! think is
one of the linchpins on this, is thls notlce Issue and the
whole thlng about you can't deal directly with a surety
under the prior statute.

--

-

And I think Judge Eismann summed U~atup veFy
weU and vigorousty. the problem of trying to engraff a new
system on the statutes that basically haven't changed sin=
1860. Okay. We will get this exhibit to you. I'II k t
you know when Iget an opinion out on this thing.
MR.McKAY: Thank you.
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MR. KANG: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE CLERK: All rise, please.

(Whereupon, the proceedings were
concluded at 2:37p.m.)
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5
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TWO JINN, INC., dba AUDDIN B
BONDS and ANYTIME BAIL
BONDS; JAMES GARSKE; AND
SHANTARA CARLOCK,
Plaintrgs,
VS.

1

case NO.

CV OC 07 06619

)

ORDER ADDING
ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT

)

TO RECORD ON APPEAL

1

DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH )
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE )
OF IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON,)
)
in her official capacity as
Administrative District Judge;
1
LARRY D. REINER, in his official
capacity as Trial Court
1
Administrator; and DIANE
BURRELL, in her official capacity as)
Assistant Trial Court Administrator, )
Defendants.

1

The Reporter's Transcript in the above matter was lodged on July 22,

2009. The parties have stipulated to add a transcript of the August 24, 2007
proceeding to the Reporter's Transcript.
Good cause appearing and pursuant to I.A.R. 22, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that:

1. The Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings held on August 24, 2007 in
the above matter, which was certified by Jeanne M. Hirmer, RPR, CSR on

00614
ORDER ADDING ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT TO RECORD ON APPEAL

Page I of 2

September 4, 2007 be added to the record on appeal in ldaho Supreme
Court Docket Number 36476-2009.
DATED this

day of August, 2009

CERTIfICATE OF SERVICE

3

I hereby certify that on the
*day of August, 2009 a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed. postage prepaid or, if the Fax service block is checked, sent a copy via
facsimile to:

Fax Service j
David Z. Nevin
Scott McKay
Robyn Fyffe
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701-2772

; I

d

345-8274

+ kcrnL

I Steven L. Olsen

\ Michael S. Gilrnoie
1 Karl T. Klein
Melissa Moody
Deputy Attorneys General
j P.O. Box 83720
j Boise, ldaho 83720-0010
:

Fax
Service.

w
854-8073

f CLS~U$IL

Clerk of the mtrict Court

00615
ORDER ADDING ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPT TO RECORD ON APPEAL
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NO.

LAWRENCE WASDEN

ATTORNEY GENERAL
STEVEN
L. OLSEN,
Chief of Civil Litigation
MICHAEL
S. GILMORE,
ISB # 1625
MELISSA
MOODY,ISB # 6027
Deputy Attorneys General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Telephone:
michael.gilmore@ag.idaho.~!ov
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation duly
qualified to do business in Idaho and doing
business as Aiaddin Bail Bonds and Anytime
Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; and
SHANTARA CARLOCK,

)

)
)
)
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross Appellants, )
)

VS.

1

DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her
official capacity as Administrative District Judge
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District; LARRY D. REINER, in his official
capacity as Trial Court Administrator for the
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District; and
DIANE BURRELL, in her capacity as Assistant
Trial Court Administrator for the District Court
of the Fourth Judicial District,
Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellants.

Case No. CV OC 07066 19
STIPULATION TO ADD
SUPREME COURT ORDER
TO RECORD ON APPEAL

The parties, through their respective attorneys, hereby stipulate and agree that the
attached August 4, 2005 Idaho Supreme Court Order be added to the record on appeal in Idaho
Supreme Court Docket Number 36476-2009.

DATED this

1q

day of August 2009.
STATE
OF IDAHO
OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

MELISSA
MOODY
Deputy Attorneys General
Attorneys for Defendants-AppellantsCross Respondents
DATED this

day of August 2009.
NEVIN,BENJAMIN,
MCKAY& BARTLETT
LLP

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-RespondentsCross Appellants

The parties, though their respective attorneys, hereby stipulate and agree that the
attached August 4,2605 Idaho Supream Court Order be added to the record on appeal in Idaho
Supreme Court Docket Number 364762009,

DATED this

1q

day of August 2009.

STATEOF IDAHO
Off ICEOF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

MEUSSAMOODY
Deputy Attonteys General
Attorneys for Defendants-Appe1Iant;sCross Respondents
DATED this

p.
day of August 2009.

NEVM,BENJAMIN,
MCKAY& E~ARTLETT LLP

Attorneys for ~lsintiffo-~es~onden'tsCross Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21 day of August 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to:
Scott McKay
.
~
.
6
'
Robyn Fyffe
LLP
NEVIN,BENJAMIN,
MCKAY& BARTLETT
P.O. Box 2772
303 West Bannock
Boise, ID 83701

CHAMBERS COPY:
Honorable James J. Judd
6498 N. Antler Place
Boise, ID 83703

@

Mail
Hand Delivery
Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
Overnight Mail
C]Facsimile: (208) 746-0753
Statehouse Mail

a

@US.Mail
Hand Delivery
Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested
C]Overnight Mail
Facsimile:
C] Statehouse Mail

Deputy Attorney General

STIPULATIONTO ADDSUPKEME
COURT
ORDERTO RECORDON APPEAL - 3

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
IN RE: ADmSTRATTVE DISTRICT )
JUDGE - JOB DESCRIPTI.ON * POWER 1
AND .DUTES
1

ORDER

followingjob description for Administrative District Judges, to read as follows, and the Court
being m y informed;
NOW, THEREFOTCE, IT IS HERBBY ORDERED,the job description f ~Administrative
r
District Judge be, and is hereby, adppted as follows:

-

ADMINISWTIVE DISTRICT JUDGE - JOB DESCRIPTION POWERS AND DUTIES
Under Idaho Code $ 1-907, the administrativejudge of each judicial district has adminispi-ttive
supervision and authority over the operation of the district courts and magistrate division in the
district. The administrative judge's role is an integral part of the administration bf the judicial
system. Under article V, section 2 of the Idaho Constitution, the courts.constitute a unified and
integrated judicial system under the administration anif supervision of the Suprime Court. The
Supreme Court maintains flexibility in carrying out its constihitional and,statutory mandates in
.
managing and mrpervising a unified court system by delegation of authority to the admurrstrative
director of the courts, the administrativejudges and the trial court administrators. Consequently,
the following list of powers and duties should not be: viewed as exhaustive or limiting, and the
administrative district judge retains such inherent power as needed to carry out the duties of the
office.
The administrative judge, subject to the rules of the stp'rernk Court, has administrative
supervision abd authority over the operation of the district courts and magistrate division in the
district. The powers aad duties of the administrative judge include, but are not limited to, all
those powers and duties set forth in statute or in other rules of the Supreme Court, as well as the
following:
(1)

meet with county commissioners and other county and local officials.within the
district on budgets and other matters,, and foster productive relationships with
such officials to secure sufficient funding for the operation of the courts;
'

(2)

supervise the business of the judicial district and court calendars in such m e r
as to insure the expeditious and efficient processing of all cwes and equitable

I

distribution of the district court caseload among the district judges, and of the
magistrate division caseload among the magistrate judges;
monitor the status of court dockets and calendars, and, where appropriate,
implement improved methods and systems of managing dockets and caseloads;
discuss any problems of delays ih. resolving cases with district judges or
magistrate judges, offer aSsistance in addressing such delays, and take remedial
action;
encourage Ad promote the investigation, consideration and implementation of
innovative approaches to managing the court's business, solving problems and
addressing particular types of cases;
provide supervision and direction to the trial court administrator in the
performance of the duties of that off~ct;
seek the assistance of other perions in addressing issues affecting the improved
administiation of justice, by appointing codf$ees, calling meetings of district
judges or magistrate judges, or assigning individual district judges, magistrate
judges or other court personnel;

oversee the development and preparation of the annual budget request, and
approve and submit the budget request to the Supreme Court;
act as spokesperson for the court, within the district, in a l l matters with the
execritive and legislative branches of state and local government, and with
community groups;
~

establish .effective.relations between the court and the media, by scheduling
forums or other .opportunities for discussion with, the media, and by providing
general information to the media about the courts, the law, and court procedures
and practices, to the extent permitted by the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct;
attend meetings of the Administrative Conference;

conduct conferences of judges and clerks within the district;
(13)' preside at meetings of the district judges and/or magistrate judges within the
district;

(14)

in cooperation with local and state officials, develop plans and procedures for
insuring the security of courthouses and courtrooms, and address security
concerns identified by the district judges, magistrate judges or other court
personnel;

(15)
.

.
supervise the daily operations of thc courts, and oversee the employment and
supervision of all personnel in the performance of their court functions and in
court-related programs, consistent with suggested model agreements developed
by the Shared Employees Committee;

(16)

assign court reporters to attend court proceedings and perform the duties set forth
in Rule 27 of the Idaho Court Administrative Rules;

(17)

delegate powers and duties to judges and court personnel as necessary and

(18)

establish guidelines for bail bonds with regard to posting, forfeiture, exoneration
and all other matters;

(19)

perform such other duties,and exercise such powers as may be provided for by the
rules or orders of the Supreme Court.

IT IS FUR'IFER ORDERED,that this order shall be effective on the 15th day of August,

. 2005.
DATED this

day of August, 2005.

I
. .

ATTEST:

.*

.

,

,

--

NO.
A.M

FiLpM.
L/ ..35

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
TWO JINN, INC., dba ALADDIN BA
BONDS and ANYTIME BAIL
BONDS; JAMES GARSKE; AND
)
SHANTAUA CARLOCK,
1
Plaintiffs,

)

1

VS.

DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH )
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE )
OF IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON,)
in her official capacity as
Administrative District Judge;
LARRY D. REINER, in his official
1
capacity as Trial Court
Administrator; and DIANE
1
BURRELL, in her official capacity as)
Assistant Trial Court Administrator,
Defendants.

case NO.

CV OC 07 06619

ORDER ADDING
IDAHO SUPREME COURT
ORDER DATED
AUGUST 4,2005
TO RECORD ON APPEAL

)

A Transcript on appeal in the above matter was lodged on July 22,
2009. By a stipulation filed on August 21, 2009, the parties have stipulated
to add a copy of an ldaho Supreme Court Order dated August 4, 2005 that
was considered in this proceeding to the Clerk's Transcript.
Good cause appearing and assuming that the stipulation to this court
is timely, pursuant to I.A.R. 29, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The ldaho Supreme Court Order dated August 4, 2005 that was
ORDER ADDING IDAHO SUPREME COURT ORDER
DATED AUGUST 4,2005 TO RECORD ON APPEAL

considered by the court in the above matter, a copy of which is attached to
this order, be added to the record on appeal in ldaho Supreme Court Docket
Number 36476-2009,
DATED this

2 728!

day of August, 2009

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2 4 d-

I hereby certify that on the
day of August. 2009 a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid or, if the Fax service block is checked, sent a copy via
facsimile to:

Fax Service
David 2. Nevin
Scott McKay
Robyn ~yff;
NEVIN. BENJAMIN. McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ldaho 83701-2772

ORDER ADDING IDAHO SUPREME COURT ORDER
DATED AUGUST 4,2005 TO RECORD ON APPEAL

345-8274

Fax
Service.
Steven L. Oisen
Michael S. Gilmore
Karl T. Klein
Melissa Moody
Deputy Attorneys General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ldaho 83720-00110

d
854-8073
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In the Supreme Court of the State of ~ d a h b
INRE: ADMINJSTRATNEDISTRICT
JUDGE - 30B DESCWTION * POWER
A

Ill
Il
Ill

, DuTm

)
)

1

0R.DER

The Coyt reviewed a recommendation from th.c AriminiRtrativc Conference to adopt the
following~jobdescription for Adrninisuative District Judges, to read as follows, and the Court
.

being tirUy informed;

NOW, TNEREFOIU3, lT IS HeREBY ORD-,
District Judge be, and is h a b y , adopted as follows:

the job description for AdminisWve

Undtr Idaho Code $ 1-907, the administrative judge of each judicid district has administrative
supervision and authority over the operation of the district courts and magistrate division in the
district. The administrative judge's rot4 is an integral part of the adminiStration of the judicial
system. Under article V, soction 2 of the Idaho Constitution, the c
a
m constitute a unified and
integrated judicial system under the Bdministration and supervision of the Suprrht Court. The
Supreme Court maintains flexibility in carrying out its constitutional and statutory mandates in
managing and supervising a unified court system by delegation of autharity to the administrative
director of the courts, the administrativejudges and the trial cowt administrators. Consequently,
the fDihwing list of powers and duties should not be viewed as exhaustive or limiting, and the
administnrtive district judge retains such inherent power as needed to carry out the duties of the
office.
The ~ s ~ i judge,
v cmbjoct to the rules of tho ~&&emeCourt, has administrative
supervision &d authority 'overthe operation of the district.courtsand magistrate division in the
district. The powers and duties of the adainistrative judge include, but are not limited to, dl
those powers and duties set forth in statute or in other d m of the Supreme Caurf as well as the
f0Uowing:

(I)

commissioners and other county and local officials within the
district on budgets and other matters, and foster prodwtive relationships
with
'

meet with county

such officials to secure sufficient funding for the operation of tbe courts;
(2)

mpcrvise the business of the judicial district and court calendars in such manner
as to h u r t the expeditious and efficient processing of all cages and equitable

,&&;2z2
DISTRICT C#
O
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~
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S
*-~
fsB*
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distribution of thc didrict court caseload among the distri~tjudges, and of the
magistrate division cascload among the magistratejudges;

R
Il

(3)

monitor the status of court dockets and calendars, and, where appropriate,
implement improved methods and gystems of managing dockets and caseloads;

(4)

discuss any problems of deiap

(5)

encoorage &id promote the investigation, consideration and implementation of
innovative approaches to managing the court's business, solving problems and
addrtssing particular types of cases;

(6)

provide supervision md direction to the trial court administrator in the
performance of the duties of that office;

(7)

seek the assistanw of o t h a persons in addressing issues affecting the improved
adm'mis~tionof justice, by appointing committees, calling meetings of district
judges or magistrate judges, or assigning individual district judges, magistrate
judges or other court personnel;

(8)

oversee

(9)

act as spokesperson for the cowt, within (he districf in 611 mattes with the
exenitiyc and legislative branches of state and local. government, end with

ih resolving cases with district judges or
and t a b rmcdial

the development and preparation of the annual budget request, and
approve and submit the budget request to the Suprma Court;

c o m ~ t groups;
y
(10)

establish .effective' relatiow betwecn the court and the media, by scheduling
forums or other .oppalunities for discussion with, the media, and by providing
general infomation to the media about the courts,, the law, and court procedurrx
and practices, to the extcnt permitted by the Idaho Code of Judiciral Conduct;

(1 1)

attend meetings of the Adminbtrative Conference;

(12)

conduct conferences of judges and c1mk.s within ttre

(13)'

preside at meetings of the district judges andfor magistrate judges within the
w e t ;

(14)

in cooperation with local and state ofticials, develop plans and procedures for
insuring the security of courthou6ts and coutrooms, and address security
concerns identified by the district judges, magistrate jwlgcs or other court
pusomel;
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(15)

supervise tho daily operations of the courts, aad oversee the employment and
supervision of all personnel in the perfonnmce of their court functions and in
court-related programs, consistent with suggested model agreements developed
by the Shared Employees Committee;

(1 6)

assign court reporters to attad court pt-o~ecdiDgsn d perform the duties sd forth
in Rule 27 of the Idaho Court Administrative Rules;

(7 8)
(19)

mtablish guidelines for bail bonds with regard td posting, forfeiture, cxonnaticn
and dl other mattas;

perform such other duties and exercise such powers as may be provided for by the
rules or orders of the Supreme Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that this order shall be effective on the 15th day of August,

